Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the school district under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging, inter alia, that the non-renewal of her teaching contract was in retaliation for expressing her First Amendment support for a candidate for school superintendent. The district court granted summary judgment for the school district. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to show that her protected speech was the cause of her discharge. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to show that she was denied adequate pre-termination process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim and procedural due process claims in all respects. View "Dearman v. Stone Cnty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

ESSG petitions for review of an order imposing a fine for its alleged failure to properly complete the employment verification forms for 242 employees. ESSG used one person in Texas to examine original documents presented by employees and another person in Minnesota to examine photocopies of the same documents and then sign the verification form. An ALJ found that ESSG's procedure violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(B), and ordered ESSG to pay fines. The court found no clear bar to corporate or entity attestation in the regulations and prior adjudications interpreting the INA. Despite the degree of deference potentially owed to the I-9 Form and the ALJ’s decision, the court concluded that ESSG lacked fair notice that corporate attestation was prohibited. The court held that even if it is proper for DHS to prohibit corporate attestation, neither the applicable I-9 Form nor any other authoritative source clearly so stated prior to the ALJ’s decision in this case. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and vacated all portions of the ALJ's order. View "Employer Solutions Staffing v. OCAHO" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of the School Board, filed suit alleging that she was sexually harassed by Timothy Graham, another board employee, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court granted the board’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the School Board is entitled to immunity under the Ellerth/Faragher defense. Therefore, the court reversed as to this issue. In this case, the district court erred in holding that the board’s efforts to prevent sexual harassment were reasonable as a matter of law. Plaintiff produced evidence that, if believed, would show that employees at the central office were not trained on sexual harassment, were not informed of the existence of a policy, were not shown where to find it, and were not told whom to contact regarding sexual harassment. The court concluded that this would be a sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find that the company did not take reasonable steps to prevent and remedy sexual harassment. The court also concluded that, because plaintiff did not show the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Graham was her supervisor in the third harassment period, the district court was correct to conclude that he was not; the court rejected plaintiff's argument that using different liability standards for the distinct periods of harassment would unduly confuse the jury; and, because plaintiff does not have any properly presented and preserved argument for why the board knew or should have known about the harassment, she cannot make out a prima facie case under the standard for coworker sexual harassment. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Pullen v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, Supreme, under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. After the action was filed but, according to Supreme, before it had learned of the suit, the company announced a new policy requiring employees to arbitrate employment disputes, including FLSA claims. The district court denied Supreme’s motion to dismiss or compel arbitration. The court reversed, concluding that the arbitration agreement is binding and contains a delegation clause transferring the power to decide threshold questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. The court remanded and directed the district court to enter an order compelling arbitration. View "Kubala, Jr. v. Supreme Production Serv." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by Securitas, a security staffing company, and was placed as a receptionist at a company called Fidelity. Plaintiff filed suit against Securitas and Fidelity, alleging that they terminated her due to her age - she was 83-years-old. Plaintiff also alleged that Securitas terminated her in violation of Section 623(a) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621−34, and sought liquidated damages, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees. The court concluded that the district court erred as to the identity of the employer where Securitas has admitted that it was plaintiff's employer; there was some evidence which created a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Securitas should have known of discrimination by Fidelity and the court reversed the grant of summary judgment as to this issue; and, depending on the outcome of the district court’s re-evaluation of whether Securitas did enough once learning Fidelity wanted plaintiff removed, the district court should also consider whether that re-evaluation affects its earlier analysis of Securitas’s decision to terminate her. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Nicholson v. Securitas Security" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former police officer for the town, filed suit against the town and several individual defendants, alleging that defendants violated his First Amendment rights when they terminated him for cooperating with an FBI investigation of public corruption. Plaintiff also asserted a claim under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h), alleging that he was fired in violation of the Act’s whistleblower protections. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing his First Amendment retaliation claims against all defendants and dismissing his FCA claims against the individual defendants. The town cross-appealed the denial of summary judgment with respect to the FCA claim against it. The court found that the district court erred in holding that plaintiff’s involvement in the FBI investigation was not entitled to First Amendment protection. Although the court held that plaintiff asserts a violation of his right of free speech, the court held that the right at issue was not “clearly established” at the time of his discharge. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the individual defendants on the basis of qualified immunity. However, the court reversed and vacated the grant of summary judgment for the town because plaintiff has demonstrated a viable claim of municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services. The court also dismissed the town's cross-appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the FCA claims against the individual defendants. View "Howell v. Town of Ball" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Town and Mayor Ragusa, alleging a claim of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court held that plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination where plaintiff has offered no evidence that the comparator, or any other employee, was retained despite performance concerns. To the extent that the Sixth Circuit’s requirement that the differences between a plaintiff and proffered comparators be relevant to the challenged employment action differs from the law in this circuit, about which the court expressed no opinion, plaintiff has not made the requisite showing. The court also concluded that to the extent plaintiff's claims are intended to support a failure-to-train or failure-to-promote cause of action, they are deemed abandoned. Plaintiff has failed to identify any Town employees that received training or promotions while plaintiff did not. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Morris v. Town of Independence" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against J.B. Hunt, alleging that he was terminated in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The district court dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that no statute requires that an ADA plaintiff exhaust the 49 C.F.R. 391.47 process before filing a lawsuit and thus the district court should not have dismissed this ADA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal on alternative grounds, concluding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of disability. At the time he was terminated, plaintiff was not certified under DOT medical standards; therefore, he was not qualified for his job under the ADA and summary judgment is appropriate. View "Williams v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

The EEOC filed suit against Bass Pro pursuant to Sections 706 and 707 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging that the company engaged in a practice of racially discriminatory hiring. EEOC seeks damages and equitable relief. The district court denied Bass Pro's motion for summary judgment, allowing the litigation to proceed. Bass Pro then filed this interlocutory appeal. The court concluded that Congress did not prohibit the EEOC from bringing pattern or practice suits under Section 706 and, in turn, from carrying them to trial with sequential determinations of liability and damages in a bifurcated framework. The court declined to imply limits upon the trial court’s management power that not only cannot be located in the language of the statute but also confound the plain language of the Federal Rules. The court rejected Bass Pro's assertions that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States model for proving pattern or practice claims would be unconstitutional, offending both due process and the Seventh Amendment. The court noted that the district court - with the flexibility afforded to it by the Rules of Civil Procedure - is in the best position to fulfill the task of enforcing the Congressional charge to protect the rights of employees. Finally, the court held that the conciliation here satisfied the Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC standard. Since the EEOC is authorized to bring a pattern or practice suit under Section 706, the fact that it focused on pattern or practice evidence instead of individual claims during the investigation and conciliation process is of no consequence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a class of servers employed by Perry's, filed suit alleging that Perry's violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 203(m), by charging its servers a 3.25% offset fee. When customers paid and tipped with a credit card, Perry’s retained 3.25% of the tip to offset credit card issuer fees and other costs it incurred in collecting and distributing the tips. Because Perry’s offset always exceeded the direct costs required to convert credit card tips to cash, as contemplated in section 203(m) and interpreted by the Sixth Circuit, the court held that Perry’s’ 3.25% offset violated section 203(m) of the FLSA, and therefore Perry’s must be divested of its statutory tip credit for the relevant time period. The court affirmed the district court’s holding of liability, its certification of a second class, and its denial of liquidated damages and a three-year extension of the statute of limitations. However, the court remanded for the district court to award plaintiffs attorney’s fees that it deems reasonable under section 216(b). View "Steele v. Leasing Enter., Ltd." on Justia Law