Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Drywall entered into a labor agreement with the Union according to which Drywall assigned to a contractors' association authority to bargain on its behalf. After Drywall attempted to terminate the agreement, it discovered that the Union and association had executed a Memorandum of Understanding extending the term of the agreement. An arbitrator held that Drywall was bound by the Memorandum.The district court vacated the arbitration award and held that the arbitrator’s interpretation of the parties’ agreement was not “plausible” and was, moreover, contrary to public policy. The court held that the district court's decision exceeded its narrow authority to determine whether the arbitrator’s award was based on the parties’ contract and whether it violated an “explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy,” and therefore the court reversed the district court's decision. View "SWRCC v. Drywall Dynamics" on Justia Law

Robert Carrion sustained a severe knee injury while working as a chassis mechanic, and continued to work at his physically demanding job for the next fifteen years before retiring early. After Carrion’s former employer ceased paying for treatment, he filed for disability under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA or the Longshore Act), 33 U.S.C. 901 et seq. The court affirmed the BRB’s decision upholding the ALJ’s conclusion that Carrion timely filed his claim against SSA where the ALJ and the BRB, in determining whether the one-year statute of limitations on disability claims was met pursuant to 33 U.S.C. 913(a), correctly looked to the date when Carrion became aware that his work for SSA caused a second, cumulative traumatic injury resulting in an impairment of his earning power. The court held that the prospect of a hypothetical future surgery and its anticipated benefits can not transform an otherwise permanent disability into a temporary one for purposes of the Longshore Act. In this case, Carrion's knee injury is a permanent disability. The court explained that evaluating an individual’s condition based on the presumed effect of a theoretical future treatment makes scant sense. Accordingly, the appropriate question to ask is not whether a future surgery would ameliorate Carrion’s knee condition, but whether there was actual or expected improvement to his knee after a normal and natural healing period. Finally, the court concluded that the doctrines of exhaustion and waiver are inapplicable because Carrion presented his claim of permanent disability well before the conclusion of the administrative process and neither SSA nor the agency were blindsided by the argument. Accordingly, the court denied SSA's petition for review of the BRB's decision and granted Carrion's cross-petition for review. View "SSA Terminals & Homeport Ins. v. Carrion" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., alleging that he lost $15.02 and one minute due to his employer's, TWEAN, compensation policy that rounds all employee time stamps to the nearest quarter-hour. The district court granted summary judgment to TWEAN. The court discerned no reason to analyze overtime minutes any differently than regular-time minutes, and the district court committed no error by treating them the same. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that TWEAN’s rounding policy violates 29 C.F.R. 785.48(b), the federal rounding regulation, because TWEAN’s rounding policy is neutral on its face where TWEAN rounds all employee time punches and where his compensation records demonstrate that TWEAN’s rounding policy is neutral in application. The court found that TWEAN’s rounding policy comports with the federal rounding regulation. The court also concluded that the district court properly classified the one minute of uncompensated time as de minimis and appropriately granted summary judgment to TWEAN on plaintiff's “logging-in” claim. Additionally, the district court did not err by limiting consideration of plaintiff’s rounding claim to the time period after the implementation of the Avaya/Kronos timekeeping system. Finally, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to plaintiff’s pre-May 4, 2010 rounding claims; the district court properly granted summary judgment as to the California Labor Code 226 claim; and, because the court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to TWEAN as to plaintiff’s individual rounding claim, there is no need to remand this case to the district court for further proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Corbin v. Time Warner Entm't" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the District and two of its administrators, alleging that she had been wrongfully discharged under Washington law, that her First Amendment rights were infringed, that she was retaliated against for exercising such rights, and that she was entitled to recovery under a variety of other state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, her speech to the school and District administrators is made up of the complaints or concerns raised up the chain of command at plaintiff's workplace about her job that are generally not protected. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the scope of her duties, and the evidence indicates that her communication with District staff fell within her job duties. Further, plaintiff's speech to parents was within the scope of her duties and is not protected by the First Amendment. Therefore, plaintiff failed to meet her burden to show that the relevant speech was made in her capacity as a private citizen, and that the district court’s judgment with respect to plaintiff’s First Amendment claim was proper. The court must vacate the district court’s judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge under Washington law because an intervening authority has overruled the Washington state decision upon which the district court’s analysis was based. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court for consideration of the wrongful discharge claim in light of Rose v. Anderson Hay & Grain Co. However, because the court affirmed with respect to the federal claim, the district court should first consider whether to continue to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. View "Coomes v. Edmonds Sch. Dist. No. 15" on Justia Law

This case arose when female corrections officer, Alice Hancock, filed a charge of discrimination with the Division against her employer, Geo, alleging that she had been subjected to discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of state and federal employment laws. In this appeal, the Division and the EEOC challenged the district court's summary judgment rulings in favor of Geo. The court held that the EEOC and the Division sufficiently conciliated its class claims against Geo in this lawsuit in light of Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC; assuming that exhaustion requirements from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Arizona Civil Rights Act (ACRA), Ariz. Rev. Stat. 41-1481(A), apply in this case, the court held that the EEOC and the Division may maintain their claims on behalf of aggrieved employees provided that the employee has alleged at least one act of misconduct that occurred within 300 days prior to the date the first aggrieved employee, Alice Hancock, filed her charge against Geo; in an EEOC class action an aggrieved employee is not required to file a new charge of discrimination with the EEOC if her claim is already encompassed within the Reasonable Cause Determination or if the claim is “like or reasonably related” to the initial charge; and that aggrieved employee Sofia Hines has presented material issues of fact as to her hostile work environment claim. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order. View "Arizona ex rel. Horne v. The Geo Group" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the parties contest the proper interpretation of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA), 5 U.S.C. 3345 et seq., as it relates to the appointment of the former Acting General Counsel of the NLRB. KTSS challenges the authority of Lafe E. Solomon, the former Acting General Counsel of the NLRB, to authorize a petition for injunctive relief against KTSS after the President nominated him to the permanent position. As a preliminary matter, the court rejected KTSS’s argument that because Solomon’s appointment did not comply with section 3(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 153(d), the appointment was necessarily invalid. The court concluded that, to be valid, a petition under section 10(j) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 160(j), must be authorized by the Board through one of two avenues: the first is for a quorum of three Board members to directly authorize the specific 10(j) petition, and the second is for the General Counsel to authorize the petition pursuant to a previous delegation of the Board’s 10(j) authority to the General Counsel. The Board concedes that the first avenue was not satisfied in this case. The court held that the second avenue was not satisfied either because Solomon was not properly serving as Acting General Counsel under the FVRA at the time that the petition was filed. In light of this holding, the court need not reach KTSS’s alternative argument that the Board never validly delegated its 10(j) authority to Solomon. Finally, the Board explicitly waived any arguments based on the FVRA’s exemption clause and it does not otherwise contest the remedy sought by KTSS. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petition. View "Hooks v. Kitsap Tenant Support Servs." on Justia Law

Employer-Appellees required their employees to participate in tip pools. Unlike the tip pools contemplated by section 203(m) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 203(m), however, these tip pools were comprised of both customarily tipped employees and non-customarily tipped employees. In 2010, the court held in Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc. that this type of tip pooling arrangement does not violate section 203(m), because section 203(m) was silent as to employers who do not take a tip credit. In 2011, shortly after Cumbie was decided, the DOL promulgated a formal rule that extended the tip pool restrictions of section 203(m) to all employers, not just those who take a tip credit. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon held that Cumbie foreclosed the DOL’s ability to promulgate the 2011 rule and that the 2011 rule was invalid because it was contrary to Congress’s clear intent. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada followed suit. Applying Chevron, the court concluded that Congress has not addressed the question at issue because section 203(m) is silent as to the tip pooling practices of employers who do not take a tip credit. There is no convincing evidence that Congress’s silence, in this context, means anything other than a refusal to tie the agency’s hands. In exercising its discretion to regulate, the DOL promulgated a rule that is consistent with the FLSA’s language, legislative history, and purpose. Having decided that the regulation withstands Chevron review, the court reversed both judgments and remanded for further proceedings. View "Oregon Rest. & Lodging Ass'n v. Perez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Energy Northwest, alleging claims of retaliation in violation of the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 5851. The whistleblower retaliation provision of the Act protects energy workers who report or otherwise act upon safety concerns. In this case, plaintiff's single expression of a difference of opinion about the “Charlie” designation of one existing internal condition report lacks a sufficient nexus to a concrete, ongoing safety concern. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment for Energy Northwest because plaintiff's conduct falls outside the scope of the Act's protection. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sanders v. Energy Northwest" on Justia Law

Petitioner was awarded benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 928(a), for injuries he sustained while working for PacificRim. On appeal, petitioner challenged the Board's decision affirming an ALJ's award of attorney's fees under the Act. The court concluded that the proxy market rate relied upon by the ALJ does not adequately reflect market rates for Portland, Oregon, the relevant community, because it is based entirely on data not tailored to Portland, even though reliable information about attorney billing rates in Portland was readily available. Therefore, the court held that the Board erred in affirming the attorney’s-fee award based on a proxy market rate not tailored to the “relevant community.” Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Shirrod v. OWCP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a managerial employee, filed suit alleging that GlobalTranz and its executives fired her for engaging in protected activity. In Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., the Supreme Court established a “fair notice” test for deciding whether an employee has “filed any complaint” under the anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3). Plaintiff alleged that defendants retaliated against her for complaining about defendants' failure to comply with the FLSA. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court held that a complaining employee’s position as a manager is an important part of the “context” that the fact-finder must consider. A reasonable employer would understand many actions taken by a non-managerial employee differently than it would understand the same actions taken by a manager. However, the court declined to formulate or adopt a special bright-line rule to apply when considering whether a manager has “filed any complaint” within the meaning of section 215(a)(3). In this case, applying Kasten’s “fair notice” rule, the court held that a jury reasonably could find that plaintiff filed such a complaint. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Rosenfield v. GlobalTranz Enters." on Justia Law