Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Relator-appellee Jeffrey Simoneaux brought a qui tam action against his former employer, E.I. duPont de Nemours & Company ("duPont"), under the False Claims Act ("FCA"). He contended that duPont had violated the reverse-false-claims provision by concealing an obligation to pay the United States a penalty arising from alleged violations of the Toxic Sub-stances Control Act ("TSCA"). He also averred that duPont had retaliated against him in violation of the FCA. DuPont unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment on both claims, and the Fifth Circuit permitted an interlocutory appeal. Because duPont had no “obligation” to pay the United States, the Court reversed and remanded the denial of summary judgment on the reverse false claim. With respect to the retaliation claim, the Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Simoneaux v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., by improperly classifying them as exempt employees and failing to pay appropriate overtime. Plaintiffs were also class members of a previously settled opt out class action in California that released FLSA claims (the Lofton settlement). The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that the FLSA does not create an exception to how California preclusion law would treat the enforcement of an opt out class action settlement, and the Lofton settlement was a final judgment for preclusion purposes. The court concluded, pursuant to Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, that plaintiffs’ FLSA claims in the instant appeal would be precluded by the Lofton settlement under California law; the FLSA does not create an implied exception to the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738; and the fact that FLSA claims can be released, and therefore precluded, by the settlement of an opt out class action in state court does not conflict with section 216(b)’s requirement that such claims only be asserted on an opt in basis. The court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to find a due process violation and rejected plaintiffs' claims that there was inadequate representation because of the improprieties committed by ILG and class counsel’s response, and the notice sent to class members was inadequate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Richardson v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated individuals, filed suit against his former employer, IBC, contending that IBC violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., by failing to pay proper overtime rates. The district court denied IBC's motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that, upon a motion to compel arbitration, a court should address the arbitrability of the plaintiff’s claim at the outset of the litigation. Therefore, the district court was required to consider the arbitrability of plaintiff's claim before conditionally certifying the collective. The court further concluded that, because the arbitration agreement contains a delegation clause, any disputes about the arbitrability of plaintiff's claim or the scope of the arbitration agreement must be decided by the arbitrator, not the courts. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration and the court reversed and remanded. The court vacated the stay pending appeal. View "Reyna v. Int'l Bank of Commerce" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who is not a union member, was denied referral for employment because he refused to pay a fee to use the union's hiring hall. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the fee was unlawful. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court rejected plaintiff's primary argument that section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 164(b), allows enforcement of Mississippi’s right to work law, Miss. Code Ann. 71-1-47, thereby precluding the assessment of hiring hall fees to plaintiff. The court concluded that section 14(b) does not allow Mississippi to prohibit unions from requiring non-union members to pay a hiring hall fee, and thus Mississippi's right to work law is preempted by federal law to the extent that it prohibits non-union members from being required to pay hiring hall fees. The court also concluded that plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a cognizable claim for breach of the duty of fair representation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Simms v. Int'l Longshoremen Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who suffers from epilepsy, was fired from his cardiology practice after a series of stress-related seizures. Plaintiff filed suit against HCA, alleging claims arising out of his alleged wrongful termination. The district court ordered arbitration of his claims based on equitable estoppel. In this case, the viability of plaintiff's claim depends on reference to the Physician Employment Agreement. The court concluded that, as the district court correctly recognized, an at-will employment relationship may exist even if the parties have entered into an employment contract, such as the Agreement. The court concluded that HCA’s liability depends on the Agreement and the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying direct benefits estoppel to Hays’s tortious interference claim. In making an Erie guess, the court held that the Texas Supreme Court would recognize intertwined claims estoppel and that plaintiff's remaining claims are subject to arbitration under that theory. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hays v. HCA Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Hispanic employees of Koch, a poultry processor, filed suit alleging harassment and abuse on the job. Koch claims that plaintiffs made up the allegations in order to benefit from the U-visa program. The U-visa program has offered temporary nonimmigrant status to victims of “substantial physical or mental abuse” resulting from certain offenses, including sexual assault, abusive sexual contact, extortion, and felonious assault. This appeal concerns Koch’s attempt to obtain concrete evidence of this malfeasance – namely, any and all records relating to plaintiffs' speculated U visa applications – through discovery. Confirming that it has jurisdiction, the court rejected Koch's waiver claim regarding plaintiffs' section 1367 claims. The court found the D.C. Circuit’s decision in In re England to be persuasive, where the D.C. Circuit construed a provision barring disclosure of certain military promotion records to any person not a member of the promotion board to forbid civil discovery of the records. In regard to section 1367's application to the EEOC, the court concluded that section 1367’s similar text and analogous purpose counsel the same result here as in England. However, section 1367 does not bar discovery of the records from the individual claimants. Their protection, if any, lies in the basic constraints of the discovery process. The court could not conclude that the district court abused its discretion in finding U visa discovery relevant and potentially probative of fraud. However, the court concluded that the discovery the district court approved would impose an undue burden and must be redefined. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to devise an approach to U visa discovery that adequately protects the diverse and competing interests at stake. View "Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Mississippi, LLC" on Justia Law

Con-way seeks review of a union election at its Laredo, Texas facility, and for review of the Board's decision and order finding that the company engaged in unfair labor practices. The court rejected Con-way's claim that the Board agent failed to ensure the secrecy and privacy of the election where, in this case, observers were simply not able to see how voters filled out their ballots; rejected Con-way's claim that the Board erroneously held that a group of pro-Union employees were not agents of the Union; rejected Con-way's claim that Union agents engaged in objectionable electioneering where the Board reasonably determined that none of the actions at issue were sufficient to "destroy the atmosphere necessary for a free choice in the election and thus to warrant setting the election aside;" rejected Con-ways' claim that the election was held in an atmosphere of fear and intimidation sufficient to taint the results where the Board reasonably exercised its discretion in finding that the vandalism did not create an atmosphere of fear and intimidation such that employees were unable to freely cast their votes; and rejected Con-way's claim that the court should invalidate the election results because the closeness of the election. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Con-way Freight, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

After Dresser-Rand and the Union failed to negotiate the renewal of the union-members' employment contract, the union called off the strike and agreed to return to work without a contract. However, Dresser-Rand had locked out the union employees. After a week, Dresser-Rand reversed course and allowed the union members to return to work. The Board held that the lockout violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. The Board found that the lockout was motivated by antiunion animus based on actions that Dresser-Rand took after the lockout ended. The court held that that much of the later conduct did not violate the Act and the conduct that did violate the Act was not motivated by animus. Accordingly, the court concluded that these violations do not establish that the lockout was motivated by antiunion animus. Therefore, the court granted in part and denied in part Dresser-Rand's petition to deny enforcement of the Board's order. The court denied in part and granted in part the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Dresser-Rand Co. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the City's former chief of police, filed a First Amendment retaliation suit alleging that he was terminated for suing the mayor. The district court granted summary judgment for the City. The court concluded that although plaintiff spoke as a citizen, his suit against the mayor in his personal capacity was not on a matter of public concern and thus was not protected speech. The court also concluded that plaintiff's state-law claim of malicious interference with employment (MIE) against the mayor is barred because plaintiff failed to bring notice of the claim before suing as required by state law. View "Gibson v. Kilpatrick" on Justia Law

After the City terminated plaintiff, he filed suit alleging disability discrimination claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the City. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact as to whether the City terminated him because of his disability where there is no evidence that the City’s reliance on his history of misconduct and poor performance was pretextual or blended with discriminatory motives. The court saw no basis for concluding that the City failed to engage in good faith by not finding him a new position after he had shown no desire to try and succeed in the first position. The court concluded that, given the undisputed evidence that plaintiff did not make an honest attempt to succeed in the new position, he cannot make out a claim placing blame for the breakdown in the accommodation process on the City. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dillard v. City of Austin" on Justia Law