Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, two former employees of Astro, filed suit against Astro, Allied, and Sirva, alleging violations of the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), N.Y. Exec. 296(15). The court noted that this case presents the following three questions that the New York Court of Appeals has not had the opportunity to address and thus the court certified to the New York State Court of Appeals: First, does Section 296(15) limit liability for unlawful denial of employment only to the aggrieved party’s “employer”? Second, if Section 296(15) is limited in that way, how should courts determine whether an entity is the aggrieved party’s “employer” for the purposes of a claim under Section 296(15)? Third, does the “aiding and abetting” liability provision of the NYSHRL, Section 296(6), apply to Section 296(15) such that a non‐employer may be liable under Section 296(15) as an aider and abettor of an employer’s unlawful denial of employment? View "Griffin v. Sirva Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the New Your State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law 290 et seq., alleging that she was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment. The district court dismissed the claims, holding that plaintiff's employer could not have engaged in retaliation because it could not be held responsible for the retaliatory animus of plaintiff's co-worker, a low-level employee with no decisionmaking authority. The court held, however, that an employee’s retaliatory intent may be imputed to an employer where, as alleged here, the employer’s own negligence gives effect to the employee’s retaliatory animus and causes the victim to suffer an adverse employment decision. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that she was terminated for exercising her First Amendment right to free speech when she spoke to local leaders about what she saw as a "scam" occurring in the police department. The district court held that the officials had not shown entitlement to summary judgment of qualified immunity because, accepting plaintiff's facts as true and drawing all permissible factual inferences in her favor, she had shown that they had violated her clearly established constitutional rights. The court concluded that, under plaintiff's version of the facts, there was no doubt that under the prevailing decisions, plaintiff's speech was not made "pursuant to" her official duties as a patrol officer. Therefore, defendants failed to show entitlement to fire plaintiff or entitlement to qualified immunity under her version of the facts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ricciuti v. Gyzenis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's partial grant of summary judgment to his former employer, Rockbestos, on his claims of hostile work environment and discriminatory discharge. The court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review so much of the district court's judgment as involves plaintiff's claim under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a‐60. In regard to plaintiff's discriminatory-discharge claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., the court concluded that, although the district court's explanation of why plaintiff was judicially estopped from asserting that he was qualified for his position was erroneous, the decision was nevertheless correct because plaintiff failed to proffer a sufficient explanation in light of the record why his assertion that he was qualified for his position was consistent with his earlier sworn statement to the SSA that he was “unable to work.” Therefore, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge on summary judgment under the ADA, Title VII, and the ADEA. Finally, the court held that to the extent plaintiff pleaded hostile-work-environment claims in his amended complaint, he has subsequently abandoned these claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and dismissed for want of appellate jurisdiction in regard to the CFEPA claim. View "Kovaco v. Rockbestos-Surprenant Cable Corp." on Justia Law

Several active and former Assistant Urban Park Rangers (AUPRs) employed by the City's Parks Department alleged that they, and others similarly situated, were not paid in accordance with the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. The district court granted partial summary judgment for defendants and closed the case without further proceedings. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. On the current record, the court could not conclude as a matter of law that plaintiffsʹ donning and doffing of uniforms were not integral and indispensable to their principal activities as AUPRs - the sole ground on which the district court granted partial summary judgment. Therefore, the court remanded to allow the district court to decide, in the first instance, whether plaintiffsʹ donning and doffing are nevertheless non‐compensable as a matter of law under the de minimis doctrine or the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The district court should also resolve the issues that defendants raise as to their entitlement to partial summary judgment on other aspects of plaintiffsʹ claims, which the district court's decision erroneously failed to reach.  Absent another appeal or additional motions by the parties that dispose of the action in its entirety, the case should then proceed to trial. View "Perez v. The City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against NYCHA, alleging that its decision not to hire her as a bricklayer was sex-based and thus violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL); and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). The district court granted summary judgment to NYCHA as to the Title VII and NYSHRL claims. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the NYCHRL claim and dismissed it without prejudice. The court concluded that the district court erred when it failed to view plaintiff’s evidence as a whole and instead set aside each piece of evidence after deeming it insufficient to create a triable issue of fact that NYCHA’s refusal to hire her was based in part on the fact that she is female. In this case, plaintiff has proffered evidence that - when viewed as a whole - is sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that NYCHA’s decision not to hire her was more likely than not motivated in part by sex-based discrimination. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Walsh v. NYCHA" on Justia Law

WCC, an employers' association, challenged the district court's order vacating an award issued in an arbitration between WCC and the District Council. The district court vacated the award, holding that the award did not draw its essence from the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and conflicted with the district court's earlier order approving the CBA. The court concluded, however, that the arbitrator properly exercised his authority to interpret the CBA, and that his award did not violate the judicial order of approval. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to revisit its decision to approve the CBA with the benefit of the arbitrator’s interpretation of its two‐man job provision. View "NYC & Vicinity Dist. v. Ass'n of Wall-Ceiling and Carpentry Indus." on Justia Law

In 2004, an AG investigation focused on an alleged bid‐rigging scheme involving Marsh and several insurance carriers. Marsh's counsel asked two employees, William Gilman and Edward McNenney, Jr., to sit for interviews, but neither employee complied with the request. The employees subsequently filed suit against Marsh after the company fired them "for cause," and denied them unvested, deferred compensation as well as severance. The district court granted summary judgment for Marsh. The court concluded that the interview demands were reasonable as a matter of law because at the time they were made, the employees were Marsh employees who had been implicated in an alleged criminal conspiracy for acts that were within the scope of employment and that imperiled the company. The court also concluded that there are no triable issues of facts as to whether Marsh fired the employees for cause. The court rejected the employees' argument that they were let go routinely as part of a reduction in force and the argument that Gilman could not be fired because he had preemptively resigned. Finally, the court rejected the employees' contention that, in light of Marsh’s cooperation with the AG, Marsh’s requirement that they answer potentially incriminating questions amounted to state action, and was thus unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment because Marsh had cause to fire the employees and they were not entitled to the employment benefits at issue. View "Gilman v. Marsh & McLennan Cos." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed the district court's denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, or alternatively for a new trial under Rule 59, or relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) on plaintiff's New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) claim. Plaintiff, diagnosed with cancer, cross-appealed the dismissal of her New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) claim. Plaintiff and her husband cross-appealed the dismissal of their Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), 29 U.S.C. 116(a), claims. The court held that, because plaintiff did not request a reasonable accommodation prior to her termination, the district court erred in denying defendants’ Rule 50 motion. Therefore, the court reversed that decision and vacated the jury award on the NYSHRL claim. However, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's NYCHRL claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denial of the COBRA claims on the merits. View "Vangas v. Montefiore Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that American Airlines violated its obligation under the McCaskill‐Bond amendment to the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. 42112 note, to provide for the integration of the American Airlines and U.S. Airways seniority lists “in a fair and equitable manner.” Plaintiffs also claimed principally that the Association of Professional Flight Attendants (“APFA”), the labor union representing American Airlines flight attendants, violated its duty of fair representation under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151‐165, by failing to represent the former TWA flight attendants adequately during the creation of the integrated seniority list. The district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss. The court concluded that McCaskill‐Bond did not require American Airlines to reorder its own seniority list upon entering into a new merger in order to redress plaintiffs’ endtailing in 2001. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim against American Airlines under McCaskill‐Bond. The court also concluded that the union’s refusal to reorder the list, in accordance with its policy and the condition imposed by American Airlines, was not irrational or arbitrary; nor was the union’s decision to use the “length of service” rule to integrate the seniority lists unlawfully discriminatory in violation of the Railway Labor Act; and the amended complaint’s allegations do not raise an inference of “bad faith” on the part of APFA. The court considered plaintiffs' remaining arguments and concluded that they are without merit. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Flight Attendants in Reunion v. Am. Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law