Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Giovanni Irizarry Sierra worked as an Attorney Advisor for the Social Security Administration (SSA) in Puerto Rico and was terminated in March 2019 for unsatisfactory performance. He subsequently filed a complaint with the SSA’s Office of Civil Rights and Equal Opportunity (OCREO), alleging that his termination was the result of discrimination and retaliation. The OCREO reorganized his allegations, dismissing one as untimely and bifurcating the remainder into pre-termination and termination discrimination claims. The termination claim was treated as a “mixed case” because it involved both discrimination and an adverse personnel action.After receiving a report of investigation, Irizarry requested a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ dismissed the termination claim for lack of jurisdiction, explaining that mixed cases must proceed through the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), not the EEOC. Irizarry then appealed his termination claim to the MSPB, which sustained his removal and notified him that he had thirty days from the final decision to seek judicial review in federal district court. Irizarry did not file within that period. Later, the OCREO erroneously issued a Final Agency Decision (FAD) on the termination claim, which was subsequently rescinded.Irizarry filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, relying on the rescinded FAD. The SSA moved to dismiss, arguing the complaint was untimely and the FAD was issued in error. The district court granted the motion, finding the claims time-barred and rejecting Irizarry’s arguments for equitable tolling and estoppel.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that Irizarry’s claim was untimely because he failed to file within thirty days of the MSPB’s final decision, and equitable relief was not warranted. View "Irizarry Sierra v. Bisignano" on Justia Law

An employee of an airline company in Puerto Rico suffered a work-related injury when an airplane door struck his head. After the incident, he sought medical treatment and eventually reported to Puerto Rico’s State Insurance Fund (the Fund) for workers’ compensation. The employer did not initially provide the necessary incident report for the Fund, nor did it file a Work Accident Report with the Fund until nearly two years later. The employee was placed on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and continued to receive treatment, including surgery and physical therapy. While still under medical care and unable to return to work, he was terminated by the employer, who cited his failure to keep them informed of his status.The employee filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, alleging several claims under federal and Puerto Rico law, including a retaliation claim under Puerto Rico’s Whistle-Blower Act (Law 115). The district court dismissed some claims at the motion to dismiss stage and granted summary judgment on the remaining claims, including the Law 115 retaliation claim. The district court found that the five-month gap between the employee’s report to the Fund and his termination was too long to establish causation, and also concluded that the employer’s stated reasons for termination were not pretextual.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the summary judgment ruling de novo. The court held that the district court erred by treating close temporal proximity as a necessary condition for causation and by failing to consider the employer’s shifting explanations for the termination as evidence of pretext. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment on the Law 115 claim and remanded for further proceedings, holding that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding causation and pretext. View "Mercado v. Hyannis Air Service, Inc." on Justia Law

A long-serving postal employee applied for two higher-level postmaster positions in New Hampshire. At the time of her applications, she was 58 years old and had significant experience. For the first position, she was interviewed by her supervisor but was not selected; instead, a 36-year-old man was chosen, with the supervisor citing his greater relevant experience. Several months later, she applied for a second position, was again interviewed by the same supervisor, and was again passed over in favor of a man, this time 53 years old. During the second interview, the supervisor remarked that the office had never had a female postmaster and questioned whether the applicant had the energy for the job. The applicant believed she was denied both promotions due to her age and sex, and she pursued administrative remedies before filing suit.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire granted summary judgment to the employer, the United States Postal Service, on all claims. The court found that the employer had provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decisions and that no reasonable jury could find those reasons to be pretextual. The court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to both the age and sex discrimination claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the summary judgment decision de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the age discrimination claims, holding that the plaintiff had waived any argument for a more lenient causation standard and that, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, no reasonable jury could find pretext. The court also affirmed summary judgment on the sex discrimination claim related to the first promotion. However, the court reversed summary judgment on the sex discrimination claim regarding the second promotion, finding that the supervisor’s comments during the interview created a genuine dispute of material fact as to pretext and discriminatory motive. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that claim. View "Warner v. Steiner" on Justia Law

The appellant, a former Senior Vice President of Corporate Development at a pharmaceutical company, had a longstanding history of back and hip problems, leading him to stop working in 2014. He received long-term disability benefits under an insurance plan administered by USAble Life for several years. In 2019, USAble terminated his benefits, citing evidence of significant improvements in his physical condition, including weight loss, increased exercise, travel, and other activities inconsistent with total disability. The termination was based on updated medical records, surveillance, and reviews by independent physicians, despite continued support for disability from some of the appellant’s treating doctors.After the termination, the appellant pursued multiple rounds of internal appeals with USAble, submitting additional medical and vocational evidence. USAble obtained further independent medical reviews, which consistently concluded that the appellant was no longer disabled under the plan’s definition. The appellant then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which granted summary judgment in favor of USAble, finding that the insurer’s decision was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo but applied a deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard to USAble’s benefits determination, as required under ERISA. The First Circuit held that USAble’s decision to terminate benefits was reasoned and supported by substantial evidence, that USAble properly applied the plan’s definition of disability, and that it adequately explained its disagreement with the appellant’s treating physicians. The court also found that any structural conflict of interest was sufficiently mitigated. Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of USAble. View "Bernitz v. USAble Life" on Justia Law

Matthew Waleyko was employed as a civilian computer scientist at the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, a division of the U.S. Navy. His employment was subject to a two-year probationary period. During his tenure, he faced complaints from female coworkers, Beibhinn Gallagher and Layna Nelson, regarding his behavior and alleged misconduct. Gallagher accused him of being condescending and making her feel sexually harassed, while Nelson falsely reported that he had deleted code files. Additionally, Waleyko was investigated for being emotionally unstable after crying in his supervisor's office. Ultimately, he was asked to resign or face termination, and he chose to resign.Waleyko filed a complaint with the Department of the Navy, which was investigated by the Department of Defense's Investigations and Resolutions Directorate. After receiving an unfavorable final agency decision, he filed a lawsuit in the District of Rhode Island, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII. The district court dismissed his suit for failure to state a claim, concluding that he did not specifically describe instances of disparate treatment based on his gender.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that Waleyko's complaint lacked sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim for relief. The court found that his allegations were speculative and did not support a reasonable inference that his termination was based on his gender. The court also noted that the alleged procedural irregularities in the Navy's investigations did not demonstrate sex-based bias and that the gender-neutral terms used to describe Waleyko did not support a gender-stereotyping claim. View "Waleyko v. Del Toro" on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Lisa Menninger, who was the Executive Director for Laboratory Operations at PPD Development, L.P. (PPD). Menninger claimed that PPD discriminated and retaliated against her due to her social anxiety disorder, violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Massachusetts antidiscrimination law. A jury found in favor of Menninger, awarding her over $24 million in damages. PPD then moved for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, and remittitur, but the district court denied these motions.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts initially granted partial summary judgment for PPD, rejecting Menninger's theory that PPD could be liable solely for failing to engage in an interactive process. It also limited Menninger's disparate-treatment claims to a single adverse action. However, the court denied PPD's motion for summary judgment on other claims, allowing the case to proceed to trial. The jury found in favor of Menninger on all counts, concluding that PPD failed to provide reasonable accommodation, discriminated against her, and retaliated against her. The jury awarded substantial damages, including punitive damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. PPD argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict, that the jury instructions were misleading, and that the punitive damages were unsupported. The Court of Appeals found that PPD failed to properly preserve its sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments by not specifying the grounds for its Rule 50(a) motion. The court also found no plain error in the jury instructions and concluded that the evidence supported the punitive damages award. The court affirmed the district court's judgment and its denial of PPD's posttrial motions. View "Menninger v. PPD Development, L.P." on Justia Law

Employees of Veolia Water Contract Operations USA, Inc. filed a lawsuit in Massachusetts state court, claiming they were entitled to prevailing wages under the Massachusetts Prevailing Wage Act (PWA) for work performed. They argued that their work fell within the scope of the PWA. Veolia removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of Veolia. The court concluded that the Special Act of 1997, which pertains to the Springfield Water and Sewer Commission, exempted Veolia from the obligation to pay prevailing wages under the PWA. The employees appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The central issue was whether the Special Act required Veolia to pay prevailing wages. The court noted that the outcome depended on unresolved questions of Massachusetts law and significant policy concerns. Consequently, the First Circuit decided to certify the dispositive state law questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for clarification.The First Circuit certified two questions: the meaning of "construction and design of improvements" in the Special Act and whether the Special Act is incompatible with the PWA under the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Metcalf v. BSC Group, Inc. The First Circuit retained jurisdiction over the appeal pending the resolution of these certified questions. View "Nicholls v. Veolia Water Contract Operations USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between several plaintiffs, who are foreign nationals participating in an au pair program, and Cultural Care, Inc., a Massachusetts company that places au pairs with host families in the U.S. The plaintiffs allege that Cultural Care violated their rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and various state wage and hour laws by failing to pay them legal wages. They also claim violations of state deceptive trade practices laws.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied Cultural Care's motion to dismiss the complaint, including its defense of derivative sovereign immunity under Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Company. Cultural Care appealed, but the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision, concluding that Cultural Care had not established entitlement to protection under Yearsley. After the case returned to the District Court, Cultural Care filed a motion to compel arbitration based on agreements in contracts signed by the au pairs with International Care Ltd. (ICL), a Swiss company. The District Court denied this motion, ruling that Cultural Care had waived its right to compel arbitration and that it could not enforce the arbitration agreement as a nonsignatory.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration. The court held that Cultural Care, as a nonsignatory to the ICL Contract, could not enforce the arbitration agreement under either third-party beneficiary theory or equitable estoppel. The court emphasized that the arbitration agreement did not demonstrate with "special clarity" that the signatories intended to confer arbitration rights on Cultural Care. Additionally, the plaintiffs' statutory claims did not depend on the ICL Contract, making equitable estoppel inapplicable. View "Posada v. Cultural Care, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a representative action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) filed by Mamadou Bah against Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston, LLC, and Enterprise Holdings, Inc. Bah alleged that the defendants failed to pay overtime wages to assistant branch managers before November 27, 2016. Bah sought conditional certification of a class of similarly situated employees and requested the issuance of notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs. The defendants moved to stay the issuance of notice pending a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted. The district court later dismissed Bah's claims against Enterprise Holdings, Inc. for failure to state a claim, leading to further amendments to the complaint.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts initially dismissed Bah's claims against Enterprise Holdings, Inc. without prejudice, leading to the filing of an amended complaint. The district court eventually denied a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, but by then, the statute of limitations had expired for potential opt-in plaintiffs. The district court conditionally certified a class and authorized notice, but the claims of the opt-in plaintiffs were dismissed as untimely. Bah requested equitable tolling of the statute of limitations due to the delay in issuing notice, which the district court denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying equitable tolling. The court found that the delay in issuing notice was attributable to Bah's own pleading errors and that the opt-in plaintiffs did not demonstrate the requisite diligence. The court affirmed the district court's decision to deny equitable tolling and dismiss the claims of the opt-in plaintiffs as untimely. View "Kwoka v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston, LLC" on Justia Law

Lorna Orabona, a high-earning mortgage development officer, was terminated by Santander Bank, N.A. for allegedly violating the company's Code of Conduct by forwarding company emails to her private email address. As a result, she was deemed ineligible for severance benefits under Santander's Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) Severance Policy. Orabona claimed that her termination was a pretext to avoid paying her severance benefits, especially since Santander was planning a large-scale layoff in her department shortly after her termination.The case was initially filed in Rhode Island Superior Court but was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. Santander moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Orabona's claims were preempted by ERISA. The district court allowed limited discovery to determine the applicability of the ERISA plan. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Santander, holding that all of Orabona's state law claims were preempted by ERISA because they related to the Severance Policy and required reference to it for determining liability and damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Orabona's claims were preempted by ERISA under section 514(a) because they related to the Severance Policy. The court also found that her claims seeking relief for the denial of severance benefits conflicted with the remedial scheme established by ERISA section 502(a). The court emphasized that determining liability and damages for Orabona's claims would require interpreting the terms of the ERISA-regulated Severance Policy, thus necessitating preemption. View "Orabona v. Santander Bank, N.A." on Justia Law