Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A 69-year-old employee of the Cook County Sheriff’s Office, who previously had a long career with the Chicago Police Department, was terminated from his position as Assistant Chief of the Electronic Monitoring Unit. The termination followed an internal investigation into his work performance, which included allegations that he was absent from his post without authorization, failed to communicate with his team, and used work hours and resources for personal business. The investigation, initiated after a complaint by his supervisor, involved interviews with colleagues and a review of GPS and work records, ultimately concluding that he had neglected his duties on multiple occasions.After his termination, the employee filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, against his supervisor in her individual capacity and the Sheriff in his official capacity, alleging age discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment (via 42 U.S.C. § 1983), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA). He also brought an indemnification claim against Cook County. During discovery, he presented affidavits from other older officers alleging ageist comments and discriminatory treatment by the same supervisor. The district court granted summary judgment for all defendants, finding insufficient evidence of age-based disparate treatment or causation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to identify similarly situated comparators who were treated more favorably, and that the evidence did not support a finding that any alleged discriminatory animus by the supervisor proximately caused the termination. The court also found that the internal investigation and the ultimate decisionmaker’s independent review provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the termination, precluding liability under the Fourteenth Amendment, ADEA, and IHRA. View "Gaines v Dart" on Justia Law

SuperValu, Inc. participated in a multiemployer pension plan, contributing on behalf of its employees for over a decade. In September 2018, SuperValu sold several stores to Schnuck’s Markets, Inc., with five of those stores employing workers covered by the pension plan. This sale qualified for a statutory “safe harbor,” meaning SuperValu did not incur withdrawal liability for the sold stores, as Schnuck’s agreed to continue contributions. Later, SuperValu closed its remaining stores and fully withdrew from the plan, triggering withdrawal liability. The pension fund calculated SuperValu’s total liability and the annual installment payments required, using statutory formulas. In calculating the payment schedule, the fund deducted the sold stores’ contribution base units for only the most recent five years, not the entire ten-year lookback period, which resulted in higher annual payments for SuperValu.SuperValu challenged the fund’s calculation, arguing that the contribution base units for the sold stores should have been excluded for all ten years, not just five. The dispute was submitted to arbitration under federal law, where the arbitrator ruled in favor of the fund. SuperValu then sought review in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The district court granted summary judgment to the fund, holding that the relevant statutory text did not require the deduction of the sold stores’ units for the entire ten-year period, and that SuperValu’s arguments based on legislative history and statutory purpose could not override the plain language.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Seventh Circuit held that the statute governing the payment schedule for withdrawal liability does not require a pension fund to deduct contribution base units for stores sold under the safe harbor provision for the entire ten-year lookback period. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "SuperValu, Inc. v. UFCW Unions and Employers Midwest Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Several pilots were terminated by United Airlines after the company implemented a COVID-19 vaccine mandate. These pilots, represented by their union, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), believed that the union did not do enough to oppose United’s vaccination policies. The pilots had previously filed grievances challenging the mandate, arguing that United’s actions violated the status quo required under the Railway Labor Act because the collective bargaining agreement had expired. ALPA did not support these grievances or file its own, but did file a separate grievance arguing that termination for being unvaccinated was not justified. The pilots’ termination grievances remain pending at their request.After their terminations, the pilots sued ALPA in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, alleging that the union breached its duty of fair representation by failing to adequately oppose United’s vaccine mandate. ALPA moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claim was unripe and failed to state a claim. The district court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness but granted the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court also denied the pilots’ request to file an amended complaint, finding that amendment would be futile.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions de novo. The Seventh Circuit held that the case was ripe because the pilots’ alleged harm—termination—had already occurred. However, the court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the pilots failed to plausibly allege that ALPA’s actions were arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith, as required to state a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation. The court also affirmed the denial of leave to amend, finding that the proposed amended complaint would not cure the deficiencies. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Wickstrom v Air Line Pilots Association, International" on Justia Law

An Arab American faculty member began working at a university as an adjunct instructor and later held a term faculty position. In April 2017, he and another faculty member were informed that their contracts would not be renewed due to budget constraints. Around the same time, the university received a letter from an attorney alleging that the faculty member had engaged in repeated acts of sexual misconduct with a student. The university’s Title IX coordinator initiated an investigation, during which the faculty member admitted to a sexual relationship with the student but claimed it was consensual and began after she was no longer his student. The student did not participate in the investigation, and the coordinator found insufficient evidence of misconduct. The department chair and the faculty member discussed his possible reappointment as an adjunct, but after the student filed a lawsuit alleging sexual harassment and other misconduct, the university decided not to hire him as an adjunct, citing low course enrollment, his compensation request, and the lawsuit. A second investigation was launched, and this time the coordinator found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the faculty member had sexually harassed the student. The university then deemed him ineligible for future employment.The faculty member sued the university and two former employees in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, among other claims. The district court dismissed his other claims and granted summary judgment to the university on the § 1981 claim, finding that the university had provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions and that the faculty member had not shown these reasons were pretext for racial discrimination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that the faculty member failed to present evidence that the university’s stated reasons for its employment decisions were pretext for racial discrimination. View "Saud v DePaul University" on Justia Law

A former sales representative for a pharmaceutical company alleged that the company engaged in an aggressive campaign to market one of its drugs, Vraylar, for uses not approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), specifically for substance abuse and major depressive disorder (MDD). The representative, who was responsible for promoting the drug to medical providers, claimed that the company trained its sales force to encourage off-label prescriptions and incentivized providers to prescribe Vraylar for these unapproved uses. He further asserted that he faced adverse employment actions, such as loss of promotion and increased workload, after raising concerns internally about the legality and compliance of these marketing practices.After the representative filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, the government declined to intervene. The plaintiff then amended his complaint, dropping his direct fraud claim and proceeding solely on a theory of retaliation under 31 U.S.C. §3730(h). The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the plaintiff’s internal complaints to the company focused on regulatory noncompliance rather than fraud against the government, and thus did not put the employer on notice of protected activity under the FCA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, to state a claim for FCA retaliation, an employee must plausibly allege that the employer was on notice that the employee was attempting to prevent fraud against the government, not merely regulatory violations. Because the plaintiff’s communications only referenced regulatory and policy concerns, and did not suggest government fraud, the court found the notice requirement unmet. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend. View "Lewis v AbbVie Inc." on Justia Law

A professional musician employed by the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra was placed on furlough in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In December 2020, she developed severe symptoms, including dizziness and tinnitus, after contracting COVID-19, which rendered her unable to perform. She was rehired by the orchestra in September 2021 but soon went on sick leave because her symptoms persisted. In February 2022, she applied for long-term disability benefits under her employer’s group policy, stating that her last day of work was in March 2020 and that her disability began in December 2020.The insurance company denied her claim, reasoning that she was not an “active, full-time employee” at the time her disability began, as required by the policy. The claimant appealed internally, submitting new information that she had returned to work in September 2021 but was again unable to perform due to her illness. The insurer treated this as a fundamentally different claim, maintaining its denial and advising her to file a new application based on the later date.She then filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, finding that she was not eligible for benefits based on her initial application and that her new information constituted a separate claim for a different loss.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the claimant was not eligible for benefits for a disability beginning in December 2020, and that her subsequent information regarding a September 2021 onset constituted a new claim, requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before judicial review. View "Moratz v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

A special education teacher with a long and distinguished career in an Illinois public school district was involuntarily transferred from one elementary school to another at age 52. After the transfer, she alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment at her new school. She claimed that she was assigned a disproportionate number of challenging students, unfairly criticized, denied adequate classroom support, and intimidated by an administrator. She believed these actions were motivated by her age, although she acknowledged that no one made any explicit age-related remarks.After she filed a complaint under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the school district. The district court found that she had not produced evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the alleged harassment was either objectively hostile or based on her age.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court assumed, without definitively deciding, that hostile work environment claims are cognizable under the ADEA. However, it held that the teacher failed to present sufficient evidence that any of the conduct she experienced was motivated by age-based animus. The court found her assertions to be speculative and unsupported by direct or circumstantial evidence. As a result, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that there was no reasonable basis to infer age-based workplace harassment under the ADEA. View "Blumenshine v. Bloomington School District No. 87" on Justia Law

Four individuals who worked as drivers for a ride-sharing company alleged that the company misclassified them as independent contractors rather than employees, resulting in violations of federal and Illinois wage laws. The drivers claimed they were denied minimum wage, overtime pay, and reimbursement for business expenses. Each driver had entered into agreements with the company that included arbitration provisions, but these agreements also allowed drivers to opt out of arbitration within a specified period. One driver, Ken Zurek, opted out of the arbitration provision in a later agreement after not opting out of an earlier one.Before joining the federal lawsuit, Zurek had filed a separate case in Illinois state court, where the company sought to compel arbitration based on the earlier agreement. The state court found that Zurek’s opt-out from the later agreement meant he was not bound to arbitrate claims arising during the period covered by that agreement, even if he had not opted out of the earlier one. The state court did not decide whether Zurek had actually agreed to the earlier arbitration provision, finding it unnecessary for the resolution of the case. The parties later settled the state court case.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the company again moved to compel arbitration for all four drivers. The district court granted the motion for three drivers but denied it for Zurek, holding that the state court’s decision precluded relitigation of whether Zurek was bound by the earlier arbitration agreement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration as to Zurek, holding that issue preclusion applied because the state court had already decided the relevant issue. View "Agha v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

A high school social studies teacher with a history of disciplinary issues was terminated after posting inflammatory messages on her Facebook account, which was followed primarily by former students. The posts, made during nationwide protests following the killing of George Floyd, included comments and memes that were perceived as racially insensitive and vulgar. Although the teacher had set her account to private and did not accept friend requests from current students, the posts quickly circulated within the school community, prompting complaints from students, parents, staff, and widespread media attention. The school district cited her prior suspensions for similar conduct, the disruption caused by her posts, and her failure to appreciate the impact of her comments as reasons for her dismissal.After her termination, the teacher requested a review hearing before the Illinois State Board of Education, where she argued that her Facebook posts were protected by the First Amendment. The hearing officer applied the Pickering balancing test and found that her dismissal did not violate her constitutional rights. Subsequently, the teacher filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, against the school district and associated individuals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a First Amendment violation. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that she was collaterally estopped from bringing her claim and, alternatively, that her claim failed on the merits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that the teacher failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find in her favor on her First Amendment claim. Applying the Pickering balancing test, the court concluded that the school district’s interest in addressing actual and potential disruption outweighed the teacher’s interest in free expression, and her posts were not entitled to First Amendment protection. View "Hedgepeth v Britton" on Justia Law

Frankie Nelson worked at Provident Hospital, part of the Cook County Health and Hospital System, from 1997 until her voluntary retirement in 2010. She held union positions, first as Environmental Services Supervisor and later as Building Custodian I. Between 2002 and 2005, Nelson and a male colleague, Henry White, shared the duties of Acting Assistant Director of Environmental Services, each handling different aspects of the role in addition to their regular jobs. Nelson later alleged that, during this period, she was paid less than similarly situated male employees due to sex discrimination, focusing her claim on the pay disparity between herself and White, as well as two Directors, Nate Gordon and Jerry Brown.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted summary judgment in favor of Cook County on both Nelson’s Title VII and Equal Pay Act claims. On appeal, Nelson challenged only the summary judgment on her Title VII claim, arguing that the district court failed to apply the correct legal standard and erred in determining that White was not a valid comparator. The district court had found that Nelson did not provide evidence of White’s compensation to support her claim of pay disparity and further concluded that White, Gordon, and Brown were not similarly situated to Nelson due to differences in job duties, qualifications, and supervisory roles.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court applied the correct legal standards, including both the McDonnell Douglas framework and the totality of the evidence approach. The court concluded that Nelson failed to provide sufficient evidence of pay disparity with White and that none of the alleged comparators were similarly situated to her. Therefore, summary judgment for the defendant was properly granted. View "Nelson v County of Cook" on Justia Law