Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Laurence Bonday, a former employee of Nalco Company LLC, filed an arbitration demand against Nalco, alleging that the company violated its severance plan by demoting him without offering severance pay. Nalco argued that a court needed to determine the scope of the arbitration agreement before proceeding. However, the arbitrator concluded that Bonday’s severance claim fell outside the scope of the arbitration agreement and awarded him nothing on that claim. Instead, the arbitrator awarded Bonday $129,465.50 on an ERISA discrimination claim that he never raised.Nalco moved to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by deciding the scope of the arbitration agreement and awarding relief on a claim Bonday never made. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted Nalco's motion, concluding that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by interpreting the scope of the arbitration agreement and awarding relief on an unraised ERISA discrimination claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by granting relief on an ERISA discrimination claim that Bonday did not submit for arbitration. The court emphasized that an arbitrator can only bind the parties on issues they have agreed to submit and that the arbitrator's decision to award relief on an unsubmitted claim was beyond her authority. The court did not address the district court's first reason for vacating the award, as the second reason was sufficient to affirm the decision. View "Nalco Company LLC v. Bonday" on Justia Law

Katie Wood, a transgender woman teaching at a public high school in Florida, challenged the enforcement of Fla. Stat. § 1000.071(3), which prohibits her from using the honorific “Ms.” and the gendered pronouns “she,” “her,” and “hers” in exchanges with students during class time. Wood argued that this statute violated her First Amendment right to free speech and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent its enforcement.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida granted Wood a preliminary injunction, finding that she had shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of her First Amendment claim. The district court reasoned that Wood’s use of her preferred honorific and pronouns constituted speech as a private citizen on a matter of public concern, and that her interest in expressing her gender identity outweighed the state’s interest in promoting workplace efficiency.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court’s findings. The appellate court held that Wood had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood that Fla. Stat. § 1000.071(3) infringed her free speech rights. The court concluded that when Wood used her preferred honorific and pronouns in the classroom, she was speaking as a government employee, not as a private citizen. Consequently, her speech was not protected under the First Amendment in this context. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Wood v. Florida Department of Education" on Justia Law

Richard Hicks and his wife, Jocelyn Hicks, filed a lawsuit seeking monetary damages after Richard was injured by a vehicle driven by Gregory Middleton, an employee of Marine Terminals Corporation - East, d.b.a. Ports America. The incident occurred at the Port of Savannah, where both Hicks and Middleton worked as longshoremen. Middleton struck Hicks with his personal vehicle while allegedly on his way to retrieve work-related documents called "game plans."The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia granted summary judgment in favor of Ports America. The court ruled that Ports America could not be held vicariously liable for Middleton's actions because Middleton was not acting within the scope of his employment when the incident occurred. The court determined that Middleton was engaged in a personal activity, specifically commuting, and had not yet begun his work duties for Ports America.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment. The appellate court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Middleton was acting in furtherance of Ports America's business and within the scope of his employment when the incident occurred. The court noted that a jury could reasonably infer that Middleton's actions, including driving to retrieve the game plans, were part of his job responsibilities and thus within the scope of his employment. The case was remanded for further proceedings to allow a jury to determine these factual issues. View "Hicks v. Middleton" on Justia Law

A psychiatric hospital in Florida, Suncoast Behavioral Health Center, and its management company, UHS of Delaware, Inc. (UHS-DE), were cited by the Secretary of Labor for violating the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s General Duty Clause by failing to protect employees from patient-on-staff violence. The citation followed an OSHA investigation that revealed numerous instances of workplace violence at the hospital.The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (the Commission) affirmed the citation, concluding that Suncoast and UHS-DE operated as a single employer and that the Secretary of Labor had proven the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed abatement measures. The Commission did not address the economic feasibility of two specific abatement measures related to hiring additional security staff, as the feasibility and efficacy of the other six measures were undisputed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the Commission’s finding that Suncoast and UHS-DE operated as a single employer, noting that they shared a common worksite, integrated operations, and common management. However, the court found that the Secretary of Labor failed to prove the economic feasibility of the two security staffing-related abatement measures. Consequently, the court set aside the ALJ’s finding regarding these two measures but upheld the citation based on the six undisputed abatement measures.The court denied in part and granted in part the petition for review, affirming the citation but clarifying that Suncoast and UHS-DE are not obligated to implement the two security staffing measures. View "UHS of Delaware, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Dr. Jeffery D. Milner, a physician, brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Baptist Health Montgomery, Prattville Baptist, and Team Health. Milner alleged that while working at a hospital owned by the defendants, he discovered that they were overprescribing opioids and fraudulently billing the government for them. He claimed that he was terminated in retaliation for whistleblowing after reporting the overprescription practices to his superiors.Previously, Milner filed an FCA retaliation lawsuit against the same defendants in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, which was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court found that Milner did not sufficiently allege that he engaged in protected conduct under the FCA or that his termination was due to such conduct. Following this dismissal, Milner filed the current qui tam action in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The district court dismissed this action as barred by res judicata, relying on the Eleventh Circuit's decisions in Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc. and Shurick v. Boeing Co.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that Milner's qui tam action was barred by res judicata because it involved the same parties and the same cause of action as his earlier retaliation lawsuit. The court found that both lawsuits arose from a common nucleus of operative fact: the defendants' alleged illegal conduct and Milner's discovery of that conduct leading to his discharge. The court also noted that the United States, which did not intervene in the qui tam action, was not barred from pursuing its own action in the future. View "Milner v. Baptist Health Montgomery" on Justia Law

The case involves Jose Rosado, a Hispanic male of Colombian origin, who worked as an Information Technology (IT) Specialist for the United States Navy. Rosado alleged that he was denied promotions on five occasions between 2014 and 2018 due to race, national origin, and age discrimination, as well as retaliation for his prior Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) activity. The promotions in question were for various IT Specialist positions within the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southeast (NAVFAC SE).In the lower court, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the Navy. The court concluded that Rosado failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation for any of the promotion decisions. Specifically, the court found that Rosado did not provide sufficient evidence to show that he was equally or more qualified than the individuals who were selected for the positions or that the Navy's decisions were influenced by discriminatory or retaliatory motives.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Rosado did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he failed to show that the selected candidates were similarly situated in all material respects or that unlawful discrimination played any part in the Navy's decision-making process. Additionally, the court found that Rosado did not present sufficient evidence to support his retaliation claims, as there was no indication that retaliatory animus influenced the Navy's actions.In summary, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Navy, concluding that Rosado did not provide enough evidence to support his claims of discrimination and retaliation. View "Rosado v. Secretary, U.S. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law

Kristie Williams, a former employee of the University of Alabama at Birmingham, requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to care for her daughter, who was allegedly sexually assaulted while serving in the Marine Corps. The University approved her leave, but Williams claimed she continued to receive work-related communications and criticism from her supervisors during her leave. This led to her resignation, and she subsequently sued the University, alleging interference with her FMLA rights and retaliation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama denied the University’s motion to dismiss, which argued that the suit was barred by state sovereign immunity. The court reasoned that Williams might have been seeking family-care leave under the FMLA, for which the Supreme Court had previously held that Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Williams’s suit could proceed regardless of whether she sought family-care leave, active-duty leave, or servicemember-family leave. For family-care leave, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hibbs confirmed that Congress had abrogated state sovereign immunity. For active-duty and servicemember-family leave, the court concluded that Alabama waived its sovereign immunity under the plan-of-the-Convention doctrine when it joined the Union, as these provisions were enacted pursuant to Congress’s constitutional authority to raise and support the military. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the University’s motion to dismiss and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Williams v. Board of Trustees of The University of Alabama" on Justia Law

Armando Guevara worked as a domestic service employee for Robert and Maria Zamora for over a decade, performing various tasks such as cleaning, car maintenance, and grocery shopping. Occasionally, he also provided services for the Zamoras' businesses, Lafise Corporation and Latin American Financial Services, Inc. (LAFS). Guevara was paid $1,365.88 biweekly, but there was no written employment agreement, and the parties disagreed on whether this amount represented a salary or an hourly wage. The Zamoras claimed they paid him an hourly rate with overtime, while Guevara asserted he was paid a salary without proper overtime compensation.Guevara filed a putative class action against the Zamoras, Lafise, and LAFS for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that Guevara was not covered by the FLSA through either "enterprise coverage" or "individual coverage." The court also found that Guevara was fully compensated for all his overtime work hours based on the Zamoras' testimony and calculations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The appellate court determined that there was a genuine dispute regarding Guevara's regular hourly rate and, therefore, his overtime rate. The court noted that the Zamoras did not maintain accurate records, and the evidence presented created a genuine issue of fact that should be determined by a jury. The appellate court also vacated the district court's ruling on whether Lafise was a joint employer, as the lower court failed to provide sufficient reasoning and did not address the relevant factors. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Guevara v. Lafise Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Georgia district attorney and others under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants conspired to violate his First Amendment rights. Plaintiff, employed as the director of the police department's crime lab, was terminated from his position after the district attorney contacted the police chief to express his concerns that plaintiff had written an expert report for and planned to testify on behalf of the defense in a criminal case. The Eleventh Circuit held that prosecutors were not entitled to absolute immunity for their alleged actions in this case because those actions were not taken in their role as advocates. However, the prosecutors were entitled to qualified immunity because they were acting within the outer perimeter of their discretionary skills in expressing concerns about plaintiff's outside work, and the law was not clearly established at the time. Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of the prosecutors' motion for judgment on the pleadings based on qualified immunity and remanded. View "Mikko v. Howard" on Justia Law

Defendant filed suit against his former employer under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601-2654, alleging that the employer interfered with the exercise of his FMLA rights and later retaliated against him for asserting those rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer. Because plaintiff likely waived his FMLA right to reinstatement by taking an additional 30 days of medical leave, because he failed to submit a fitness-for-duty certification by the end of his FMLA leave, and because the record was devoid of proof challenging the employer's contention that its fitness-for-duty certification policy was implemented in a uniform fashion, plaintiff lost the right to be reinstated after failing to comply with this policy. Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to show that he was denied a benefit to which he was entitled under the FMLA, and the district court properly granted summary judgment as to the interference claim. The court affirmed as to this claim. The court held that temporal proximity, for the purpose of establishing the causation prong of a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, should be measured from the last day of an employee's FMLA leave until the adverse employment action at issue occurs. In this case, plaintiff has met his burden of raising a genuine dispute as to whether his taking of FMLA leave and his termination were casually related. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment as to the retaliation claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Gulf Coast Health Care of Delaware, LLC" on Justia Law