Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Murphy v Caterpillar Inc.
Brian J. Murphy, a former employee of Caterpillar Inc., alleged that he was constructively discharged due to age discrimination and retaliation for previous legal actions against the company. Murphy, who began working for Caterpillar in 1979, had a long history of positive performance reviews and promotions. In 2000, he was placed on a performance action plan and subsequently fired after complaining about age discrimination. He sued Caterpillar, won a retaliation claim, and was reinstated in 2005. In 2018, after successfully leading a significant project, Murphy was placed on another performance action plan that he argued was designed for him to fail.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of Caterpillar on all claims. The court found that Murphy did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claims of age discrimination and retaliation. Murphy appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Murphy presented enough evidence to support a reasonable inference of pretext and unlawful intent regarding his age discrimination claim. The court noted that the performance action plan was flawed, as it included a deadline that had already passed and was signed off as failed before Murphy had a chance to comply. This, along with Murphy's consistent positive performance reviews, suggested that the plan was a pretext for discrimination. However, the court affirmed the summary judgment on Murphy's retaliation claim, citing the long gap between his previous lawsuit and the adverse action, and the lack of evidence of retaliatory animus.The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision on the age discrimination claim, allowing it to proceed to trial, but affirmed the decision on the retaliation claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Murphy v Caterpillar Inc." on Justia Law
Oye v Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company
Olayinka Oye, a director at PricewaterhouseCoopers, applied for long-term disability benefits through her employer's plan, administered by Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company, due to fibromyalgia. Initially, Hartford denied her claim but later reversed its decision and awarded her benefits. In 2020, Hartford reevaluated her condition and terminated her benefits, concluding she was no longer disabled. Oye filed a lawsuit seeking to reinstate her benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois conducted a "paper trial" and found that Oye's fibromyalgia, while limiting, did not render her disabled under the plan. The court noted that consultative reports from Hartford's doctors, which were detailed and tied to Oye's medical records, outweighed the brief and conclusory letters from Oye's treating physicians. Additionally, the court found that Oye's mental health issues contributed significantly to her limitations, disqualifying her from additional benefits under the plan.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, emphasizing that the district court owed no deference to Hartford's prior determination of disability. The appellate court found no clear error in the district court's findings, noting that the district court carefully considered the evidence and provided adequate reasoning for its decision. The court also addressed Oye's contention that the district court should have discussed a 2017 consultative report, concluding that the district court was not obligated to address every piece of evidence and had reasonably focused on more recent reports. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Hartford. View "Oye v Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company" on Justia Law
Anderson v. United Airlines
Employees of United Airlines, including pilots, flight attendants, and other staff, challenged the company's COVID-19 vaccination mandate and masking requirement issued in 2021. United required employees to either get vaccinated or apply for religious or medical exemptions by specific deadlines. Plaintiffs alleged that despite submitting or attempting to submit exemption requests, they were either fired, placed on unpaid leave, or subjected to a hostile work environment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice, finding that they had not stated any viable claim for relief despite having sufficient opportunities to do so. The court addressed each of the plaintiffs' twelve claims, noting that many were forfeited due to the plaintiffs' failure to respond to substantive arguments. The court also found deficiencies in the proposed amended complaints and ultimately dismissed the action with prejudice after determining that further amendments would be futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs' claims were either improperly preserved or inadequately pled. The court found that the plaintiffs had forfeited their FDCA, invasion of privacy, and negligence claims by failing to address the district court's findings of forfeiture. The court also upheld the dismissal of the Illinois Whistleblower Act claim, as the plaintiffs did not show how receiving a COVID-19 vaccine would violate federal regulations. Additionally, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Title VII claims due to the plaintiffs' failure to obtain right-to-sue letters from the EEOC, which is a prerequisite for such lawsuits. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not err in denying further opportunities to amend the complaint. View "Anderson v. United Airlines" on Justia Law
Lukaszczyk v Cook County
In August 2021, the Cook County Health and Hospitals System implemented a policy requiring all personnel to be fully vaccinated against infectious diseases, including COVID-19. Exemptions were allowed for disability, medical conditions, or sincerely held religious beliefs. Plaintiffs, who are healthcare employees or contractors, requested religious exemptions, which were granted. However, the accommodation provided was a transfer to unpaid status pending termination, with a limited time to find a non-existent remote position. Plaintiffs argued this was religious discrimination violating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois previously denied plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunctions against the vaccine mandates, including Cook County’s. The Seventh Circuit affirmed this denial, rejecting the plaintiffs' facial challenge to the mandate. On remand, plaintiffs amended their complaint but were denied permission to add a claim under the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act until after the court ruled on the County’s motion to dismiss. The district court dismissed the second amended complaint, considering it a facial challenge, which had already been ruled upon.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs waived their as-applied challenge by not raising it in the district court or their opening brief on appeal. The court also noted that plaintiffs conceded they no longer sought injunctive relief and did not pursue a facial challenge. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the constitutional claim. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint to include the Illinois RFRA claim. The court criticized the plaintiffs' counsel for poor advocacy and procedural errors. View "Lukaszczyk v Cook County" on Justia Law
Napier v Orchard School Foundation
James Napier, the Director of the Middle School at the Orchard School, was not renewed for his contract in 2019 following orders from the new Head of School, Dr. Sherri Helvie. Napier, believing his termination was due to his sex, filed an employment discrimination suit against Orchard. After being rejected when he reapplied for his position, he added a retaliation claim to his lawsuit.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of Orchard on both claims. The court concluded that Napier had not presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. Specifically, the court found that Napier failed to show that his sex was the reason for his termination and that there was no connection between his protected activity and the rejection of his reapplication.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Napier did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Helvie's reason for terminating him—breaching her trust—was pretextual. The court noted that Helvie's explanation for the termination was consistent and credible. Additionally, the court found that Napier's retaliation claim failed because there was no evidence that his litigation was the but-for cause of Orchard's decision not to rehire him. The court concluded that the decision was based on Napier's past performance issues and the fractured relationship with Helvie. View "Napier v Orchard School Foundation" on Justia Law
Davis v Illinois Department of Human Services
Dyamond Davis, an employee at the Shapiro Development Center, informed her supervisor on May 12, 2017, that she needed to leave work due to pregnancy-related morning sickness. Her supervisor allowed her to leave, reminding her to complete the necessary paperwork. Davis was later granted FMLA leave retroactive to May, but DHS determined that part of her May 12 absence was unauthorized because it believed FMLA did not cover morning sickness and that Davis violated policies requiring the substitution of accrued paid leave for FMLA leave. Consequently, DHS terminated her employment. Davis appealed her termination unsuccessfully to the Illinois Civil Service Commission and then filed a lawsuit alleging FMLA interference. Another employee, Antionette Burns, joined the lawsuit with a similar claim.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois dismissed Burns’s claim for lack of Article III standing and granted summary judgment in favor of DHS on Davis’s claim. The court found that Burns failed to establish a concrete injury-in-fact and that DHS was entitled to rely on the medical certification provided by Davis’s doctor, which did not indicate a need for intermittent leave for morning sickness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of Burns’s claim without prejudice, agreeing that she failed to establish a concrete injury-in-fact. However, the court found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding Davis’s FMLA claim. The court noted that morning sickness qualifies as a serious health condition under FMLA and that DHS was aware of Davis’s need for intermittent leave due to morning sickness. The court also found that DHS may have improperly applied its paid leave substitution policy, which could have led to Davis’s termination. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for DHS on Davis’s claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Davis v Illinois Department of Human Services" on Justia Law
Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Event Media Inc.
Event Media Inc. and Pack Expo Services, LLC, were contributing employers to the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund. Both companies withdrew from the Fund and incurred withdrawal liability obligations. The dispute centers on how to calculate these obligations, specifically whether post-2014 contribution rate increases should be included in the calculation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, held that the employers' post-2014 contribution rate increases should be excluded from the calculation of their withdrawal liability payments. The court reasoned that these increases were required by a rehabilitation plan and thus should be disregarded under 29 U.S.C. § 1085(g)(3).The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the post-2014 contribution rate increases were indeed required by the rehabilitation plan and should be excluded from the calculation of the employers' withdrawal liability payments. The court concluded that neither of the exceptions outlined in 29 U.S.C. § 1085(g)(3)(B) applied in this case, as the increases were not due to increased levels of work, employment, or periods for which compensation is provided, nor were they used to provide an increase in benefits permitted by subsection (f)(1)(B). Therefore, the Fund must use the 2014 contribution rate, not the higher 2019 rate, in calculating the employers' withdrawal liability payments. View "Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Event Media Inc." on Justia Law
Nawara v Cook County Municipality
John Nawara, a former correctional officer at Cook County Jail, had several altercations with other county employees. As a result, the Cook County Sheriff's Office required him to undergo a fitness-for-duty examination and sign medical information release forms. Nawara initially resisted but eventually complied. Before doing so, he sued Cook County and Sheriff Thomas Dart, alleging that the examination requirement and inquiry into his mental health violated § 12112(d)(4) of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found in favor of Nawara, but the jury awarded him zero damages. Nawara filed a post-trial motion requesting back pay, lost pension benefits, and restoration of his seniority. The court granted the restoration of seniority but denied the request for back pay, concluding that the violation of § 12112(d)(4) could not support an award of back pay. Nawara appealed the denial of back pay, and the Sheriff cross-appealed the restoration of seniority.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision to restore Nawara's seniority, finding that it could still benefit him in his current role as a police officer within the Sheriff's Office. However, the court reversed the district court's denial of back pay. The Seventh Circuit held that a violation of § 12112(d)(4) of the ADA constitutes discrimination on the basis of disability, thus entitling Nawara to request back pay. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Nawara v Cook County Municipality" on Justia Law
Kinder v Marion County Prosecutor’s Office
Susan Kinder, a white woman, was employed by the Marion County Prosecutor’s Office (MCPO) and alleged racial discrimination when she was reassigned to a new role. She claimed violations of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. Kinder had conflicts with a black colleague, Lydia Richardson, who accused her of making racially insensitive remarks. An investigation found the animosity was mutual. The prosecutor decided to reassign both employees, but Kinder viewed her new role as a demotion.The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued a right-to-sue letter on April 28, 2022, but Kinder’s counsel could not access it until July 6, 2022. Kinder filed her complaint on October 4, 2022, alleging Title VII and Equal Protection Clause violations. The MCPO moved for summary judgment, arguing the Title VII claim was untimely and that the office was not a suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment to the MCPO, finding the Title VII claim was filed outside the 90-day window and that the MCPO was an arm of the state, immune from § 1983 claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the 90-day period for filing the Title VII claim began when Kinder’s counsel was notified on June 15, 2022, that the right-to-sue letter was available, making the October 4 filing untimely. The court also held that the MCPO is an arm of the state and not a suable “person” under § 1983, as the office is financially interdependent with the state and enjoys state indemnification for employment-related actions. View "Kinder v Marion County Prosecutor's Office" on Justia Law
Siddiqui v National Association of Broadcast Employees & Tec
Members of a local union sued their national parent organization for imposing an illegal trusteeship. The plaintiffs, members of NABET-CWA Local 41, claimed that the national union imposed the trusteeship in bad faith following a local officer election. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and issued a temporary restraining order, later converting it into a preliminary injunction. The parties eventually settled, resulting in a consent judgment that dissolved the trusteeship and required the national union to pay Local 41 approximately $26,000 in trusteeship costs. The only unresolved issue was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees. The court acknowledged its broad discretion and the American Rule, which presumes against fee shifting. It considered two exceptions: bad faith and common benefit. The court found that while the national union acted in bad faith in imposing the trusteeship, both parties litigated the dispute in good faith, thus not justifying fee shifting. Additionally, the court recognized that the plaintiffs conferred common benefits on Local 41 and the national union but concluded that these benefits were not substantial enough to merit an award of attorneys' fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling, finding that the lower court had appropriately applied the American Rule and its exceptions. The district court's decision to deny attorneys' fees was deemed reasonable and within its broad discretion, as it provided a sound explanation for its conclusions. The appellate court emphasized the highly deferential standard of review for such decisions and upheld the district court's judgment. View "Siddiqui v National Association of Broadcast Employees & Tec" on Justia Law