Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A physician specializing in physical medicine and rehabilitation was employed by a medical practice under a three-year contract that anticipated partnership if not terminated. After patient and staff complaints about her conduct, the practice proposed a new one-year contract without a partnership track, which she refused to sign. She was then terminated with 90 days’ notice. The physician alleged that her termination was due to age and sex discrimination, as well as retaliation for stating her intent to file an EEOC complaint, and also brought a breach of contract claim.After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. A Magistrate Judge recommended granting summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The District Judge reviewed the report and recommendation (R&R) only for clear error, concluding that the physician’s objections were improper because they repeated arguments made before the Magistrate Judge, and adopted the R&R in full. The physician appealed, arguing that her objections were timely and specific, and that the District Judge should have conducted de novo review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the District Court erred in applying only clear error review, as the physician’s objections were proper and required de novo review. However, the appellate court found this error harmless because it reviews summary judgment decisions de novo. On its own review, the Second Circuit concluded that the physician failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact on her preserved claims of sex discrimination, aiding and abetting discrimination, and retaliation. The court also found that her age discrimination and breach of contract claims were not preserved for appellate review. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment granting summary judgment to the defendants. View "Nambiar v. The Central Orthopedic Group, LLP" on Justia Law

An educator employed by the New York City Department of Education (DOE) was appointed Executive Director of the “AP for All” program, where she supervised a diverse team and was credited with expanding access to Advanced Placement courses. Early in her tenure, she experienced racial tensions with subordinates, including accusations of “microaggressions” and being labeled as exhibiting “white fragility.” These tensions escalated after a new Chancellor implemented an “equity agenda” that included mandatory implicit bias trainings. The plaintiff, who is Caucasian, alleged that these trainings and subsequent workplace interactions fostered a racially hostile environment, with repeated negative generalizations about white employees and a lack of intervention by supervisors when she complained.The plaintiff initially filed suit in the Supreme Court of New York, later amending her complaint to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for race discrimination, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, where the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a municipal policy or custom that caused her demotion, the alleged hostile work environment, or her constructive discharge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Second Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the demotion and constructive discharge claims, holding that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence that these actions were motivated by racial discrimination or that the employer intentionally created intolerable working conditions. However, the court vacated the summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim, finding that genuine disputes of material fact existed as to whether the DOE’s actions and inaction amounted to a municipal policy or custom that created a racially hostile environment. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that claim. View "Chislett v. New York City Department of Education" on Justia Law

Two former employees of a fire alarm and sprinkler company provided fire alarm testing and inspection services on public works projects in New York. They alleged that their employer failed to pay them the prevailing wages required by New York Labor Law § 220, which mandates that workers on public works projects receive at least the prevailing rate of wages. The contracts between the employer and various public entities included clauses that either disclaimed the applicability of prevailing wage laws, were silent on the issue, or referenced prevailing wage rates. Many contracts also contained a provision shortening the statute of limitations for any action against the company to one year.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York granted partial summary judgment in favor of the employer on all prevailing wage-related claims. The court found that: (1) the contracts did not expressly promise to pay prevailing wages; (2) the one-year contractual limitations period barred the claims; and (3) fire alarm testing and inspection work was not covered by § 220’s prevailing wage requirement. The court also dismissed related quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims and later approved a class action settlement on other claims, with the prevailing wage claims reserved for appeal.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, based on a 2009 New York State Department of Labor opinion letter and relevant precedent, fire alarm testing and inspection work is covered by § 220, entitling the plaintiffs to prevailing wages. However, the Second Circuit found New York law unsettled on whether a promise to pay prevailing wages is implicit in every public works contract (even if not expressly stated) and whether a contractual one-year limitations period is enforceable against workers’ third-party beneficiary claims. The court therefore certified these two questions to the New York Court of Appeals for resolution. View "Walton v. Comfort Systems" on Justia Law

A former dancer at two adult entertainment clubs in Manhattan filed a class charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging pervasive sexual harassment and a hostile work environment affecting herself and other female dancers. She claimed that the clubs’ policies and practices fostered this environment, including being forced to change in open areas monitored by video and being pressured to engage in sexual acts with customers. After receiving the charge, the EEOC requested information from the clubs, including employee “pedigree” data such as names, demographics, and employment details. The clubs objected, arguing the requests were irrelevant and burdensome, but the EEOC issued subpoenas for the information.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the EEOC’s petition to enforce the subpoenas, finding the requested information relevant to the investigation and not unduly burdensome for the clubs to produce. The clubs appealed and, while the appeal was pending, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter to the charging party, who then filed a class action lawsuit in the same district court. The clubs argued that the EEOC lost its authority to investigate and enforce subpoenas once the right-to-sue letter was issued and the lawsuit commenced.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the EEOC retains its statutory authority to investigate charges and enforce subpoenas even after issuing a right-to-sue letter and after the charging party files a lawsuit. The court also found that the employee information sought was relevant to the underlying charge and that the clubs had not shown compliance would be unduly burdensome. The Second Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s order enforcing the subpoenas. View "EEOC v. AAM Holding Corp." on Justia Law

Four former employees of grocery store chains, who participated in a defined contribution 401(k) retirement plan, brought a putative class action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). They alleged that the plan’s fiduciaries mismanaged the plan by failing to prudently select and monitor investment options, failing to act solely in the interest of plan participants, and allowing excessive fees and improper compensation arrangements. The plaintiffs sought monetary and injunctive relief on behalf of themselves, the plan, and a proposed class of similarly situated participants.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed several of the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of Article III standing, finding that the plaintiffs had not alleged any concrete injury to their individual accounts from the alleged mismanagement of certain investment options or from the plan’s compensation arrangements. The district court concluded that because the plaintiffs had not invested in the specific funds they challenged, or had not shown that the alleged breaches affected their own accounts, they lacked standing to pursue those claims. The court did find standing for some claims related to funds in which the plaintiffs had invested, but ultimately dismissed those claims for failure to state a claim and denied leave to amend.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims for lack of standing. The Second Circuit held that participants in a defined contribution plan must plausibly allege a concrete, individualized financial injury to establish Article III standing for monetary relief under ERISA. Because the plaintiffs did not allege that they suffered losses in their own accounts from the challenged conduct, they lacked both individual and class standing for those claims. The court affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s judgment, remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Collins v. Ne. Grocery, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former employee of a dental supply company, suffered a traumatic brain injury and later filed a claim for long-term disability (LTD) benefits under her employer’s LTD plan, which was insured and administered by an independent insurance company. After her claim was denied, she left her job and entered into a separation agreement with her employer. This agreement included a broad release of claims against the employer and its “parents, subsidiaries, related or affiliated entities,” as well as their agents, including claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Before signing, the plaintiff sought clarification from her employer about whether the release would affect her ability to pursue her LTD claim against the insurer. The employer’s representatives assured her that the insurer was a separate, independent entity and that the agreement would not impact her ability to appeal the denial of her LTD claim.After the insurer denied her appeal, the plaintiff sued the insurer in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging violations of ERISA. The insurer moved for summary judgment, arguing that the release in the separation agreement barred her claims. The district court agreed, holding that the insurer was covered by the release and that the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily waived her ERISA claims against it. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, and the plaintiff appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the plaintiff did not knowingly and voluntarily release her ERISA claims against the insurer. The court emphasized the employer’s express assurances to the plaintiff that the release would not affect her LTD claim and found no evidence to create a genuine dispute on this point. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Schuyler v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada" on Justia Law

Brian Flores, a current NFL coach, brought a putative class action against the National Football League and several of its member clubs, including the Denver Broncos, New York Giants, and Houston Texans, alleging racial discrimination under federal, state, and local law. Flores’s claims stemmed from his interviews and employment experiences with these teams, during which he alleged discriminatory hiring practices. His employment contracts with various NFL teams incorporated the NFL Constitution, which contains a broad arbitration provision granting the NFL Commissioner authority to arbitrate disputes between coaches and member clubs.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration based on Flores’s employment agreements. The District Court granted the motion for claims against the Miami Dolphins, Arizona Cardinals, and Tennessee Titans, but denied it for Flores’s claims against the Broncos, Giants, Texans, and related claims against the NFL. The court found the NFL Constitution’s arbitration provision illusory and unenforceable under Massachusetts law, as it allowed unilateral modification by the NFL and lacked a signed agreement in one instance. The District Court also denied the defendants’ motion for reconsideration.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s orders. The Second Circuit held that the NFL Constitution’s arbitration provision, which vested unilateral substantive and procedural authority in the NFL Commissioner, did not qualify for protection under the Federal Arbitration Act and was unenforceable because it failed to guarantee Flores the ability to vindicate his statutory claims in an impartial arbitral forum. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion for reconsideration, concluding there was no abuse of discretion. View "Flores v. N.Y. Football Giants" on Justia Law

Two fiduciaries, who managed retirement and welfare funds for a New York City law enforcement union, were found to have improperly withdrawn over $500,000 from the union’s annuity fund. The withdrawals, which occurred over several years, were facilitated by one defendant preparing false authorization forms and the other signing and submitting them to the fund’s custodian. The funds were then transferred to the union’s operating account and used for unauthorized purposes, including personal enrichment and unrelated union expenses. The defendants misrepresented the nature of these withdrawals to both the fund’s custodian and union members, and they continued the scheme even after being warned by auditors that their actions were improper.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over a joint jury trial, where both defendants were convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. One defendant was also convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States and multiple counts of tax evasion. The district court denied motions to sever the trials, found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions, and imposed restitution and forfeiture orders. The court also addressed government discovery errors by granting a continuance and requiring early disclosure of materials, but declined to impose harsher sanctions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed claims of improper joinder, insufficient evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and errors in restitution calculation. The court held that joinder was proper because the indictment sufficiently linked the fraud and tax offenses, the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and the attorney’s illness did not constitute per se ineffective assistance. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s handling of discovery issues or restitution calculation, and no reversible prosecutorial misconduct. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Wynder" on Justia Law

Samantha Long, a former Clerk of the Town Justice Court for the Town of New Lebanon, filed a lawsuit against the Town of New Lebanon and Jessica Byrne, a former Town Justice. Long alleged that she was unlawfully terminated in retaliation for cooperating with an investigation by the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct into Byrne’s suspected judicial misconduct. Long claimed that she provided specific case files to the Commission and refused to discuss the investigation with Byrne, which led to her termination. She argued that her termination violated her First Amendment rights and her rights under New York State Civil Service Law § 75-b.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed Long’s claims. The court concluded that Long’s actions were not protected by the First Amendment because they were part of her official duties as Court Clerk and did not constitute protected citizen speech. Consequently, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Long’s Section 75-b claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that Long’s complaint adequately alleged that she acted as a private citizen, not pursuant to her work responsibilities, when she cooperated with the Commission’s investigation and refused to discuss it with Byrne. The court emphasized that Long’s refusal to discuss the investigation with Byrne was not within the scope of her job duties and that her cooperation with the Commission was motivated by a sense of civic duty rather than employment-related responsibilities. The court also vacated the district court’s dismissal of Long’s state-law claim under Section 75-b, as the legal premise for the dismissal was defeated by the reinstatement of her First Amendment claim. View "Long v. Byrne" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, consisting of several Cement and Concrete Workers District Council Funds and their fiduciary, sued Defendants Manny P. Concrete Co., Inc. and Manny P. Con Industries, Inc. for failing to make fringe benefit contributions as required by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The CBA mandated contributions to the Funds for work performed by employees within its jurisdiction. An audit revealed that Defendants owed significant amounts in unpaid contributions and dues checkoffs.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs. The court deemed the matters within Plaintiffs' Requests for Admissions admitted due to Defendants' failure to respond timely. Consequently, the court found no genuine disputes of material fact and ruled that Plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deeming the matters admitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36. The court found that the requests sought admissions of fact or the application of law to fact, which are permissible under Rule 36. The appellate court also agreed that Defendants' failure to respond timely constituted implied admissions, and the district court was correct in not allowing Defendants to withdraw or amend these admissions.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that there were no genuine disputes of material fact regarding the contributions owed by Defendants. The court noted that Defendants' arguments and evidence did not sufficiently counter the admissions and findings from the audit. Thus, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Cement and Concrete Workers District Council Welfare Fund v. Manny" on Justia Law