Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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Plaintiffs, three former baristas, filed a class action against Starbucks, challenging the legality of Starbucks’ practice of withholding state and federal taxes from baristas’ paychecks based on the cash tips they receive. As a general practice, the baristas do not report to Starbucks how much they receive in tips. Instead, for tax withholding purposes, the company simply imputes 50 cents per hour in estimated tip income to each barista and withholds state and federal taxes from the baristas’ paychecks based on that amount. The district court granted Starbucks' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that, under the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 1341, and the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. 7421(a), the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court also concluded that the federal-state comity doctrine bars the district court from awarding statutory damages on the state-tax component of plaintiffs’ claims, from which the federal-tax component cannot be severed. Because all of the claims are jurisdictionally barred or foreclosed by the comity doctrine, the court concluded that the entire action must be remanded to state court. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Fredrickson v. Starbucks Corp." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against the Hospital and the Union under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, alleging that the Hospital’s failure to allow her to “bump” back to her prior Ward Clerk position violated a 2007 Seniority Agreement and a 2008 collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Plaintiff also alleged that the Union breached its duty of fair representation by failing to pursue her grievance on this issue. Plaintiff settled her suit against the hospital and the district court granted summary judgment to the Union. The court rejected the Union's argument that the Seniority Agreement is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule or was superseded by the 2008 CBA. The court concluded that plaintiff has shown a violation of the Security Agreement and the CBA. The court also concluded that, if plaintiff's evidence is believed, she has shown a violation of the Union’s duty of fair representation. In this case, there is ample evidence showing that the Union acted improperly by failing to put plaintiff's claims through the Union's own formal mechanisms for reviewing the merits of grievances, by including plaintiff in a class action grievance that did not raise her specific claim, and by providing weak or invalid justifications for rejecting her claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rollins v. Community Hospital of San Bernardino" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, alleging violations of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301-4334. Plaintiff claimed that he was fired from his job after providing notice of his deployment to Afghanistan in the United States Navy Reserve. The court joined its sister circuits and held that the plain text of USERRA does not preclude the compelled arbitration of disputes arising under its provisions. Furthermore, plaintiff has failed to establish that the legislative history evinces Congress’s intent to prevent the enforcement of the arbitration agreement he signed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration and dismissing the complaint. View "Ziober v. BLB Resources" on Justia Law

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The Union filed suit against Aviation Safeguards for violations of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151–165. The district court granted Aviation Safeguards’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Union’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The court held that equitable tolling principles apply to the Union’s unlawful interference and coercion claim; remanded and directed the district court to grant summary judgment for the Union on its claim for unlawful interference and coercion under RLA 152, Third and Fourth; held that the district court erred in finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Union’s status quo claim under RLA 152, Seventh, 155, and 156; remanded this claim for the limited purpose of determining whether this claim is timely and, if the claim is timely, the court directed the district court to grant summary judgment in favor of the Union on its status quo claim; held that Aviation Safeguards unlawfully refused to mediate; and remanded and directed the district court to grant summary judgment in favor of the Union on its failure to mediate claim under RLA 152. View "Herrera v. Command Security" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a former FWS employee, filed suit contending that she was discriminated and retaliated against in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and retaliated against in violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), 5 U.S.C. 1201 et seq. The district court dismissed the WPA claim for lack of jurisdiction based on plaintiffs failure to present the claim to the MSPB. The court held that the statutory scheme governing the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), Pub. L. No. 95-4545, 92 Stat. 1111, and the WPA did not authorize plaintiff to file her WPA claim in district court without first presenting it to the MSPB. The court also held that, although a federal district court can exercise federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331, that general grant of jurisdiction does not apply where it is fairly discernible that Congress intended a statutory review scheme to provide the exclusive avenue to judicial review. Therefore, the scheme precluded the district court from exercising original jurisdiction over plaintiff's WPA claim. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to remand to the MSPB. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kerr v. Jewell" on Justia Law

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Petitioner seeks review of the Board's decision holding that petitioner could not receive concurrent payments for total disability and permanent partial disability under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901–50. In this case, petitioner seeks concurrent compensation for a “scheduled” injury (hearing loss) under 33 U.S.C. 908(c)(13) and total disability caused by his back injury. Stevedoring Servs. of Am. v. Price allows concurrent awards for certain time-delayed injuries. The court held that, where the only evidence of hearing loss is a post-retirement audiogram, the Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs rule applies when determining the timing of disabilities under Price. Here, petitioner's last day of exposure to excessive noise was the same day as his back injury and Price does not apply. Under wage-compensation principles, concurrent payments for total disability and scheduled permanent partial disability are generally unavailable. Therefore, the Price exception does not apply because plaintiff's hearing loss did not precede his back injury. The court rejected petitioner's claim that he should at least be provided a decreased award capped at two-thirds of his wage under ITO Corp. of Baltimore v. Green. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Fenske v. Service Emp. Int'l" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, RSA, alleging retaliatory discharge claims under both state law and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. A jury awarded him lump-sum damages on his state law claims, and the district court then entered judgment in his favor on his ERISA claim. Even though, at plaintiff's request, the jury had been instructed to include front pay in its damages award, the district court granted plaintiff additional equitable remedies consisting of reinstatement as well as front pay until reinstatement occurred. RSA appeals these equitable remedies. Given the way in which the jury was instructed and the evidence presented at trial, the court concluded that the jury’s verdict encompassed an implicit factual determination as to the entire amount of front pay to which plaintiff was entitled on account of his retaliatory discharge. Therefore, the court held that the district court’s grant of an additional front pay remedy for the same harm disregarded that determination in violation of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The court also held that, although the reinstatement remedy does not necessarily conflict with factual findings implicit in the jury’s verdict, it is nevertheless improper because plaintiff waived that relief when he elected to seek the duplicative front pay remedy from the jury. Accordingly, the court reversed the equitable awards. View "Teutscher v. Woodson" on Justia Law

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After BNSF suspended an employee, BMWED filed a complaint against BNSF alleging that BNSF's disciplinary actions interfered with and subverted the Railway Labor Act's (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151-188, grievance and arbitration processes, and sought a declaration that BNSF’s actions violated the RLA. BNSF subsequently filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin BMWED from proceeding with a threatened strike. The district court ruled in favor of BNSF, concluding that the dispute was minor and subject to mandatory arbitration, and enjoining the threatened strike. BMWED filed an interlocutory appeal of the preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the subsequent entry of the final judgment in the case mooted the question of the procedural propriety of the preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the district court properly applied the ConRail test (Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives. Ass’n ) and properly concluded that the parties' dispute is a minor one. The court rejected BMWED's attempts to sidestep the ConRail framework by claiming that the distinction between minor and major disputes does not apply to the case. Rather, the court concluded that this is a dispute that fits squarely within the major/minor framework from the RLA and ConRail. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bhd. of Maint. of Way v. BNSF" on Justia Law

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Hotels appealed the denial of their motion to preliminarily enjoin the City from enforcing the Citywide Hotel Worker Minimum Wage Ordinance. The district court denied Hotels’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Hotels’ motion for a preliminary injunction to stop enforcement of the City’s Wage Ordinance, because the Hotels failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. The court has consistently held that minimum labor standards do not implicate Machinists preemption, and the Wage Ordinance is no different. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "American Hotel and Lodging Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Morris and McDaniel filed suit against Ernst & Young, alleging that the company misclassified Morris and similarly situated employees and denied overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and California laws. Ernst & Young subsequently moved to compel arbitration under the agreements signed by Morris and McDaniel. The district court ordered arbitration and dismissed the case. Morris and McDaniel argue that their employment agreements, where they signed a "concerted action waiver" with the company, violate federal labor laws and cannot be enforced. Plaintiffs claim that the “separate proceedings” clause in the agreement contravenes three federal statutes: the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et. seq., the Norris LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. 101 et seq., and the FLSA. The court agreed with the Board's interpretation of section 7 and section 8 of the NLRA that an employer violates the NLRA when it requires employees covered by the Act, as a condition of their employment, to sign an agreement that precludes them from filing joint, class, or collective claims addressing their wages, hours, or other working conditions against the employer in any forum, arbitral or judicial. In this case, the terms of the concerted action waiver are unenforceable. The “separate proceedings” clause prevents concerted activity by employees in arbitration proceedings, and the requirement that employees only use arbitration prevents the initiation of concerted legal action anywhere else. The court also concluded that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., does not dictate a contrary result. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to determine whether the “separate proceedings” clause was severable from the contract. View "Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP" on Justia Law