Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against Nike, Inc., alleging gender discrimination and hostile workplace claims. During discovery, a collection of internal workplace complaints, known as the Starfish complaints, was produced under a protective order. Three media organizations, including The Oregonian, intervened in the case to gain access to these documents. Plaintiffs' attorney inadvertently sent confidential documents to a reporter from The Oregonian, who refused to return or destroy them upon request.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon initially granted a motion to intervene by the media organizations. However, when the inadvertent disclosure occurred, the magistrate judge ordered The Oregonian to return or destroy the documents. The district court vacated this order, reasoning that it lacked authority to compel a non-party to return the documents. The magistrate judge then denied the motion, and the district court affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court had the inherent authority to order The Oregonian, as an intervenor and thus a party to the case, to return or destroy the confidential documents. The court determined that The Oregonian did not have a First Amendment right to withhold the documents because pretrial discovery proceedings are not public components of the judicial process. The court applied relaxed First Amendment scrutiny and concluded that the district court's exercise of its inherent authority over discovery furthered a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "CAHILL V. NIKE, INC." on Justia Law

Elizabeth Perez, a former employee of Rose Hills Company, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of herself and similarly situated employees, alleging violations of California wage-and-hour laws. The complaint did not specify the amount in controversy or the frequency of the alleged violations. Rose Hills removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which allows removal if the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.The United States District Court for the Central District of California remanded the case to state court, stating that Rose Hills did not meet CAFA’s $5 million amount-in-controversy requirement. The district court found that Rose Hills failed to provide evidence justifying its assumed violation rate, which was used to calculate the amount in controversy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a removing defendant under CAFA is permitted to rely on reasonable assumptions based on the plaintiff’s complaint to calculate the amount in controversy. The court found that Rose Hills’ approach, which included assumptions about the violation rate tethered to the language of the complaint, was reasonable. The district court erred by requiring Rose Hills to provide evidence supporting its assumed violation rate.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to evaluate whether Rose Hills’ violation-rate assumption was a reasonable interpretation of the complaint. The court emphasized that assumptions need not be proven with evidence if they are reasonable interpretations of the complaint’s allegations. View "Perez v. Rose Hills Company" on Justia Law

The case involves the International Union of Operating Engineers, Stationary Engineers, Local 39 (the Union), Macy’s Inc., and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). During negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, Union members rejected Macy’s final offer and went on strike. After three months, the Union ended the strike and offered to return to work unconditionally. Macy’s responded by locking out the Union members, leading the Union to file a charge with the NLRB, alleging that the lockout was an unfair labor practice.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of the Union, finding that Macy’s violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by locking out employees without providing a clear and complete offer outlining the conditions necessary to avoid the lockout. The NLRB adopted the ALJ’s findings and ordered Macy’s to reinstate the employees and compensate them for any losses incurred due to the lockout.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction because the Union was a "person aggrieved" by the NLRB's decision. The court found substantial evidence supporting the NLRB's conclusion that Macy’s failed to clearly inform the Union of the conditions necessary for reinstatement, making the lockout unjustified. The court also upheld the NLRB's decision to deny the Union's request for additional extraordinary remedies, finding that the traditional remedies were sufficient.The court enforced the NLRB's order, including the make-whole relief for direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms suffered by the employees due to the lockout. The court concluded that the NLRB did not abuse its discretion in its remedial order and denied both the Union's and Macy’s petitions for review. View "International Union of Operating Engineers, Stationary Engineers, Local 39 v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the International Union of Operating Engineers, Stationary Engineers, Local 39 (the Union), Macy’s Inc., and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). During negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, Union members rejected Macy’s final offer and went on strike. After three months, the Union ended the strike and offered to return to work unconditionally. Macy’s responded by locking out the Union members, which led the Union to file a charge with the NLRB, alleging that the lockout was an unfair labor practice.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of the Union, finding that Macy’s violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by locking out employees without providing a clear and complete offer outlining the conditions necessary to avoid the lockout. The NLRB adopted the ALJ’s findings and ordered Macy’s to reinstate the employees and compensate them for any losses incurred due to the lockout. Macy’s and the Union both petitioned for review of the NLRB’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction because the Union was a “person aggrieved” by the NLRB’s decision. The court found that substantial evidence supported the NLRB’s conclusion that Macy’s lockout was unlawful because the Union was not clearly and fully informed of the conditions necessary for reinstatement. The court also upheld the NLRB’s remedial order, including the make-whole relief for direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms, finding no clear abuse of discretion.The Ninth Circuit denied both the Union’s and Macy’s petitions for review and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement of its final order. The court concluded that the NLRB’s actions were within its broad discretion to effectuate the policies of the NLRA. View "MACY'S INC. V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD" on Justia Law

After American filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, it sought to reject and to renegotiate its collective bargaining agreements with TWU. American and TWU negotiated new agreements, including an early separation program. TWU members who took advantage of the Early Separation Program filed two putative class-actions alleging that TWU breached its duty of fair representation by excluding them from the bulk of the equity distribution. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the consolidated actions, holding that TWU did not breach its duty of fair representation. In this case, TWU's equity distribution scheme was not arbitrary; the allegations of discrimination were implausible; and TWU did not act in bad faith. View "Demetris v. Transport Workers Union of America" on Justia Law

After plaintiff discovered that she was payed less than her male counterparts for the same work, she filed suit under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5; and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov. Code 12940. The County conceded that it paid plaintiff less than comparable male employees for the same work, but raised an affirmative defense to a claim under the Equal Pay Act that the differential was "based on any other factor other than sex." In this case, the County claimed that the pay differential was a result of prior salary. The court concluded that Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co. is controlling in this case. Kouba held that prior salary can be a factor other than sex, provided that the employer shows that prior salary effectuates some business policy and that the employer uses prior salary reasonably in light of its stated purpose as well as its other practices. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's denial of the County's motion for summary judgment, remanding with instructions for the district court to evaluate the business reasons offered by the County and to determine whether the County used prior salary reasonably in light of its stated purposes as well as its other practices. View "Rizo v. Yovino" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a 53-year-old garbage truck driver, filed suit against USA Waste, his employer of 32 years, alleging wrongful termination based on age discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for USA Waste. The court held that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of USA Waste because plaintiff established a prima facie case under both his age discrimination and retaliation theories, and USA Waste failed to introduce any evidence that it had a legitimate reason for firing him. In this case, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub.L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, did not require proof of employment eligibility from plaintiff, and USA Waste could not make plaintiff's reinstatement contingent on verification of his immigration status because doing so would violate California public policy. Furthermore, plaintiff's use of an attorney was activity protected by California public policy, USA Waste fired plaintiff because he was represented by his attorney at the Settlement Agreement negotiations, and the district court erred by holding that USA Waste provided a legitimate reason for firing plaintiff. Therefore, the court concluded that USA Waste failed to meet its burden as to plaintiff's claim based on retaliation discrimination. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiff's oral request for leave to amend the complaint eight months after the filing deadline. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Santillan v. USA Waste of California" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Matteo Brunozzi and Casey McCormick, technicians for CCI, filed separate suits alleging that CCI's compensation plan violated the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207, and Oregon's statutory requirement that an employer pay all wages earned and unpaid after terminating an employee, ORS 652.140. Brunozzi also alleged additional claims under Oregon law. The district court granted summary judgment for CCI. The court held that CCI's pay plan violated the FLSA's overtime provisions. In this case, the diminishing "bonus" device in CCI's pay plan caused it to miscalculate the technicians' regular hourly rate during weeks when they work overtime and allowed CCI to pay the technicians less during those weeks. Consequently, the court reversed as to this issue and also reversed as to plaintiffs' claim under ORS 652.140. Having examined the text, context, and pertinent legislative history, the court found that the Oregon legislature intended the term "reported" in ORS 659A.199 to mean a report of information to either an external or internal authority. In this case, Brunozzi complained to his supervisors on several occasions that he was not being properly compensated for overtime. Therefore, the court reversed as to Brunozzi's retaliation claim under ORS 659A.199. The court also reversed as to Brunozzi's retaliation claim under ORS 652.355 where the act of complaining about inadequate wages was a protected activity. View "Brunozzi v. Cable Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a county correctional officer, filed suit alleging that the county sheriff created a sexually hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov't Code 12900 et seq. Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that defendant greeted her with unwelcome hugs on more than one hundred occasions, and a kiss at least once, during a 12-year period. The district court granted summary judgment for the sheriff and the county. The court concluded that a reasonable juror could conclude that the differences in hugging of men and women were not, as defendants argue, just "genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite sex." The court also held that the district court's contrary conclusion may have been influenced by application of incorrect legal standards. In this case, the district court had not properly considered the totality of the circumstances where the district court failed to consider whether a reasonable juror would find that hugs, in the kind, number, frequency, and persistence described by plaintiff, created a hostile work environment. The court concluded that plaintiff submitted evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that, even if the sheriff also hugged men on occasion, there were "qualitative and quantitative differences" in the hugging conduct toward the two genders. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Zetwick v. County of Yolo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the county and certain county officials after she was terminated as a litigation attorney for the Maricopa County Attorney's Office (MCAO). Before her termination, county officials requested that she not be assigned further cases in which the county was a party and which involved risk management. A jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, finding that she was terminated in retaliation for her exercise of First Amendment rights in speaking to a newspaper reporter, and against certain county officials for state-law based tortious interference with her employment contract. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could conclude that the county's risk management office was not the client. Therefore, the court reversed the tortious interference with contract judgment because Defendants Wilson and Armfield's conduct was not improper. With the legally defined scope of an attorney's duties in mind, the court explained that it becomes obvious that plaintiff's comments to the newspaper could not constitute constitutionally protected citizen speech under the principles from Dahlia v. Rodriguez. Accordingly, the court reversed the First Amendment retaliation verdict. The court remanded for the district court to enter judgment for defendants and vacated the fee award. View "Brandon v. Maricopa County" on Justia Law