Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose when female corrections officer, Alice Hancock, filed a charge of discrimination with the Division against her employer, Geo, alleging that she had been subjected to discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of state and federal employment laws. In this appeal, the Division and the EEOC challenged the district court's summary judgment rulings in favor of Geo. The court held that the EEOC and the Division sufficiently conciliated its class claims against Geo in this lawsuit in light of Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC; assuming that exhaustion requirements from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Arizona Civil Rights Act (ACRA), Ariz. Rev. Stat. 41-1481(A), apply in this case, the court held that the EEOC and the Division may maintain their claims on behalf of aggrieved employees provided that the employee has alleged at least one act of misconduct that occurred within 300 days prior to the date the first aggrieved employee, Alice Hancock, filed her charge against Geo; in an EEOC class action an aggrieved employee is not required to file a new charge of discrimination with the EEOC if her claim is already encompassed within the Reasonable Cause Determination or if the claim is “like or reasonably related” to the initial charge; and that aggrieved employee Sofia Hines has presented material issues of fact as to her hostile work environment claim. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order. View "Arizona ex rel. Horne v. The Geo Group" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the parties contest the proper interpretation of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA), 5 U.S.C. 3345 et seq., as it relates to the appointment of the former Acting General Counsel of the NLRB. KTSS challenges the authority of Lafe E. Solomon, the former Acting General Counsel of the NLRB, to authorize a petition for injunctive relief against KTSS after the President nominated him to the permanent position. As a preliminary matter, the court rejected KTSS’s argument that because Solomon’s appointment did not comply with section 3(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 153(d), the appointment was necessarily invalid. The court concluded that, to be valid, a petition under section 10(j) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 160(j), must be authorized by the Board through one of two avenues: the first is for a quorum of three Board members to directly authorize the specific 10(j) petition, and the second is for the General Counsel to authorize the petition pursuant to a previous delegation of the Board’s 10(j) authority to the General Counsel. The Board concedes that the first avenue was not satisfied in this case. The court held that the second avenue was not satisfied either because Solomon was not properly serving as Acting General Counsel under the FVRA at the time that the petition was filed. In light of this holding, the court need not reach KTSS’s alternative argument that the Board never validly delegated its 10(j) authority to Solomon. Finally, the Board explicitly waived any arguments based on the FVRA’s exemption clause and it does not otherwise contest the remedy sought by KTSS. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petition. View "Hooks v. Kitsap Tenant Support Servs." on Justia Law

Employer-Appellees required their employees to participate in tip pools. Unlike the tip pools contemplated by section 203(m) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 203(m), however, these tip pools were comprised of both customarily tipped employees and non-customarily tipped employees. In 2010, the court held in Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc. that this type of tip pooling arrangement does not violate section 203(m), because section 203(m) was silent as to employers who do not take a tip credit. In 2011, shortly after Cumbie was decided, the DOL promulgated a formal rule that extended the tip pool restrictions of section 203(m) to all employers, not just those who take a tip credit. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon held that Cumbie foreclosed the DOL’s ability to promulgate the 2011 rule and that the 2011 rule was invalid because it was contrary to Congress’s clear intent. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada followed suit. Applying Chevron, the court concluded that Congress has not addressed the question at issue because section 203(m) is silent as to the tip pooling practices of employers who do not take a tip credit. There is no convincing evidence that Congress’s silence, in this context, means anything other than a refusal to tie the agency’s hands. In exercising its discretion to regulate, the DOL promulgated a rule that is consistent with the FLSA’s language, legislative history, and purpose. Having decided that the regulation withstands Chevron review, the court reversed both judgments and remanded for further proceedings. View "Oregon Rest. & Lodging Ass'n v. Perez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Energy Northwest, alleging claims of retaliation in violation of the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 5851. The whistleblower retaliation provision of the Act protects energy workers who report or otherwise act upon safety concerns. In this case, plaintiff's single expression of a difference of opinion about the “Charlie” designation of one existing internal condition report lacks a sufficient nexus to a concrete, ongoing safety concern. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment for Energy Northwest because plaintiff's conduct falls outside the scope of the Act's protection. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sanders v. Energy Northwest" on Justia Law

Petitioner was awarded benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 928(a), for injuries he sustained while working for PacificRim. On appeal, petitioner challenged the Board's decision affirming an ALJ's award of attorney's fees under the Act. The court concluded that the proxy market rate relied upon by the ALJ does not adequately reflect market rates for Portland, Oregon, the relevant community, because it is based entirely on data not tailored to Portland, even though reliable information about attorney billing rates in Portland was readily available. Therefore, the court held that the Board erred in affirming the attorney’s-fee award based on a proxy market rate not tailored to the “relevant community.” Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Shirrod v. OWCP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a managerial employee, filed suit alleging that GlobalTranz and its executives fired her for engaging in protected activity. In Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., the Supreme Court established a “fair notice” test for deciding whether an employee has “filed any complaint” under the anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3). Plaintiff alleged that defendants retaliated against her for complaining about defendants' failure to comply with the FLSA. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court held that a complaining employee’s position as a manager is an important part of the “context” that the fact-finder must consider. A reasonable employer would understand many actions taken by a non-managerial employee differently than it would understand the same actions taken by a manager. However, the court declined to formulate or adopt a special bright-line rule to apply when considering whether a manager has “filed any complaint” within the meaning of section 215(a)(3). In this case, applying Kasten’s “fair notice” rule, the court held that a jury reasonably could find that plaintiff filed such a complaint. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Rosenfield v. GlobalTranz Enters." on Justia Law

The Union appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Medical Center and dismissal of the Union's petition to compel arbitration. At issue was when the Union requested arbitration, and when the Medical Center unequivocally and expressly rejected that request. The court held that it is a breach of the duty of good faith performance under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, for an employer to fail to respond within a reasonable time to a union’s communication which seeks to abide by a grievance process set forth in a collective bargaining agreement. In this case, it was not reasonable for the Medical Center to wait in silence for more than five months following the Union’s letter demanding arbitration, and then claim in litigation that the Union missed the statute of limitations. The Medical Center's delay of five months is a length of time nearly as long as the six months statute of limitations itself. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded in part, and vacated in part. View "SEIU v. Los Robles Reg'l Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

The EEOC brought a subpoena enforcement action against McLane where the EEOC is investigating a charge of sex discrimination filed against McLane by one of its former employees. At issue was whether the district court correctly held that some of the information sought by the subpoena is not relevant to the EEOC’s investigation. The court concluded that the district court erred by refusing to enforce the subpoena’s request for production of pedigree information where the information is relevant to the EEOC's investigation. In this case, the employee's charge alleges that McLane’s use of the strength test discriminates on the basis of sex. To decide whether there is any truth to that allegation, the EEOC wants to contact other McLane employees and applicants for employment who have taken the test to learn more about their experiences. For similar reasons, the district court erred when it held that pedigree information is irrelevant “at this stage” of the investigation. Finally, the court vacated the district court's order denying enforcement of the subpoena’s request for the reasons for termination, and remanded so that the district court can rule on whether requiring McLane to produce that information would in fact be unduly burdensome. View "EEOC V. McLane Co." on Justia Law