Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The EEOC filed suit against CMS, alleging that the company's conduct discriminated on the basis of a black job applicant's race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) & 2000e-2(m). When the applicant said that she would not cut her dreadlocks, she was told by a CMS human resources manager that the company would not hire her. The district court dismissed because the complaint did not plausibly allege intentional racial discrimination by CMS against the applicant. The court concluded that the EEOC conflates the distinct Title VII theories of disparate treatment (the sole theory on which it is proceeding) and disparate impact (the theory it has expressly disclaimed); the court's precedent holds that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on immutable traits, and the proposed amended complaint does not assert that dreadlocks - though culturally associated with race - are an immutable characteristic of black persons; the court is not persuaded by the guidance in the EEOC’s Compliance Manual because it conflicts with the position taken by the EEOC in an earlier administrative appeal, and because the EEOC has not offered any explanation for its change in course; and no court has accepted the EEOC’s view of Title VII in a scenario like this one, and the allegations in the proposed amended complaint do not set out a plausible claim that CMS intentionally discriminated against the applicant on the basis of her race. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions" on Justia Law

The Union filed suit to compel arbitration under its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Shaw. The district court granted the Union’s motion to compel arbitration and ordered the parties to select an arbitrator, which they did. After holding a hearing, the arbitrator issued a written decision siding with the Union. Shaw moved the district court to vacate the award, contending, among other things, that the arbitrator had exceeded her power by improperly modifying the CBA instead of interpreting it. The district court then vacated the award and the Union appealed. In light of United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., the court concluded that it must resolve the ambiguity in the stated reasons for the award in favor of enforcement. Therefore, the court concluded that the arbitrator interpreted instead of modified the agreement. The court reversed and remanded. View "Wiregrass Metal Trades Council v. Shaw Envtl." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a retired criminal investigator with the Cobb Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, filed suit against the county, alleging discrimination on the basis of sex after he learned that a less-experienced female in the office was earning a substantially higher salary for the same job. The district court granted summary judgment to the county. The court affirmed, concluding that the county is a legally separate and distinct entity that did not control the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship between the office of the District Attorney and its criminal investigators, nor did it act as a joint employer with the District Attorney. Because its role as paymaster is wholly insufficient to establish that the county was plaintiff's employer, he could not sue the county under the federal antidiscrimination laws. View "Peppers v. Cobb County" on Justia Law

After Cooks terminated him, plaintiff filed suit against the company, alleging claims under the Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301, 4302(b), and Alabama state law. The district court entered an order striking from the arbitration agreement two terms that violated USERRA, dismissing the suit without prejudice, and ordering plaintiff to submit his claims to arbitration. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the district court erred by failing to apply the plain language of USERRA’s non-waiver provision. The court concluded that the contract's arguable delegation clause - which would require that the arbitrator, rather than the court, determine whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable - does not control this appeal. The court also concluded that, in reaching whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable, section 4302(b) is not in conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1, 2, and the district court properly determined the arbitration agreement is enforceable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision to compel arbitration. View "Bodine v. Cook's Pest Control" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed with IBEX as a computer software and hardware engineer for almost ten years. He filed suit against the company under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., asserting minimum wage and overtime claims. IBEX admitted that it had withheld plaintiff's final three weeks of pay as a result of an audit and its belief that he had improperly collected $147,230 in per diem payments. IBEX raised as an affirmative defense that plaintiff was an exempt employee under the FLSA. The court held that an hourly computer employee who is otherwise exempt under section 213(a)(17) does not become “non-exempt” during his last three weeks of work if the employer withholds his final paycheck. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the FLSA claim. The court held, however, that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to plaintiff on his state-law counterclaim for unjust enrichment. In this case, the district court acknowledged (and plaintiff conceded) that IBEX presented evidence that plaintiff improperly collected $147,230 in per diem payments by misleading IBEX for a number of years about the location of his permanent residence. The court concluded that this evidence would likely have been sufficient to get the unjust enrichment claim to a jury. View "Pioch v. IBEX Engineering Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Board affirmed the ALJ's conclusion that Gaylord committed unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5), (1). The Board petitioned for enforcement of its order and Gaylord cross-petitioned for review of the Board's order. The court concluded that the evidence in the record supports the Board’s conclusion that Gaylord had a bargaining relationship with the USW that pre-dated the move to Tuscaloosa, that Gaylord’s operation in Tuscaloosa was a continuation of its operation in Bogalusa, and therefore that Gaylord had an obligation to bargain with the USW concerning its Tuscaloosa employees; the record supports the Board's conclusion that a Gaylord VP interrogated an employee about his union sympathies in violation of the NLRA; and therefore, the court granted the Board's petition to enforce its order and denied Gaylord's cross-petition for review. View "NLRB v. Gaylord Chem. Co., LLC" on Justia Law

After Lear filed suit against a former employee in state court for defamation and intentional interference with business relations, the district court granted the Secretary's motion for injunctive relief under the whistleblower protection provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. 660(c). The injunction enjoined Lear from, inter alia, suing any current or former employee. The court held that the district court had jurisdiction to consider the Secretary’s request for injunctive relief. However, the district court erred by enjoining Lear from pursuing litigation without finding that such litigation was either baseless or preempted. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order and vacated the injunction. View "Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Labor v. Lear Corp. EEDS and Interiors" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging disability discrimination and retaliation claims arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101, and Florida law. At issue is whether defendant discriminated against plaintiff by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation that would have enabled her to perform either her duties or the essential duties of another position for which she was qualified. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims of discrimination failed. To the extent plaintiff intended to request a permanent light-duty position, it is undisputed that no such position existed. Defendant was not required by the ADA to create a permanent light-duty position especially for plaintiff. In regards to a request for a reassignment, plaintiff did not support the request with any evidence that there was a specific, full-duty vacant position she was qualified for and could have done, given her medical condition. Finally, the district court properly rejected plaintiff’s claim that defendant failed to initiate an “interactive process” to identify a reasonable accommodation, as required by ADA regulations. The court also concluded that plaintiff's retaliation claim fails where all of the evidence in the record shows that plaintiff was terminated solely as the result of her inability to return to full duty at the expiration of her eligibility for light-duty status. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Frazier-White v. Gee" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. 1983, against the School District and the School Board, alleging that they discriminated and retaliated against her by refusing to renew her employment contract and filing an ethics complaint against her. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court concluded that the proper framework for examining mixed-motive claims based on circumstantial evidence is the approach adopted by the Sixth Circuit in White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., - not the McDonnell Douglas framework. Applying the proper mixed-motive framework to plaintiff's discrimination claims, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her claims against the School District and School Board members Scott Morgan and Mark Nesmith. However, the court found that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's remaining discrimination claims, as well as all of her retaliation claims. Therefore, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Crew One refers stagehands to the producers of concerts and other live events in the Atlanta area. The Board determined that the stagehands were employees of Crew One, which gave the Board authority to regulate their relationship. The Board later directed an election and certified a union, and when Crew One refused to negotiate with the union, the Board entered summary judgment against Crew One for an unfair labor practice. Crew One petitioned for review. After considering all the relevant factors, the court concluded that the stagehands are independent contractors where the most important factor, control, supports this conclusion. Further, the failure to withhold taxes, the independent contractor agreements, the nature of Crew One’s business, the absence of benefits, the tools, and the insurance provided by the clients also support this conclusion. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, denied the cross-application for enforcement, and vacated the decision of the Board. View "Crew One Productions v. NLRB" on Justia Law