Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a labor dispute involving the H-2A visa program. Defendant Consolidated Citrus Limited Partnership (“Consolidated Citrus”) appealed from the district court’s order granting judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and holding Consolidated Citrus liable as a joint employer. All original plaintiffs were Mexican nationals who came to the United States temporarily to work as harvesters on citrus groves in central Florida. These plaintiffs entered the United States legally under the federal H-2A visa program. During the 2005-06 harvest season, Consolidated Citrus struggled to find sufficient labor to meet its harvesting needs. Starting with the 2006-07 harvest season, Consolidated Citrus began working with labor contractors to hire temporary foreign workers. One such labor contractor was defendant Ruiz Harvesting, Inc. (“RHI”), owned by Basiliso Ruiz (“Ruiz”). Consolidated Citrus expected the temporary workers to be at their assigned groves at some time in the early morning, but RHI personnel ultimately decided what time the workers would arrive. Each day, RHI transported workers to and from the groves in RHI vehicles. Under the H-2A program regulations, agricultural workers compensated on a piece-rate basis must be paid at least the equivalent of the wages they would have received under the applicable “adverse effect wage rate” (“AEWR”), which was the hourly minimum set by the Department of Labor. Where a worker’s piece-rate wages did not add up to the wages the worker would have earned under the hourly rate, the employer had to supplement that worker’s earnings to meet that minimum wage. The supplemental amount was known as “build-up” pay. RHI perpetrated a kickback scheme to recoup this build-up pay: on payday, RHI employees drove the H-2A temporary workers to a bank where the workers cashed their paychecks. The workers then returned to the RHI vehicle, where an RHI employee collected cash from each worker in an amount equal to that worker’s build-up pay. H-2A workers were told to return money only to Ruiz and RHI and only when the workers’ paychecks included build-up pay. No one from Consolidated Citrus demanded that H-2A temporary workers return their build-up pay, and no H-2A temporary worker ever complained directly to Consolidated Citrus about RHI’s kickback scheme. After careful review of this matter, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings. To the extent that the district court held Consolidated Citrus liable as a joint employer for purposes of the plaintiffs’ Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) claims, the Court affirmed. The Court reversed, however, the district court’s determination that the FLSA “suffer or permit to work” standard applied to the breach of contract claims for purposes of determining whether Consolidated Citrus qualified as a joint employer under the H-2A program. The case was remanded to the district court to apply, in the first instance, that governing standard of common law agency for purposes of the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims. View "Garcia-Celestino, et al. v. Consolidated Citrus Ltd. Partnership" on Justia Law

Leokadia Bryk, a disabled nurse, sought a reasonable accommodation in the form of a job reassignment to another unit at St. Joseph’s Hospital because she required the use of a cane, which posed a safety hazard in the psychiatric ward where she worked. After Bryk did not obtain another Hospital position, the Hospital terminated her employment. The EEOC filed suit on her behalf against the Hospital. Based on the framework in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the court affirmed the district court's finding that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., did not require job reassignment without competition as a reasonable accommodation. The court also agreed with the district court’s summary judgment rulings finding that Bryk was a “disabled qualified individual” under the ADA and that the Hospital’s 30-day allowance to apply for alternate jobs was reasonable as a matter of law. However, the court disagreed with the district court’s order granting in part the EEOC’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion for alteration of the judgment. The court explained that, except in rare circumstances not present here, motions under Rule 59(e) may not be used to raise new legal theories or arguments, much less in this case where the movant under Rule 59(e), the EEOC, was seeking to contravene language in the jury instructions and verdict form that the EEOC had previously proposed. Therefore, the EEOC failed to meet the Rule 59(e) standard and the district court erred in altering the judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "EEOC v. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

MBUSI seeks review of the Board's order modifying and adopting as modified the recommended order of the ALJ, finding that MBUSI violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. The Board found that MBUSI violated the Act by (1) maintaining an overly broad solicitation and distribution rule that employees would reasonably understand to prohibit solicitation in work areas by employees not on working time of other employees not on working time; (2) prohibiting an employee not on working time from distributing union literature in one of MBUSI’s team centers, which are mixed-use areas; and (3) prohibiting employees not on working time from distributing union literature in the MBUSI atrium, which is a mixed-use area. The court enforced the order with the exception of the last four words of paragraph 1(b) and the words “team centers and” in the Appendix. The court remanded to the Board with instructions to consider whether MBUSI’s team centers are converted mixed-use areas during the pre-shift period. If so, the Board should either narrow the scope of the Order to Gilbert’s team center or conduct additional factfinding regarding special circumstances at the 18 team centers the ALJ did not consider. View "Mercedes-Benz U.S. Int'l v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Sheriff of Lee County, Florida, alleging wage and overtime claims. At issue is whether employees may maintain a collective action against their employer under section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., at the same time as a class action brought based on state law and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). The district court found that, under LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., these two types of actions are “mutually exclusive and irreconcilable.” However, the court joined the D.C., Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits and held that an FLSA collective action and a Rule 23(b)(3) state-law class action may be maintained in the same proceeding. Therefore, the court reversed the district court only with respect to its contrary conclusion on this point. On remand, the district court must consider whether plaintiffs' putative class action meets the Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) requirements, as well as whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the class action under 28 U.S.C. 1367(a). View "Calderone v. Scott" on Justia Law

The EEOC filed suit against CMS, alleging that the company's conduct discriminated on the basis of a black job applicant's race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) & 2000e-2(m). When the applicant said that she would not cut her dreadlocks, she was told by a CMS human resources manager that the company would not hire her. The district court dismissed because the complaint did not plausibly allege intentional racial discrimination by CMS against the applicant. The court concluded that the EEOC conflates the distinct Title VII theories of disparate treatment (the sole theory on which it is proceeding) and disparate impact (the theory it has expressly disclaimed); the court's precedent holds that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on immutable traits, and the proposed amended complaint does not assert that dreadlocks - though culturally associated with race - are an immutable characteristic of black persons; the court is not persuaded by the guidance in the EEOC’s Compliance Manual because it conflicts with the position taken by the EEOC in an earlier administrative appeal, and because the EEOC has not offered any explanation for its change in course; and no court has accepted the EEOC’s view of Title VII in a scenario like this one, and the allegations in the proposed amended complaint do not set out a plausible claim that CMS intentionally discriminated against the applicant on the basis of her race. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions" on Justia Law

The Union filed suit to compel arbitration under its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Shaw. The district court granted the Union’s motion to compel arbitration and ordered the parties to select an arbitrator, which they did. After holding a hearing, the arbitrator issued a written decision siding with the Union. Shaw moved the district court to vacate the award, contending, among other things, that the arbitrator had exceeded her power by improperly modifying the CBA instead of interpreting it. The district court then vacated the award and the Union appealed. In light of United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., the court concluded that it must resolve the ambiguity in the stated reasons for the award in favor of enforcement. Therefore, the court concluded that the arbitrator interpreted instead of modified the agreement. The court reversed and remanded. View "Wiregrass Metal Trades Council v. Shaw Envtl." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a retired criminal investigator with the Cobb Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, filed suit against the county, alleging discrimination on the basis of sex after he learned that a less-experienced female in the office was earning a substantially higher salary for the same job. The district court granted summary judgment to the county. The court affirmed, concluding that the county is a legally separate and distinct entity that did not control the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship between the office of the District Attorney and its criminal investigators, nor did it act as a joint employer with the District Attorney. Because its role as paymaster is wholly insufficient to establish that the county was plaintiff's employer, he could not sue the county under the federal antidiscrimination laws. View "Peppers v. Cobb County" on Justia Law

After Cooks terminated him, plaintiff filed suit against the company, alleging claims under the Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301, 4302(b), and Alabama state law. The district court entered an order striking from the arbitration agreement two terms that violated USERRA, dismissing the suit without prejudice, and ordering plaintiff to submit his claims to arbitration. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the district court erred by failing to apply the plain language of USERRA’s non-waiver provision. The court concluded that the contract's arguable delegation clause - which would require that the arbitrator, rather than the court, determine whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable - does not control this appeal. The court also concluded that, in reaching whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable, section 4302(b) is not in conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1, 2, and the district court properly determined the arbitration agreement is enforceable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision to compel arbitration. View "Bodine v. Cook's Pest Control" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed with IBEX as a computer software and hardware engineer for almost ten years. He filed suit against the company under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., asserting minimum wage and overtime claims. IBEX admitted that it had withheld plaintiff's final three weeks of pay as a result of an audit and its belief that he had improperly collected $147,230 in per diem payments. IBEX raised as an affirmative defense that plaintiff was an exempt employee under the FLSA. The court held that an hourly computer employee who is otherwise exempt under section 213(a)(17) does not become “non-exempt” during his last three weeks of work if the employer withholds his final paycheck. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the FLSA claim. The court held, however, that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to plaintiff on his state-law counterclaim for unjust enrichment. In this case, the district court acknowledged (and plaintiff conceded) that IBEX presented evidence that plaintiff improperly collected $147,230 in per diem payments by misleading IBEX for a number of years about the location of his permanent residence. The court concluded that this evidence would likely have been sufficient to get the unjust enrichment claim to a jury. View "Pioch v. IBEX Engineering Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Board affirmed the ALJ's conclusion that Gaylord committed unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5), (1). The Board petitioned for enforcement of its order and Gaylord cross-petitioned for review of the Board's order. The court concluded that the evidence in the record supports the Board’s conclusion that Gaylord had a bargaining relationship with the USW that pre-dated the move to Tuscaloosa, that Gaylord’s operation in Tuscaloosa was a continuation of its operation in Bogalusa, and therefore that Gaylord had an obligation to bargain with the USW concerning its Tuscaloosa employees; the record supports the Board's conclusion that a Gaylord VP interrogated an employee about his union sympathies in violation of the NLRA; and therefore, the court granted the Board's petition to enforce its order and denied Gaylord's cross-petition for review. View "NLRB v. Gaylord Chem. Co., LLC" on Justia Law