Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, an employee of the SSA, seeks review of a Board order dismissing his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that the Board did not err in dismissing petitioner's IRA appeal because petitioner has not made a non-frivolous allegation under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A). Petitioner was employed by the SSA as a Hearing Office Director. Faced with disciplinary proceedings, petitioner filed an IRA with the Board, alleging that he engaged in protected whistleblowing activity under the WPA for which he could not be disciplined. The court concluded that the standard for determining whether a petitioner has made a non-frivolous disclosure is analogous to the standard for reviewing a motion to dismiss. In this case, disclosures 1–2 are not protected disclosures, because an agency ruling or adjudication, even if erroneous, is not a violation of the law or gross mismanagement under the WPA; disclosures 3–5 are not protected disclosures, because communications concerning policy decisions are explicitly excluded from protection under the WPA; and there is no evidence that the SSA took any personnel action against petitioner as a result of disclosures 3–5. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Daniels v. MSPB" on Justia Law

The three cases in this consolidated appeal involve employees represented by labor unions who seek remedies under state law against their employers. The cases were initially filed in state court, but then removed to federal court on the basis of preemption under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185(a). In all the cases, the district court denied a motion to remand and held the state law claims preempted. At issue on appeal is section 301 preemption. The court articulated a two-step inquiry to analyze section 301 preemption of state law claims: first, a court must determine whether the asserted cause of action involves a right conferred upon an employee by virtue of state law, not by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA); and second, whether the right is substantially dependent on analysis of a CBA. Where there is such substantial dependence, the state law claim is preempted by section 301. If not, the claim can proceed under state law. In Kobold, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Good Samaritan. In Barr, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to RISG as to Barr’s money had and received claim, but reversed as to plaintiffs’ Or. Rev. Stat. 652.610(4) and breach of fiduciary duty claims, and remanded to the district court to decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the section 652.610(4) and breach of fiduciary duty claims. In Allen, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Allen’s motion to remand as well as its grant of summary judgment to NWP. View "Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg'l Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City for retaliation, alleging that he was terminated for planning to testify against the City in a lawsuit relating to age discrimination. Plaintiff alleged that his termination violated both the First Amendment and the retaliation provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 623(d). The court rejected the City's argument that plaintiff's speech was not speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern and so fell outside the First Amendment's protections. In this case, plaintiff's sworn statement and imminent testimony were outside the scope of his ordinary job duties, which means that he was engaged in speech as a citizen for First Amendment purposes. The court also concluded that the retaliation provision of the ADEA does not preclude a plaintiff such as the one in this case from bringing a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Given the substantial difference between the level of scrutiny afforded age discrimination equal protection claims and First Amendment retaliation claims, the court cannot assume that Congress intended the ADEA to affect the availability of section 1983 claims in the same manner in both subject areas. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stilwell v. City of Williams" on Justia Law

This case arises out of a longstanding jurisdictional dispute between two unions representing workers at Terminal 6 at the Port of Portland. In this appeal, the Board challenges the district court’s ruling that it had subject matter jurisdiction to vacate an interlocutory decision of the Board issued under section 10(k) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 160(k). In Leedom v. Kyne, the Supreme Court carved out a narrow exception to the rule precluding jurisdiction over Board decisions beyond that provided in section 10(f). While the court was skeptical that the Board's exercise of jurisdiction was proper, the court need not and did not resolve the question. Whether or not the Board’s decision was ultra vires, the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction under Leedom was improper if PMA had some alternative means to challenge the Board’s section 10(k) decision. In this case, the court concluded that the district court erred in applying Leedom’s second prong because PMA had alternative means available to seek review of the Board’s section 10(k) decision. Because the court concluded that the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction was improper, the court left it to the Board to render a final decision on its own jurisdiction in the first instance. Furthermore, the court concluded that PMA's argument on the basis of NLRB v. Noel Canning fails where it has the opportunity to raise its Noel Canning challenge as an intervenor in the section 8(b)(4)(D) case, or if it later files a petition as an aggrieved person under section 10(f). Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed two complaints against APWU in federal court, alleging a contractual breach of APWU’s duty of fair representation in the first, and alleging a series of violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and Nevada state tort laws in the second. One district court judge dismissed plaintiff's first complaint. The second district court judge dismissed the second complaint, ruling that, because a prima facie claim of disability discrimination against a union necessarily required a showing of a breach of the duty of fair representation, plaintiff's ADA claims were barred by the issue preclusion doctrine. The court endorsed the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Green v. American Federation of Teachers/Illinois Federation of Teachers Local 604, and held that a prima facie disability discrimination claim against a union does not require that a plaintiff demonstrate that the union breached its duty of fair representation. In this case, plaintiff's ADA claims are not barred by issue preclusion. The court also found that plaintiff's second complaint survives APWU's claim preclusion challenge. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Garity v. APWU" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former police officers employed by the City, filed suit against the City under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-19, alleging that the City failed to include payments of unused portions of plaintiffs’ benefits allowances when calculating their regular rate of pay, resulting in a lower overtime rate and a consequent underpayment of overtime compensation. Plaintiffs asserted that the City’s violation of the FLSA was “willful,” entitling them to a three-year statute of limitations. The court concluded that the City’s payment of unused benefits must be included in the regular rate of pay and thus in the calculation of the overtime rate for its police officers as well. Furthermore, because the City took no affirmative steps to ensure that its initial designation of its benefits payments complied with the FLSA and failed to establish that it acted in good faith in excluding those payments from its regular rate of pay, plaintiffs are entitled to a three-year statute of limitations and liquidated damages for the City’s violations. The court concluded, however, that the City has demonstrated that it qualifies for the partial overtime exemption under section 207(k) of the Act, limiting its damages for the overtime violations. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's summary judgment partially in favor of plaintiffs. View "Flores v. City of San Gabriel" on Justia Law

Drywall entered into a labor agreement with the Union according to which Drywall assigned to a contractors' association authority to bargain on its behalf. After Drywall attempted to terminate the agreement, it discovered that the Union and association had executed a Memorandum of Understanding extending the term of the agreement. An arbitrator held that Drywall was bound by the Memorandum.The district court vacated the arbitration award and held that the arbitrator’s interpretation of the parties’ agreement was not “plausible” and was, moreover, contrary to public policy. The court held that the district court's decision exceeded its narrow authority to determine whether the arbitrator’s award was based on the parties’ contract and whether it violated an “explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy,” and therefore the court reversed the district court's decision. View "SWRCC v. Drywall Dynamics" on Justia Law

Robert Carrion sustained a severe knee injury while working as a chassis mechanic, and continued to work at his physically demanding job for the next fifteen years before retiring early. After Carrion’s former employer ceased paying for treatment, he filed for disability under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA or the Longshore Act), 33 U.S.C. 901 et seq. The court affirmed the BRB’s decision upholding the ALJ’s conclusion that Carrion timely filed his claim against SSA where the ALJ and the BRB, in determining whether the one-year statute of limitations on disability claims was met pursuant to 33 U.S.C. 913(a), correctly looked to the date when Carrion became aware that his work for SSA caused a second, cumulative traumatic injury resulting in an impairment of his earning power. The court held that the prospect of a hypothetical future surgery and its anticipated benefits can not transform an otherwise permanent disability into a temporary one for purposes of the Longshore Act. In this case, Carrion's knee injury is a permanent disability. The court explained that evaluating an individual’s condition based on the presumed effect of a theoretical future treatment makes scant sense. Accordingly, the appropriate question to ask is not whether a future surgery would ameliorate Carrion’s knee condition, but whether there was actual or expected improvement to his knee after a normal and natural healing period. Finally, the court concluded that the doctrines of exhaustion and waiver are inapplicable because Carrion presented his claim of permanent disability well before the conclusion of the administrative process and neither SSA nor the agency were blindsided by the argument. Accordingly, the court denied SSA's petition for review of the BRB's decision and granted Carrion's cross-petition for review. View "SSA Terminals & Homeport Ins. v. Carrion" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., alleging that he lost $15.02 and one minute due to his employer's, TWEAN, compensation policy that rounds all employee time stamps to the nearest quarter-hour. The district court granted summary judgment to TWEAN. The court discerned no reason to analyze overtime minutes any differently than regular-time minutes, and the district court committed no error by treating them the same. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that TWEAN’s rounding policy violates 29 C.F.R. 785.48(b), the federal rounding regulation, because TWEAN’s rounding policy is neutral on its face where TWEAN rounds all employee time punches and where his compensation records demonstrate that TWEAN’s rounding policy is neutral in application. The court found that TWEAN’s rounding policy comports with the federal rounding regulation. The court also concluded that the district court properly classified the one minute of uncompensated time as de minimis and appropriately granted summary judgment to TWEAN on plaintiff's “logging-in” claim. Additionally, the district court did not err by limiting consideration of plaintiff’s rounding claim to the time period after the implementation of the Avaya/Kronos timekeeping system. Finally, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to plaintiff’s pre-May 4, 2010 rounding claims; the district court properly granted summary judgment as to the California Labor Code 226 claim; and, because the court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to TWEAN as to plaintiff’s individual rounding claim, there is no need to remand this case to the district court for further proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Corbin v. Time Warner Entm't" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the District and two of its administrators, alleging that she had been wrongfully discharged under Washington law, that her First Amendment rights were infringed, that she was retaliated against for exercising such rights, and that she was entitled to recovery under a variety of other state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, her speech to the school and District administrators is made up of the complaints or concerns raised up the chain of command at plaintiff's workplace about her job that are generally not protected. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the scope of her duties, and the evidence indicates that her communication with District staff fell within her job duties. Further, plaintiff's speech to parents was within the scope of her duties and is not protected by the First Amendment. Therefore, plaintiff failed to meet her burden to show that the relevant speech was made in her capacity as a private citizen, and that the district court’s judgment with respect to plaintiff’s First Amendment claim was proper. The court must vacate the district court’s judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge under Washington law because an intervening authority has overruled the Washington state decision upon which the district court’s analysis was based. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court for consideration of the wrongful discharge claim in light of Rose v. Anderson Hay & Grain Co. However, because the court affirmed with respect to the federal claim, the district court should first consider whether to continue to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. View "Coomes v. Edmonds Sch. Dist. No. 15" on Justia Law