Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

An African American employee worked as a driver for a metal recycling company in South Carolina for several months in 2017. During his employment, he experienced repeated racial harassment from white coworkers and supervisors, including the frequent use of racial slurs, exposure to racist cartoons, and derogatory comments both in person and on social media. The employee also believed he was denied training and promotional opportunities due to his race. He refrained from making complaints initially out of fear of retaliation, as a manager had previously warned him against associating with African American coworkers who had complained about discrimination. On June 13, 2017, after a racially offensive incident involving his manager, the employee complained directly to the manager about racial harassment and discrimination. He was immediately suspended and, after providing a written statement, was terminated a week later.After his termination, the employee filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging a racially hostile work environment, race discrimination in training and promotion, and retaliatory discharge under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court, adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation in part, held that the hostile work environment and race discrimination claims were time-barred. The court also granted summary judgment to the employer on the retaliatory discharge claim, concluding that the employee’s termination was due to “belligerent and insubordinate conduct” rather than retaliation and that no reasonable jury could find otherwise.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that genuine disputes of material fact existed as to whether the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretext for retaliation and whether retaliation was a but-for cause of the discharge. The appellate court therefore vacated the summary judgment on the retaliatory discharge claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Stewart v. GES Recycling South Carolina LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former employee of a company participating in a deferred profit-sharing plan, sought to liquidate his 401(k) account in anticipation of a post-election stock market increase. He requested that the plan’s record keeper, Fidelity, complete the liquidation rapidly and in a manner advantageous for tax purposes. The plaintiff claimed that Fidelity’s communications led him to believe he would have quicker access to his funds than ultimately occurred, resulting in a missed investment opportunity. Additionally, he alleged that the plan administrator, Altria, failed to provide him with a copy of the administrative services agreement (ASA) between Altria and Fidelity, which he requested under ERISA.After the plaintiff’s formal complaint was denied by the plan administrator, he appealed to the plan’s management committee, which upheld the denial. He then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, raising claims for denial of benefits, breach of fiduciary duty, and failure to provide plan documents. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all remaining claims, finding that the plan administrator’s denial was reasonable, that Fidelity was not acting as a fiduciary or had not breached any fiduciary duties, and that the ASA was not a document required to be disclosed under ERISA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s rulings on the denial of benefits and breach of fiduciary duty claims, concluding that the plan administrator’s decision was reasonable and that Fidelity was not a fiduciary in this context or had not breached any such duty. However, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision regarding the ASA, holding that it was a document under which the plan was operated and remanded for consideration of statutory penalties. The court affirmed the award of attorney’s fees to the defendants. View "Kelly v. Altria Client Services, LLC" on Justia Law

After a workplace injury, an employee developed a disability that prevented him from performing his previous physically demanding job as a pest control technician. He repeatedly requested reassignment to a less demanding “light-duty” position, providing medical documentation and engaging with his employer about his limitations and desire to return to work. Despite these requests, the employer neither responded substantively nor engaged in discussions about available light-duty positions. Over sixteen months, the employee remained on unpaid leave and ultimately resigned after the employer filled several suitable positions without contacting him.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on both claims brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court found that the employee could not perform the essential functions of his original position with a reasonable accommodation and concluded that placing him on indefinite unpaid leave constituted a reasonable accommodation. It also determined that the unlawful termination claim failed because the employee had voluntarily resigned.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether the employer was obligated to reassign the employee to a light-duty position and whether it failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. The court clarified that the ADA requires consideration of whether an employee can perform the essential functions of the desired position, not just the original one, and that indefinite unpaid leave is not a reasonable accommodation when reassignment is possible. However, the court affirmed dismissal of the unlawful termination claim because the employee failed to exhaust administrative remedies on that claim. The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the summary judgment on the failure to accommodate claim, but affirmed summary judgment on the unlawful termination claim. View "Dieng v. Orkin, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney for the City of Martinsville, Virginia, sought leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in November 2021 to care for his mother. He submitted an FMLA certification form, personally completing the section meant for a medical provider and subsequently obtaining a nurse’s signature. After submitting the form to his employer, concerns arose regarding the authenticity of the certification, specifically whether the medical provider was aware of signing a FMLA-related document. The plaintiff was questioned by his supervisor about the circumstances and ultimately terminated after declining to resign.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia reviewed the plaintiff’s claim that his FMLA rights had been interfered with when his employer contacted his mother’s medical provider for authentication before giving him an opportunity to cure any alleged deficiency. The district court assumed qualified immunity was a defense to FMLA interference claims, but denied the defendant’s summary judgment motion, ruling that federal regulations clearly established the right to a cure period before such contact.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the interlocutory appeal, focusing on whether it was clearly established in November 2021 that an employer was prohibited from contacting a certifying medical provider for authentication without first offering the employee an opportunity to cure any inauthenticity. The Fourth Circuit found that the relevant FMLA regulations were not sufficiently clear to place this right “beyond debate” and concluded that a reasonable official could interpret the regulations as not requiring a cure period for authenticity concerns. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on whether qualified immunity is available as a defense to FMLA interference claims. View "Mook v. Hall" on Justia Law

Dr. Mark Lee, age 59 at hiring, was appointed Chair of the Department of Neurosurgery at West Virginia University’s School of Medicine and also employed as a pediatric neurosurgeon by University Health Associates. By spring 2020, senior administrators raised concerns about Lee’s performance, including absenteeism and lack of engagement. In March 2021, Lee was offered a new position requiring him to step down as Chair, which he ultimately declined. Discussions about his removal continued, during which Lee was allegedly told the university sought a younger Chair. After Lee’s attorney raised age discrimination concerns in July and August 2021, Lee was informed he would be removed as Chair effective September 1, 2021, rather than the previously discussed later date. Lee subsequently resigned in January 2022 and pursued claims for age discrimination, retaliation, and breach of contract.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia dismissed claims against WVU defendants on sovereign immunity grounds and granted summary judgment to University Health Associates on all remaining claims. The district court found Lee’s age discrimination claim lacked direct and circumstantial evidence, noting Lee’s replacement and the decisionmaker were of similar age. Lee’s retaliation claims failed because the removal process began before his complaints, and the decision to accelerate his removal was attributed to his conduct at a July meeting rather than his protected activity. The breach-of-contract claims were rejected based on the employment agreement’s terms and integration clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for University Health Associates on Lee’s age discrimination, retaliation (removal and constructive discharge), and breach-of-contract claims. However, it vacated the judgment on Lee’s claim that the acceleration of his removal constituted unlawful retaliation, finding genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that claim. View "Lee v. West Virginia University Medical Corp." on Justia Law

Two journalists, both of Iraqi national origin, worked for a Virginia-based media company operating Arabic-language broadcasts targeting the Middle East and North Africa. The company maintained a mandatory Code of Ethics and social media policy requiring its journalists to remain neutral both in their reporting and in personal social media posts. Both journalists violated these policies by posting political content on social media, and after refusing direct orders to remove the posts, each was terminated. They alleged that the company enforced its policies more harshly against Iraqi journalists than non-Iraqi journalists and that their terminations were discriminatory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.Each journalist filed a separate lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, asserting claims of national origin discrimination. Both district courts granted the employer’s motions to dismiss, finding that the complaints failed to allege sufficient facts to plausibly support a claim of discrimination. Specifically, the courts found that neither plaintiff identified non-Iraqi employees who engaged in similarly insubordinate conduct—such as violating the same policies after direct warnings—yet were treated more favorably.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both cases de novo. The court affirmed the district courts’ decisions, holding that the plaintiffs’ complaints did not state plausible claims for relief under Title VII. The court found that the facts alleged showed the plaintiffs were terminated for insubordination and repeated policy violations, not because of their national origin, and that the comparator allegations were too generalized to support an inference of discrimination. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying one plaintiff leave to amend, as no request for leave was made and amendment would have been futile. The judgments of dismissal were affirmed. View "Aljizzani v. Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc." on Justia Law

Hourly workers at a brewing company’s Williamsburg, Virginia facility alleged that the company failed to pay them for various pre- and post-shift activities, including donning and doffing personal protective equipment, complying with COVID-19 protocols, attending shift-handoff meetings, and handling tools. The company used an electronic badge system for entry but compensated employees based on scheduled shift hours, not actual time on site. Different employees performed these tasks at different times and locations, with some tasks done at home, some during shift hours, and some on the premises outside shift hours. The company committed to pay for all hours actually worked, provided employees notified management about extra time worked.The plaintiffs filed suit under the Virginia Wage Payment Act, the Virginia Overtime Wage Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, seeking class certification for wage and hour claims. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia certified the class, finding that common questions predominated, such as whether the company’s policy resulted in uncompensated mandatory work. The district court’s class definition included all hourly employees at the facility within the relevant timeframe, and it denied the company’s motion to decertify the FLSA collective action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred by certifying the class without adequately considering significant variations among employees regarding their pre- and post-shift activities, the timing and location of those activities, and the applicable legal standards over time. The appellate court found that the class definition was overly broad and failed to account for differences among employees. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit vacated the class certification order and remanded for further proceedings, allowing the district court to consider narrower subclasses or to deny certification entirely. The appeal regarding the FLSA collective action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Overby v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC" on Justia Law

A former employee brought a class-action lawsuit against his previous employer, alleging that the company’s practices concerning rounding employees’ time entries and automatically deducting meal breaks resulted in violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act. The employer operated manufacturing facilities in North Carolina and used policies that rounded employee work time and deducted unpaid meal breaks regardless of whether an employee actually took the break. Plaintiffs argued these policies led to unpaid overtime and wages.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina initially certified two classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and conditionally certified a collective action under the FLSA. However, after further developments and evidence showing that individualized inquiries would be necessary to determine whether employees were harmed by the time-rounding and meal-deduction policies, and that not all employees suffered wage loss, the district court decertified the classes and collective action. Subsequently, the named plaintiffs settled their individual claims with the employer, and the district court dismissed all remaining substantive claims with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was asked to review the district court’s order decertifying the classes and collective action. The court held that because the plaintiff voluntarily settled his individual claims before filing the appeal, he lacked standing to challenge the district court’s decertification order. The court reasoned that once the individual claims underlying the request for class certification are settled or dismissed voluntarily, the plaintiff no longer retains a concrete interest sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Mebane v. GKN Driveline North America, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of former employees of a company that operated a manufacturing facility in Virginia sued the company after it announced it would close and began terminating employees. They alleged violations of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act) due to insufficient notice of the plant closure, and violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) relating to the improper termination of a severance plan. The employees initially named an investment group and several related parties as defendants, claiming they were alter egos or successors of the company and should be jointly liable. However, before trial, the employees voluntarily dismissed the investment group and related parties without prejudice, focusing instead on the liability of the company itself.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted summary judgment in part, including dismissing claims by employees who signed releases, and ultimately entered a money judgment against the company after a bench trial. The employees were unable to collect on this judgment due to the company's insolvency. They then filed a new lawsuit against the investment group and various related parties, seeking to enforce the prior judgment on alter ego and veil piercing theories and claiming federal jurisdiction under the WARN Act and ERISA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court's dismissal of the new lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit held that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a prior federal judgment against parties not found liable in the original action, absent independent allegations of new federal statutory violations. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, concluding that neither federal question jurisdiction nor ancillary jurisdiction applied because the plaintiffs did not allege new violations of the WARN Act or ERISA. View "Messer v. Garrison Investment Group, LP" on Justia Law

A financial advisory employee of a large securities firm participated in a compensation program called the WealthChoice Awards, which provided annual contingent cash awards to select high-performing advisors. To earn these awards, an advisor had to meet certain revenue thresholds and remain employed at the company for eight years after the award was granted. A notional, unfunded account tracked a benchmark investment, but no funds were set aside for the advisor during the vesting period. If the advisor left the company before vesting, the award was typically forfeited. After vesting, payment was mandatory and made promptly, usually while the advisor was still employed. The stated purpose of the program was to incentivize retention and productivity, not to provide retirement income.After voluntarily resigning and forfeiting unvested awards, the employee filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. He alleged that the WealthChoice Awards program was an “employee pension benefit plan” under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), and that it violated ERISA’s vesting and anti-forfeiture rules. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer, finding that the program was a bonus plan exempt from ERISA.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that the WealthChoice Awards program is a bonus payment plan and not an ERISA-covered pension benefit plan. The court reasoned that the program’s primary purpose was to enhance retention and productivity, eligibility was limited, the awards were not funded with deferred employee income, and payment was not systematically deferred until employment termination or retirement. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Milligan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc." on Justia Law