Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a contract pediatrician, filed suit against Spectrum and Distinctive for employment discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, alleging discrimination, hostile work environment, and accommodation claims. Addressing an issue of first impression, the court held that an independent contractor who lacks an employer-employee relationship with the defendant may sue that defendant for employment discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Because the district court did not reach the merits of plaintiff's claims, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Flynn v. Distinctive Home Care, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, alleging that it violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k), by terminating her employment because she was pregnant. Plaintiff also alleged that the employer violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a), by failing to pay her overtime. The district court entered judgment in favor of the employer. The court affirmed the judgment as to the FLSA claim, concluding that the district court did not clearly err in holding that the employer did not have notice, whether actual or constructive, that plaintiff was working overtime during the period at issue. The court also affirmed as to the Title VII claim, concluding that the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law after it established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for plaintiff's termination. In this case, the record demonstrated that plaintiff had a contentious relationship with her manager, she caused problems regarding store morale and customer service, and she repeatedly had performance-related problems. View "Fairchild v. All American Check Cashing, Inc." on Justia Law

Sanderson Farms petitioned for review of the OSHRC's citation for an unguarded arbor and projecting key in violation of the mechanical power-transmission apparatus regulation, 29 C.F.R. 1910.219. In regard to the unguarded arbor, the court concluded that the ALJ did not err when she found that the arbor was a “vital and integral part of the power transmission apparatus;" substantial evidence established that Sanderson Farms possessed knowledge of the violative conditions; and there is sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s characterization of the violation as serious but of low gravity. In regard to the projecting key, the court concluded that there is not substantial evidence on the record to sustain the citation because the cited standard was inapplicable. The Secretary and ALJ erred when applying 29 C.F.R. 1910.219(c)(4)(i) instead of 29 C.F.R. 1910.219(h)(1) to the protruding key. Accordingly, the court denied the petition as to the unguarded arbor and granted the petition as to the projecting key. View "Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Perez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., against JFS after JFS revoked its employment offer for a field engineer position at a mining site after learning that plaintiff had a rotator cuff impairment that prevented him from lifting his right arm above the shoulder. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of JFS. The court concluded that the district court's finding that plaintiff could not prove that he was disabled or a qualified individual was erroneous becuase it ignored Congress's expansion of the definition of disability when it amended the ADA in 2008. Under this more relaxed standard, the court concluded that evidence exists supporting a finding either that plaintiff is disabled or was regarded as disabled. Because a factual dispute exists on these issues, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded. View "Cannon v. Jacobs Field Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, employed within the CDC in a bio-terrorism preparedness program, filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) and 2671 et seq., alleging that his employers’ actions constituted numerous torts, including fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff claimed that he was terminated in retaliation for reporting perceived public health threats. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction based upon its conclusion that plaintiff’s FTCA claims were precluded by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. The court agreed with the district court and concluded that the CSRA provides plaintiff's sole remedy against his employer because he is a federal employee, and due to the nature of his employment-related claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Tubesing v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Metrocare and others, alleging various federal and state law claims. The district court dismissed plaintiff's Texas Health & Safety Code claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and granted summary judgment for defendants on all other claims. The court concluded that plaintiff has failed to offer sufficient evidence that Metrocare’s articulated reason for firing him is a pretext for discrimination and therefore the district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Metrocare on plaintiff's claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.; Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.; and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's procedural due process claim because he received an adequate name-clearing hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Miller v. Metrocare Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination suit against the Commission. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commission and plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that most of plaintiff's various retaliation claims are unsupported by the record and are without merit. In regard to the claims that merit further discussion, the court concluded that plaintiff's mere assignment of janitorial duties, without further description or detail about what those duties actually were, does not state a materially adverse action; plaintiff produced no evidence to show that the delay in her evaluation or the failure to grant her 4% step increase - accompanied by a right of appeal that she did not exercise - constituted a materially adverse action; and the denial of a reassignment was not, as a matter of law, an adverse action. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Commission with respect to these retaliation claims. In regard to plaintiff's retaliatory termination claim, the court concluded that - based on the record before the court indicating that the Commission discharged some employees for excessive force, but not others - the mixed record constitutes substantial evidence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff’s discharge would have occurred “but for” exercising her protected rights. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the Commission on this issue. The court vacated as to the retaliatory termination claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Wheat v. Florida Parish Juvenile Justice Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Sage, alleging racial discrimination, wrongful termination, and retaliation, in violation of Title VII as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981, as well as comparable Texas law and other state law claims. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the dismissal of her retaliation claims. The court affirmed the judgment because plaintiff, who was a supervisor familiar with company employment policies, has not created a genuine material fact issue that she suffered an adverse employment action. View "Brandon v. Sage Corporation." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a negligence suit against defendants after he was injured while employed as a boilermaker by Wyatt. CP entered into a contract with Wyatt to perform work on a vacuum tower. CP and Wyatt signed a Master Services Agreement (MSA). At issue was whether a non-operating partner in a joint-venture qualifies as a “statutory employer” as that term is used in the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act (LWCA), LA. Stat. Ann. 23:1021 et seq., even though the operating partner signed a contract with a contractor that did not specifically designate the non-operating partner as a “statutory employer.” Whether viewed in terms of the inherent legal relationships among CP, Excel, and the joint venture and Wyatt, or proper inferences drawn from the MSA, the court did not think the parties’ failure to name or require the signature of Excel in the MSA can overcome the broad presumption of statutory employer status approved by Louisiana courts. The very purpose of CP and Excel in creating the joint venture was to give CP the exact operational authority it exercised on behalf of the joint venture when it signed the MSA with Wyatt. The parties’ written contract, in essence, “recognized” the parties to the joint venture as the statutory employers through their authorized agent. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wright v. Excel Paralubes" on Justia Law

Entergy filed a petition with the Board, arguing that Entergy's dispatchers are supervisors under Section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 152(11). The Board affirmed the ALJ's decision that dispatchers are not supervisors under Section 2(11). About the same time that Entergy first filed its petition to reclassify dispatchers as supervisors, it demanded that intervenor, the Union, remove all references to dispatchers from the collective-bargaining agreement. Entergy refused the Union's request to bargain and the Board subsequently filed a charge against Entergy for violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA. The Board granted summary judgment and held that Entergy had violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5). The court affirmed the Board's decision in all but one respect: the court reversed the Board's determination that dispatchers do not “assign” field employees to “places” through the exercise of "independent judgment." The court remanded for further proceedings. The court denied the Board's request for enforcement. View "Entergy Mississippi, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law