Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an intelligence analyst with the FBI, was required to complete the FBI Basic Field Training Course (BFTC), which included in-person training sessions and various tasks and assessments, some of which were scheduled outside working hours. Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging that they were not compensated for all overtime hours worked during the BFTC.The United States Court of Federal Claims denied the government's motion for summary judgment, holding that the OPM regulation 5 C.F.R. § 551.423(a)(3), which bars overtime compensation for entry-level training, was invalid. The court reasoned that the regulation was inconsistent with the Department of Labor (DOL) regulations and that the government failed to justify the categorical rule against overtime compensation for entry-level training. The court certified the validity of the regulation for interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the OPM regulation 5 C.F.R. § 551.423(a)(3) is valid. The court reasoned that the differences between OPM and DOL regulations are justified by the need to accommodate the differences between federal and non-federal employment, particularly considering the Government Employees Training Act (GETA), which generally prohibits overtime pay for training for federal employees. The court concluded that OPM's regulation is a legitimate policy choice consistent with both the FLSA and GETA. The case was remanded to determine whether the OPM regulation is consistent with the FLSA. View "DOE NO. 1 v. US " on Justia Law

Mark L. Sadler, a former employee of the United States Army, was suspended and then removed from his position for insubordination. Sadler claimed that these actions were retaliatory under the Whistleblower Protection Act and sought corrective action from the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). He also requested sanctions against the government for the destruction of evidence. The Board denied both his motion for sanctions and his request for corrective action.The Merit Systems Protection Board initially dismissed Sadler’s first complaint, finding it did not sufficiently allege protected activity. For his second complaint, the Board acknowledged that Sadler engaged in protected whistleblower activity but concluded that the Army had shown by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same actions regardless of the protected activity. The Board also denied Sadler’s motion for sanctions, finding that the destruction of evidence was part of the Army’s ordinary procedures and did not warrant sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Board’s decision. The court agreed that Sadler’s first complaint did not allege protected activity and that the Army had provided clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same actions absent the whistleblowing. The court also upheld the Board’s decision on the sanctions issue, agreeing that the destruction of evidence was part of routine procedures and did not meet the intent standard required for sanctions under Rule 37(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. View "SADLER v. ARMY " on Justia Law

Dr. Jabeen N. Abutalib, a physician with the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), sought corrective action from the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) for alleged retaliatory personnel actions following her Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint. Dr. Abutalib claimed that her EEO complaint, which was settled in January 2020, led to adverse actions including a reduction in pay and reassignment. She filed a whistleblower complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) and subsequently appealed to the MSPB.The MSPB dismissed Dr. Abutalib’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that she failed to make a nonfrivolous showing of whistleblowing or other protected activity. The administrative judge noted that as a VHA physician, Dr. Abutalib could not appeal adverse agency actions under chapter 75 of title 5. Additionally, the judge found that her claims of retaliation for filing an EEO complaint did not constitute whistleblowing under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or protected activity under § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i).The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the MSPB’s decision. The court held that Dr. Abutalib did not present her argument regarding the settlement agreement as evidence of whistleblowing to the administrative judge, and thus could not raise it for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the court found that the matters addressed in the settlement agreement were not the subjects of her OSC complaint, indicating a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court concluded that Dr. Abutalib did not make a nonfrivolous showing of a qualifying whistleblowing disclosure and upheld the MSPB’s dismissal of her appeal. View "ABUTALIB v. MSPB " on Justia Law

Dr. Neena Biswas, a physician at the VA’s Dallas facility, alleged that the VA retaliated against her for whistleblowing by converting her appointment from permanent to temporary and subsequently terminating her employment. Dr. Biswas had made disclosures regarding the hiring process for the Chief of the Hospitalist Section, which she believed violated statutory requirements prioritizing U.S. citizens.The Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) found that Dr. Biswas’s disclosures were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act and contributed to the VA’s actions. However, the Board denied her request for corrective action, concluding that the VA would have taken the same actions regardless of her disclosures. The Board determined that the VA had strong evidence supporting its personnel actions, including Dr. Biswas’s unprofessional and disruptive conduct, and that other similarly situated employees were treated similarly.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the Board’s decision, agreeing that the VA had clear and convincing evidence to support its actions. The court noted that Dr. Biswas’s conduct, including refusing patient assignments and sending inflammatory emails, justified the VA’s actions. The court also found that the Board’s error in considering Dr. Biswas’s emails to the VA Secretary as insubordination was harmless, as the decision was supported by other substantial evidence of her misconduct. The court concluded that the VA met its burden of proving it would have taken the same actions absent the whistleblowing. View "BISWAS v. DVA " on Justia Law

Kitlinski, employed by the DEA and a Coast Guard reservist, was recalled to active duty. For an extended period, he served full-time at Coast Guard headquarters in Washington, D.C. He filed complaints under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301-35, and an equal employment opportunity complaint against DEA, based on DEA’s responses to his requests to be transferred from DEA’s San Diego office to Arlington, Virginia, where Kitlinski’s wife worked. After a deposition, Kitlinski returned to his car, in a secure DEA parking lot, and discovered a Blackberry device bearing a DEA sticker under his car's hood. He suspected that it was intended to track his location and record his conversations. Kitlinski reported his discovery to the FBI. Kitlinski’s wife was interrogated and was threatened with discipline if she did not turn over the Blackberry. Kitlinski filed an action with the Merit Systems Protection Board, alleging that the placement of the Blackberry and his wife's interview violated USERRA as discrimination and by creating a hostile work environment. He also alleged retaliation and a hostile work environment in retaliation for his exercise of his USERRA rights. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s dismissal of various claims but remanded in part because the Board did not make a finding on Kitlinski’s claim that DEA had created a hostile work environment in retaliation for his USERRA activities. View "Kitlinski v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

In 2008, Lee began an appointment under the Federal Career Intern Program (FCIP) with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security. Before that appointment. Lee had completed almost six years of federal service under a series of term appointments. In 2010, the agency notified Lee that her FCIP appointment would expire on March 15, 2010, and that upon completion of the appointment, the agency would not convert it into a competitive service appointment. She completed her FCIP term and was terminated from federal service. A Merit Systems Protection Board Administrative Judge dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Board and Federal Circuit affirmed. Lee was not subject to an adverse action appealable to the Board; successful completion of her internship and satisfaction of other Office of Personnel Management requirements did not guarantee her the right to further federal employment when her internship expired. View "Lee v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act (VACAA) provisions vesting significant authority in administrative judges violates Appointments Clause. In 2014, Congress investigated reports that senior executives in the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) had manipulated hospital performance metrics by maintaining secret wait lists of veterans who needed care. The resulting VACAA established new rules for the removal of DVA Senior Executive employees, 38 U.S.C. 713. Previously, senior DVA executives could only be removed under the Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. 1101, and were entitled to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), to a hearing, and to attorney representation. Section 713 created an accelerated timeline for MSPB appeals and required the MSPB to refer all appeals to an administrative judge (AJ) for decision within 21 days. Helman, the Director of the Phoenix Veterans Affairs Health Care System, was removed from her position under section 713. An MSPB AJ affirmed. Helman sought review from the full Board. Citing section 713(e)(2), the Board refused to take any further action. The Federal Circuit remanded, holding that, by prohibiting Board review under section 713(e)(2), Congress vested significant authority in an AJ in violation of the Appointments Clause. Section 713(e)(2) and two related sections are severable, leaving the remainder of the statute intact. View "Helman v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal of a claim against the U.S. government, finding that the government had no contractual obligation to reimburse plaintiff’s pension withdrawal liability costs, incurred under the Multi-Employer Pension Plan Amendment Act (MPPAA), 29 U.S.C. 1381. Plaintiff had a contract with NASA to provide services, which was subject to the McNamara-O’Hara Service Contract Act (SCA), 41 U.S.C. 6701, under which service contracts specify a “wage determination,” setting wage rates and fringe benefits. The SCA insures that service employees who were protected by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with one contractor are not deprived of that CBA’s wages and benefits when the contract they work on is competitively awarded to a new contractor. Otherwise, if an incumbent contractor agreed to a CBA that provided for wages and benefits greater than the prevailing rate, a challenger could underbid the incumbent for the follow-on contract by providing its employees with less. The government is willing to increase contract prices when contractors incur increased costs as a result of an increase in the wage determination. The courts concluded that this plaintiff independently chose to negotiate a CBA with the Teamsters and join the Teamsters’ pension plan and independently assumed the risk of MPPAA withdrawal liability. NASA did not require plaintiff to do so and had no contractual recourse if plaintiff failed to satisfy its MPPAA obligations, so the SCA does not allocate the risk of MPPAA liability to the government. View "Call Henry, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The 2013 Department of Defense (DOD) budget was cut by $37 billion halfway through Fiscal Year 2013. The Secretary of Defense directed DOD managers to prepare to furlough most civilian employees for up to 11 workdays, with exceptions for employees deployed to a combat zone, those whose jobs are necessary to protect safety of life and property, Navy Shipyard employees, National Intelligence Program employees, Foreign Military Sales employees, political appointees, non-appropriated fund instrumentality employees, foreign national employees, and various employees not paid directly by DOD Military accounts. Snyder, a civilian engineer at the Naval Surface Warfare Center (Dahlgren) received a Notice of Proposed Furlough. Snyder worked on an Advanced Shipboard Weapons Control project, governed by a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) between Dahlgren and Lockheed. Lockheed was solely responsible for funding and paid $2.6 million in 2012 to the U.S. Treasurer. Unused funds were to be remitted to Lockheed. Lockheed and Snyder requested that Dahlgren employees supporting the CRADA be exempt from furlough. The Navy denied the request. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Merit System Protection Board in upholding Snyder’s furlough. An agency may furlough an employee for lack of work or funds or other non-disciplinary reasons, 5 U.S.C. 7511(a)(5), 7512(5) if the furlough “will promote the efficiency of the service.” The court found the furlough decision to “be a reasonable management solution to the financial restrictions placed on the agency.” View "Snyder v. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law

Banks was hired by the VA in July 2015. Her appointment was in the excepted service and was subject to a one-year probationary period. In March 2016, the VA notified Banks that it planned to terminate her due to performance issues. Rather than wait for the agency to terminate her, Banks resigned. Banks appealed to the Merit Systems Board, asserting that her resignation constituted a constructive removal. An administrative judge found that Banks was not preference eligible, that the record contained no evidence of prior federal service, and that Banks was within her probationary period, and concluded that Banks was not an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. 7511(a)(1) with the right to appeal to the Board. The AJ concluded that Banks’s allegations of a hostile work environment and retaliation did not provide jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. 7702(a), absent non-frivolous allegations of an agency action independently appealable to the Board. The Board upheld the dismissal after considering new evidence indicating that, before being hired by the VA, Banks had been currently and continuously employed by the U.S. Postal Service for three years. The Board concluded that this prior federal service did not give Banks a right to appeal because the Postal Service is not an “Executive agency” under 5 U.S.C. 7511(a)(1)(C)(ii). The Federal Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the Board lacked jurisdiction. View "Banks v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law