Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff was terminated from his position as a police officer, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging retaliatory discharge in violation of the First Amendment based on the comments he made as a candidate for town council that were critical of his employer. The district court denied Police Chief Rob Hall qualified immunity. The court concluded, however, that Hall is entitled to qualified immunity because it was debatable at the time of plaintiff's dismissal that his speech interests as a citizen outweighed Hall’s interests as a public employer. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Brickey v. Hall" on Justia Law

After William Gault terminated plaintiff from her position as deputy clerk, plaintiff filed suit challenging her termination on First Amendment grounds. The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that plaintiff occupied a confidential or policymaking position and was subject to termination for campaigning against her boss. The court reversed the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to Gault based on the Elrod-Branti exception, determining that it could not, as a matter of law, conclude that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of plaintiff's former position as a deputy clerk; Gault has not established the defense of qualified immunity; the court found unpersuasive Gault's contention that the Eleventh Amendment immunizes him from suit for monetary damages in his official capacity; and the history of this case does not present the court with an adequate Pickering record to review. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lawson v. Union County Clerk of Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Arab-American Muslim woman from Morocco, filed suit against Fairview, alleging claims, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1981, for race discrimination (Count I), hostile work environment (Count II), and retaliation (Count III); and pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000(e) et seq., claims for discrimination based on religion, national origin, and pregnancy (Count IV), hostile work environment (Count V), and retaliation (Count VI). The district court granted summary judgment for Fairview on all six counts. In regard to the discrimination and retaliation counts, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to meet plaintiff's burden to show pretext. In this case, the evidence supports plaintiff's argument that when she complained to her supervisor, who was also her alleged harasser, the supervisor decided to terminate her and immediately got the decision approved. Furthermore, the absence of any evidence to support Fairview’s lack-of-work explanation is also important. Although Fairview claims that there were discussions of eliminating plaintiff's position in the past, there is no record evidence to support that claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated as to Counts III and VI. Likewise, the court reversed as to the remaining counts. By failing to address numerous comments that were open to a racially motivated interpretation, and by circumscribing its analysis to just one comment without reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the district court committed reversible error in its grant of summary judgment for Fairview. View "Guessous v. Fairview Property Investments" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former Fairfax County fire captains, filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-219, alleging that they are entitled to overtime pay. The court held that plaintiffs do not fall within the FLSA's exception for certain executive and administrative employees whose primary job duties are management-related. In this case, the County has not submitted evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find, under the clear and convincing standard, that plaintiffs’ primary duty is anything other than first response. Therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to overtime compensation under the FLSA. The court reversed and remanded. View "Morrison v. County of Fairfax, VA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, exotic dancers, filed suit alleging that their dance clubs failed to comply with the minimum wage standards pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and corresponding Maryland wage and hour laws. The district court held that plaintiffs were employees of the defendant companies and not independent contractors. The court concluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the relationship between plaintiffs and defendants falls on the employee side of the spectrum. The court found that the many ways in which defendants directed the dancers rose to the level of control that an employer would typically exercise over an employee. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in rejecting defendants’ good faith defense for the period prior to September 2011 and awarding plaintiffs liquidated damages for that period; the trial court correctly excluded evidence showing plaintiffs’ earnings in the form of tips and performance fees; and the court found no grounds for reversal based on defendant's claims of error regarding jury instructions, the verdict sheet, or the denial of a new trial motion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "McFeeley v. Jackson Street Entm't" on Justia Law

After CSX charged plaintiff, one of its employees, with "serious" violations of the company's safety policy, plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20109, alleging that he was disciplined in retaliation for his activities as local chairman of the transportation union. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CSX, concluding that plaintiff had failed to show that any CSX employee involved in the disciplinary process had also known about his union activities. The court held that the “knowledge” relevant for a retaliation claim under the FRSA must be tied to the decision-maker involved in the unfavorable personnel action. The court concluded that, because plaintiff does not present sufficient evidence that the relevant CSX decision-makers knew of his protected activities, his claims fail as a matter of law at the prima facie stage. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Conrad v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

After registered nurses employed at the Hospitals elected the Union as their bargaining representative, the Hospitals challenged the election results and refused the Union’s requests to bargain. The Board issued a final decision concluding that the Hospitals violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., by refusing to bargain with the Union. Determining that the Hospitals did not waive their argument regarding the Board's lack of quorum, the court gave deference to the Board's interpretation and concluded that the Regional Director’s authority to act was not abrogated during the period when the Board lacked a quorum. The court rejected the Hospitals' argument that the Regional Director was not validly appointed because the Acting General Counsel, was without authority to act at the time of Regional Director Harrell’s appointment. It is the Board - not the General Counsel - that retains final authority over the appointment of a Regional Director, and the Board approved the appointment of the Regional Director in this case. The court further concluded that there is no merit in the Hospitals' contention that the Board appointed the Regional Director after the Board lost a quorum and consequently, the appointment was invalid. Finally, the court concluded that the Hospitals’ sole challenge to the merits of the Board’s final decision was baseless. Accordingly, the court granted the Board's application for enforcement. View "NLRB v. Bluefield Hospital" on Justia Law

After the Board certified a collective bargaining unit consisting of all maintenance employees at an ice-cream production facility operated by Dreyers, the company contends that the Board petitioned for review. The court held that the Board acted within its broad discretion in certifying the Union’s petitioned-for unit where the Regional Director (RD), under the Specialty Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center of Mobile framework, applied the traditional community-of-interest factors to determine not only that the maintenance employees share a community of interest amongst themselves, but also that maintenance employees form a group distinct from production employees. By doing so, the RD did not allow the extent of organization to control his decision. The court rejected Dreyer's objections that focused on attacking Specialty Healthcare rather than on the Board's decision in this case. Accordingly, the court denied Dreyer's petition for review and granted the Board's cross-petition for enforcement. View "Nestle Dreyer's Ice Cream Co. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Maritime employed Elmer Escalante, an undocumented alien, at one of its two full-service carwashes. After Escalante filed a complaint against Maritime with the EEOC for discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., the EEOC issued a subpoena seeking information from Maritime related to Escalante’s charges. The parties disagree on how Escalante’s undocumented status affects the EEOC’s authority to investigate his charges. The district court denied the EEOC's application for subpoena enforcement. The court held that the EEOC’s subpoena, designed to investigate Escalante’s Title VII charges, is enforceable. In this case, the plain language of Title VII provides a "plausible" or "arguable" basis for the EEOC's subpoena where Title VII allows any "person claiming to be aggrieved" to file charges with the EEOC, and nothing explicitly bars undocumented workers from filing complaints. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "EEOC v. Maritime Autowash, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, trainees at the Casino, filed a putative class action against the Casino, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-219; the Maryland Wage and Hour Law (MWHL), Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. 3-401 to -431; and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (MWPCL), Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. 3-501 to -509. The district court granted the Casino's motion to dismiss, holding that the trainees failed to show that the primary beneficiary of their attendance at the training was the Casino rather than themselves. The court concluded that the trainees alleged facts supporting their claim that the Casino, and not the trainees, primarily benefited from the training where the Casino received a very large and immediate benefit - an entire workforce of over 800 dealers trained to operate table games to the Casino’s specifications at the very moment the table games became legal. The trainees, in contrast, received very little because the training was unique to the Casino’s specifications and not transferable to work in other casinos. Moreover, there are charges that the training was either conceived or carried out in such a way as to violate the spirit of the minimum wage law. Finally, the trainees allege, and the Casino acknowledges, that the Casino paid all participants in the "dealer school" the minimum hourly wage for the last two days of the twelve weeks of training. Because the trainees have alleged sufficient facts to support their claims, the court reversed and remanded. View "Harbourt v. PPE Casino Resorts Maryland" on Justia Law