Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

School district was not required to accommodate an administrator, whose disability precluded being “in the vicinity of potentially unruly students.” Brown was an assistant principal for Milwaukee Public Schools until she badly injured her knee while restraining a student. When she returned to work following surgery, she and her doctor stated that she could not be “in the vicinity of potentially unruly students.” Since virtually all students are “potentially” unruly, Milwaukee Schools understood that limit to bar virtually all student contact. It repeatedly communicated that understanding to Brown as it tried to find her a new position. When Brown’s three-year leave of absence expired before a suitable position was found, she was fired. Brown sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, claiming that her disability had never prevented interaction with students and that Milwaukee Schools failed to accommodate her disability. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Milwaukee Schools. All but one of the other jobs Brown identified as reasonable accommodations would have required proximity to students. The lone exception would have been a promotion for which Brown was not the most qualified candidate. The Act did not require Milwaukee Schools to promote her as an accommodation. View "Brown v. Milwaukee Board of School Directors" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit upheld Milwaukee's residency requirement for law enforcement and emergency personnel. Milwaukee’s corporate charter previously required all city employees to live within city limits. In 2013, the Wisconsin legislature prohibited local governments from imposing a residency requirement as a condition of employment, exempting requirements that law enforcement, fire, or emergency personnel reside within 15 miles of jurisdictional boundaries. Milwaukee announced its intent to enforce its original residency requirement, citing the Wisconsin Constitution’s home‐rule provision. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected that argument. The city amended its charter to require all law enforcement, fire, and emergency personnel to reside within 15 miles of city limits, giving affected employees six months to comply, with extensions available for hardship. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment on the pleadings for the city. Municipal employees do not have a fundamental right to be free from residency requirements, for purposes of substantive due process. Rejecting a procedural due process argument, the court stated that no vested right was impaired. The amended charter does not apply retroactively. View "Milwaukee Police Association v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Hirschbach, a trucking company, offered Turner, an African-American, a job as a driver contingent on his completion of orientation and a drug test. Turner claims that throughout orientation, the evaluator stared at him and once whispered insults. An independent facility collected a urine sample. MedTox split the sample, tested one part, and stored the other. As required by Department of Transportation regulations, MedTox reported Turner's positive result to Hirschbach’s independent medical review officer. Hirschbach’s safety officer, Winegarden, told Turner he could request that the second half of his sample be tested by a different laboratory. Turner told Winegarden he wanted the split test. That test never took place; the reason is disputed. Turner left the orientation program. Hirschbach, as permitted by DOT regulations, reported Turner’s results to an industry consortium which can be seen by future employers, with Turner’s permission. Turner sued under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000– e(2)(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 1981, and Illinois civil conspiracy law. The district court granted Hirschbach summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Turner did not respond to most of Hirschbach’s statements of undisputed facts. Giving Turner the benefit of conflicts in the evidence, the court found evidence that Winegarden cancelled the split test and acted based on racial animus but no evidence that Winegarden’s racial animus caused him not to be hired. There was no evidence that the MedTox test was unreliable or that the split test would have been negative. View "Turner v. Hirschbach Motor Lines" on Justia Law

Hirmiz, a Travelodge Hotel front‐desk clerk, was fired after being caught on video sleeping in the lobby while a fight broke out among guests. He sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, claiming that his employer had failed to accommodate a condition caused by long‐term exposure to high levels of electromagnetic voltage at the hotel; had discriminated against him because of his disorder; and had fired him in retaliation for his having complained about the hotel’s voltage levels to OSHA. OSHA found the electromagnetic voltage levels to be normal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the hotel. Hirmiz failed to present evidence that he is disabled for purposes of the ADA, that he engaged in any protected activity before his termination, or that his OSHA complaint played any role in his termination. The court noted debate in the medical community over whether sensitivity to electromagnetic voltage is a physical disorder or a psychological one and that Hirmiz did not try to prove that he has a “record” of an impairment or that he was “regarded as having” one by his employer. Hirmiz neither sought an accommodation, nor filed his EEOC discrimination charge before he was fired. View "Hirmiz v. New Harrison Hotel Corp." on Justia Law

Hively, who is openly lesbian, began teaching as a part‐time adjunct professor at Ivy Tech in 2000. In 2013, she filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming that she had been discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation, having been blocked from full-time employment “without just cause.” After exhausting EEOC procedural requirements, she filed suit, pro se, under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (Title VII). The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed, holding that Title VII did not apply to claims of sexual orientation discrimination. On rehearing, the court reversed, interpreting the Act’s prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sex as including sexual orientation; “the essence of the claim is that the plaintiff would not be suffering the adverse action had his or her sex” been different. The court noted “the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s decisions, not only in the field of employment discrimination, but also in the area of broader discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.” View "Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana" on Justia Law

Under the Illinois Public Relations Act, 5 ILCS 315, a union representing public employees collects dues from its members, but only “fair share” fees (a proportionate share of the costs of collective bargaining and contract administration) from non-member employees on whose behalf the union also negotiates. A 2015 suit sought to preclude such fees, arguing that the statute violated the First Amendment by compelling employees who disapprove of the union to contribute money. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting that one of the plaintiffs has previously challenged the “fair share” provision in state court and that his claim is barred by claim preclusion. The court also noted the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, upholding, against a First Amendment challenge, a Michigan law that allowed a public employer, whose employees (public-school teachers) were represented by a union, to require those of its employees who did not join the union nevertheless to pay fees to it because they benefited from the union’s collective bargaining agreement with the employer. View "Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees" on Justia Law

In 2009, Dr. Burton was hired as a professor at the University of Wisconsin‐Platteville. She was promoted to associate professor. Burton subsequently received a complaint from a student who claimed that another professor had sexually harassed her. Burton contacted Dean Throop, and her department chair, Caywood. The offending professor claimed the incident was designed to display to the class social norms by violating them. Days later, Caywood circulated a memo, stating professors were to bring students’ complaints directly to Caywood, rather than going outside of the department. Caywood believed Burton had overreacted. Throop and Caywood then began to withdraw support for a curriculum that Burton was developing. Burton was unanimously granted tenure. Caywood stepped down as department chair. Burton filed a charge of discrimination with the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, alleging discrimination based on her sex and retaliation for reporting the student incident and deliberate indifference to her grievances. Administrators pressured her to drop her case. Burton filed suit and contacted the EEOC. Days later, Throop sent Burton a letter identifying seven examples of inappropriate behavior by Burton. After Throop accused Burton of canceling class without permission, Burton sent an email asking all of her students for their help in proving that she had held class that day. The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejection of Burton's claims on summary judgment. "Burton’s frustrations may be significant," but do not amount to actionable retaliation under Title VII or Title IX. View "Burton v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin" on Justia Law

APS is a broker for the purchase and sale of accounting practices, working through brokers who are treated as independent contractors and are assigned exclusive sales territories. Burford became an APS broker in 2003, under a contract with a “minimum yearly sales volume” requirement. Burford did not meet this requirement for four consecutive years. In 2010, APS’s owner, Holmes spoke with Burford about his poor performance. Burford failed to meet his minimum yearly sales volume requirements again in 2010 and 2011. In 2012, APS terminated Burford’s contract and reassigned his sales territory. Burford filed suit. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, reasoning that Burford’s contract was terminable at will. On remand, a jury found for APS. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred by supposedly allowing APS to change the legal theory for its defense in violation of the “mend‐the‐hold” doctrine in Illinois law and abused its discretion by denying admission of an exhibit. The court also rejected an argument that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence on whether APS waived its right to enforce the minimum sales requirement. View "Estate of Burford v. Accounting Practice Sales, Inc" on Justia Law

Illinois’ Child Care Assistance Program (CCAP) subsidizes childcare services for low-income and at-risk families. The program pays about 60,000 childcare providers. The Home Services Program (HSP) pays about 25,000 “personal assistants” who help “customers” with basic living needs. The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA) generally allows public employees in a bargaining unit to choose, by majority vote, an exclusive bargaining representative to negotiate with the state over employment terms. A majority of both HSP and CCAP providers chose SEIU as their exclusive bargaining representative, but the providers are under no obligation to join SEIU or pay dues. SEIU cannot discriminate against a provider because of membership or lack thereof, so providers are able to present their own grievances to the state, publicly oppose the SEIU, and associate with whomever they want, without retaliation from the union. Providers sued the SEIU and Illinois officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the IPLRA violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments because the statute forces them into an agency-like association with SEIU. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. IPLRA’s authorization of a majority-elected exclusive bargaining representative does not compel an association that triggers heightened First Amendment scrutiny; the law survives rational basis analysis. View "Hill v. Service Employees International Union" on Justia Law

McGreal began working as an Orland Park police officer in 2005. Conflict between McGreal and the department arose in 2009, which culminated in McGreal’s firing in 2010. McGreal alleges that he was fired because of his exercise of protected speech at a village board meeting on November 2, 2009, concerning a proposal to lay off as many as seven full‐time police officers. McGreal, the elected secretary of the local police union, allegedly presented three alternative solutions; he claims the defendants retaliated by accusing, interrogating, and ultimately firing him under the pretext of unsubstantiated violations of department policy. The defendants deny knowing that McGreal even attended the board meeting and claim that McGreal was legitimately fired because of misconduct, including an improper traffic stop; two unauthorized, unnecessary, dangerous high‐speed chases; McGreal’s behavior at and after an awards banquet; reckless driving while off-duty; and violation of a no-contact order during the ensuing investigation. The defendants allege that McGreal lied during questioning about each of those incidents. An arbitrator and a state court sustained McGreal’s termination. McGreal filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that McGreal offered no admissible evidence supporting his claims for relief. View "McGreal v. McCarthy" on Justia Law