Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Plaintiff was diagnosed with an eye disease. In 2010, Plaintiff’s contract with her employer expired and was not renewed. Plaintiff filed discrimination and retaliation claims against Defendants. The district court awarded summary judgment to Defendants, concluding (1) Plaintiff was not an Americans with Disabilities Act “qualified individual”; (2) Defendants’ denial of Plaintiff’s request for reasonable accommodations did not constitute discharge; and (3) Defendants’ decision not to rehire Plaintiff was for a non-discriminatory reason. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendants acted for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, and therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants failed. View "Velez-Ramirez v. Commonwealth of P.R." on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board (Board) issued an order ruling that a Massachusetts car dealership was liable for unfair labor practices. The dealership petitioned for review, arguing that the Board’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence and that the Board applied its precedents arbitrarily and capriciously. The Board, in turn, petitioned for enforcement of its order. The Supreme Court denied the dealership’s petition for review and granted the Board’s petition for enforcement, holding that the Board’s rulings were supported by substantial evidence and by reasoning that was not arbitrary and capricious. View "Boch Imports Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Article 3 of Puerto Rico’s Law No. 80 requires companies that operate in Puerto Rico to pay a “mesada” - or a statutory severance - to employees who are terminated without “just cause.” Plaintiffs were the former, and least senior, employees in American’s sole Puerto Rico office. Plaintiffs could be entitled to a mesada only if their seniority was computed in relation to America’s offices worldwide. The district court ruled in favor of American, concluding that Article 3 counts only those transfers that occur in Puerto Rico and none that are made to or from an office outside of it. In January, the First Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico concerning the proper interpretation of Article 3. The First Circuit received the Supreme Court’s response and, on that basis, affirmed the district court’s judgment ruling in favor of American. Specifically, the First Circuit held that because American has only one office in Puerto Rico, American does not make transfers that could trigger the method for computing seniority that would benefit Plaintiffs. View "Carrasquillo-Ortiz v. American Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Tang began working at Citizens' Boston Commercial Real Estate Group in 2007. After applying for a position as a portfolio manager in the Technology Banking Group, Tang interviewed with Nackley in 2010, who had arranged the interview at a restaurant that Tang characterized as a popular dating spot. During the interview, Tang alleges, Nackley focused on personal matters and topics not relevant to the transfer. Tang, who is Chinese, recalled that Nackley expressed his views that Asian women are obedient and mentioned live-in au pairs whom he had hired from Thailand. He told Tang that the au pairs did not wear sufficiently revealing swimsuits and offered to teach Tang to golf. Nackley asked whether Tang was married and enquired where she looked to find a boyfriend. Tang showed Nackley examples of her work. Nackley encouraged her to apply for a position as a senior portfolio manager. Tang got the position and alleges that similar incidents followed, that she reported Nackley to human resources, and that she was terminated in 2011. The district court rejected her sexual harassment and retaliation suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The First Circuit vacated, finding that Tang’s evidence was sufficient to survive summary judgment. View "Tang v. Citizens Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The City of Boston and other Massachusetts communities and state employers, in selecting police officers for promotion to the position of sergeant in 2005 and 2008, adapted a test developed by a Massachusetts state agency. The test was the result of an effort to eliminate the use of race and other improper considerations in decisions involving public employment. Some of the Black and Hispanic applicants who were not selected for promotion filed suit, claiming that the use of the test resulted in an unjustified “disparate impact” in violation of Title VII. The district court entered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that the test was a valid selection tool and that Plaintiffs failed to prove that there was an alternative valid selection tool available that would have resulted in the promotion of a higher percentage of Black and Hispanic officers. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court applied correct legal standards and that the record contained sufficient support for the court’s findings. View "Lopez v. City of Lawrence, Massachusetts" on Justia Law

The Massachusetts Delivery Association (MDA), a trade organization representing same-day delivery companies in Massachusetts, brought this suit on behalf of its members seeking a declaration that “Prong 2” of the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Statute is preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) as well as an injunction barring the Attorney General from enforcing Prong 2 against its members. After the First Circuit twice remanded the case, the district court held that the FAAAA preempts Prong 2 as to the members of the MDA as a matter of logical effect. Applying the logic of the First Circuit's decision in Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., the First Circuit affirmed, holding that the application of Prong 2 to the members of the MDA is preempted by the FAAAA. View "Massachusetts Delivery Ass’n v. Healey" on Justia Law

After he was terminated from his employment Plaintiff sued his former employer and its parent company (collectively, Defendants) alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and its Massachusetts analog. Plaintiff also alleged a state wrongful discharge claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in its assessment that Plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination; and (2) correctly concluded that Plaintiff failed to carry his burden of establishing that his termination implicated a sufficiently important and clearly defined public policy in Massachusetts. View "Murray v. Warren Pumps, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a discrimination and retaliation suit against his Employer, alleging illegal harassment, discrimination and retaliation. Employer filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it did not employ the minimum number of employees necessary to qualify as an “employer” under either the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to Employer’s motion for summary judgment, attaching a post-discovery sworn statement in support of his opposition. Employer requested that the district court strike the sworn statement. The district court granted Employer’s motions for summary judgment and to strike Employer’s sworn statement under the sham affidavit doctrine. The district court then sanctioned Plaintiff’s counsel for filing the sham affidavit after he received repeated warnings in earlier cases not to do so. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) striking Plaintiff’s sworn statement; (2) granting summary judgment to Employer on the basis that Plaintiff did not meet his burden of showing that Employer had enough employees to qualify as a covered employer under either the ADA or ADEA; and (3) ordering sanctions. View "Escribano-Reyes v. Prof’l HEPA Certificate Corp." on Justia Law

While working for Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., Plaintiff claimed a disability arising from her “pregnancy status.” Plaintiff, however, claimed she could perform the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation. Wal-Mart refused Plaintiff’s accommodation request and later terminated her. Plaintiff brought this action against Wal-Mart claiming violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the New Hampshire Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart on all claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge correctly granted summary judgment to Wal-Mart on the ADA claim, as Plaintiff failed to create a trial worthy issue as to whether she could have performed an essential function of her job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (2) Plaintiff’s challenges to the dismissal of her state-law claims of unlawful disability discrimination and retaliation were without merit. View "Lang v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P." on Justia Law

In 2004, five structural steel contractors filed a complaint against a local union - Labor Union No. 7 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron Workers - alleging labor law violations under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), antitrust law violations under the Sherman Act, and other violations under state law. The First Circuit reviewed the matter and found elements pertaining to the federal claims undeveloped. Therefore, the Court remanded for further proceedings. After a trial, the case once again reached the First Circuit, with both parties appealing and cross-appealing various aspects of the final judgment. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions upholding the LMRA jury verdict and award of damages for Plaintiffs D.F.M. Industries, Inc. and Ajax Construction Company, Inc. and granting summary judgment for Defendant on the antitrust claims, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Am. Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Local Union No. 7" on Justia Law