Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Joseph Simone worked as a Transportation Security Officer (TSO) for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport. He disclosed a heart condition when hired, which did not generally affect his job performance. In 2014, TSA determined Simone was no longer medically qualified and placed him on administrative leave, eventually removing him from federal service in 2015. Simone filed an administrative complaint alleging discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act, which was denied by an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission administrative law judge and later on appeal. He then brought suit in federal district court against the Secretary of Homeland Security, asserting four claims under the Rehabilitation Act: disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, retaliation, and unlawful interference.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss. The court relied on the Eleventh Circuit’s prior decision in Castro v. Secretary of Homeland Security, which held that the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) exempted TSA from the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act regarding the hiring of security screeners. The district court concluded that ATSA precluded Simone’s claims and rejected his argument that the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA), enacted in 2012, abrogated Castro and allowed Rehabilitation Act claims against TSA.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the WPEA abrogated Castro and extended Rehabilitation Act protections to TSA security screeners. The court found that the WPEA’s statutory language superseded ATSA’s exemption and allowed TSOs to bring claims under the Rehabilitation Act. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether Simone satisfied administrative requirements to bring his claims. View "Simone v. Secretary of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Harvey, three licensed insurance adjusters were assigned by an outsourcing company to process claims for a Texas state-created insurer. The adjusters were required to complete additional certification and follow specific procedures set by the insurer. Their contracts labeled them as independent contractors, but the assignments lasted between one and a half to two years, during which they worked exclusively for the insurer. The company set their work schedules, required timesheets, and provided necessary equipment, though the adjusters were responsible for some personal and professional expenses. A shift to remote work introduced new monitoring policies, but the company maintained control over work hours and approval for overtime.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. Applying a six-factor test to determine employment status under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the court found that four factors favored independent contractor status and two favored employee status, with one of the latter given little weight. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding the adjusters were independent contractors and thus not entitled to FLSA overtime protections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court found that, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the adjusters, five of the six factors favored employee status. The court held that a reasonable jury could find the adjusters were employees under the FLSA, as they were economically dependent on the companies, had little control over their work, and their services were integral to the business. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Galarza v. One Call Claims, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, several former employees of a seafood company participated in an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) that was funded by a $92 million loan used to purchase all outstanding company stock from four directors and officers. The plaintiffs alleged that these directors and officers manipulated sales projections and inventory figures to inflate the stock’s valuation, causing the ESOP to overpay by tens of millions of dollars. They further claimed that the plan’s trustee failed to conduct proper due diligence before agreeing to the purchase price. The plaintiffs sought restoration of plan losses, disgorgement of profits, and other equitable relief under ERISA, asserting breaches of fiduciary duty.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia without first exhausting the plan’s internal administrative remedies, despite acknowledging that the plan provided such procedures. They argued that exhaustion was not required for their claims and, alternatively, that they were excused from exhausting due to futility and inadequacy of the remedy. The defendants moved to dismiss on exhaustion grounds. The district court granted the motions, finding that Eleventh Circuit precedent required exhaustion for ERISA claims, and rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments for excusal. The court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for a stay to allow exhaustion, but did not specify whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that ERISA plaintiffs must exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking judicial review, including for breach of fiduciary duty claims, and that no valid excuse relieved the plaintiffs of this obligation. The court also remanded the case for the district court to clarify whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. View "Bolton v. Inland Fresh Seafood Corporation of America, Inc." on Justia Law

Jay Gould served as CEO of Interface, Inc., a carpet manufacturer. After an incident at an annual sales meeting in which Gould allegedly became intoxicated and verbally abused an employee, Interface’s board of directors terminated his employment for cause. This followed a prior warning and an investigation by King & Spalding LLP, which corroborated the allegations. Under Gould’s employment agreement, termination for cause resulted in significantly reduced compensation compared to termination without cause.Gould filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging breach of contract and arguing that Interface’s determination of cause was made in bad faith. Interface moved for summary judgment, asserting that the contract gave it absolute discretion to determine cause, or, alternatively, that it had acted in good faith. Gould’s arguments in the district court focused on the company’s alleged lack of good faith, contending that the investigation was a sham. The magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment to Interface, finding both that the company had absolute discretion and, alternatively, that Gould had not shown bad faith. The district court adopted this recommendation and denied Gould’s subsequent motion for reconsideration, ruling that Gould had waived a new argument that Interface had no discretion to determine cause.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Gould advanced the new theory that Interface had no discretion to determine cause under the contract. The Eleventh Circuit held that this theory was a new issue, not a subsidiary argument, and that Gould had forfeited it by failing to raise it in the district court. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that Gould’s remaining claims did not warrant reversal. View "Gould v. Interface, Inc." on Justia Law

An athletic trainer employed by a rehabilitation services provider was assigned to work at a local high school under a contract between her employer and the school. Over several years, she reported concerns about the conduct and performance of other athletic trainers at the school, which led to personnel changes. In 2020, after a new head football coach was hired, the trainer was briefly given additional responsibilities but was soon told to return to her original role. Shortly thereafter, the school’s principal requested her removal, citing workplace issues unrelated to her sex. The trainer was then removed from her assignment at the school and offered several alternative positions by her employer, some with reduced pay or less desirable conditions. She ultimately accepted a new assignment but later resigned, alleging that her removal and reassignment were due to sex discrimination and retaliation for her complaints.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, finding that although there was a factual dispute about the employer’s control over the removal, the trainer failed to show that the employer discriminated or retaliated against her in violation of Title VII. The court concluded there was insufficient evidence that the employer knew or should have known the school’s removal request was based on sex, or that the reassignment options were offered for discriminatory reasons.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the trainer’s discrimination claim failed because there was no evidence the employer knew or should have known the school’s request was sex-based, and no evidence that the reassignment was motivated by sex. The retaliation claim also failed, as there was no evidence the employer removed or reassigned her because she engaged in protected activity. The court affirmed summary judgment for the employer. View "Vincent v. ATI Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

NCR Corporation established five “top hat” retirement plans to provide supplemental life annuity benefits to senior executives. Each plan promised participants a fixed monthly payment for life, with language allowing NCR to terminate the plans so long as no action “adversely affected” any participant’s accrued benefits. In 2013, NCR terminated the plans and paid participants lump sums it claimed were actuarially equivalent to the promised annuities, using mortality tables, actuarial calculations, and a 5% discount rate. NCR knew that, statistically, about half of the participants would outlive the lump sums if they continued to withdraw the same monthly benefit, resulting in some participants receiving less than they would have under the original annuity.Participants filed a class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging breach of contract and seeking either replacement annuities or sufficient cash to purchase equivalent annuities. The district court certified the class and granted summary judgment for the participants, finding that NCR’s lump-sum payments adversely affected the accrued benefits of at least some participants, in violation of the plan language. The court ordered NCR to pay the difference between the lump sums and the cost of replacement annuities, plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment order de novo. The Eleventh Circuit held that the plan language was unambiguous and did not permit NCR to unilaterally replace life annuities with lump sums that reduced the value of accrued benefits for any participant. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, including the remedy of requiring NCR to pay the cost of replacement annuities and awarding prejudgment interest. View "Hoak v. NCR Corp." on Justia Law

An employee of the Department of Veterans Affairs began experiencing respiratory issues at work, which she attributed to the building environment. Over several years, she requested various accommodations, including changes to her work schedule, relocation of her workstation, and the use of air purifiers. The Department provided some accommodations, but the employee found them ineffective. In 2012, she was diagnosed with breast cancer and submitted a Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) form to request leave for treatment. Later, she learned that a union steward had been informed of her cancer diagnosis by a human resources manager, which she had not expected. After returning to work, she continued to request further accommodations, eventually being allowed to work from home full-time.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the Department on all claims, including disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, unlawful disclosure of medical information, and retaliation or hostile work environment. The court found that the Department had provided reasonable accommodations, that there was no evidence of discrimination or retaliation, and that the employee had not shown a tangible injury from the alleged disclosure of her medical information.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on the claims of disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The appellate court agreed that the Department had made reasonable efforts to accommodate the employee and that her dissatisfaction with the accommodations did not amount to a legal violation. However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the summary judgment on the unlawful disclosure claim, holding that requiring medical information for FMLA leave constituted an employer inquiry under the Rehabilitation Act, and that there were genuine issues of fact as to whether confidential medical information was improperly disclosed and whether the employee suffered a tangible injury as a result. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the unlawful disclosure claim. View "Mullin v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Perfection Bakeries Inc. paid into the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store International Union’s Industry Pension Fund for its employees in Michigan and Indiana. The company later ceased contributions, first in Michigan and then in Indiana, incurring "withdrawal liability" under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980. The Fund calculated this liability using a four-step formula outlined in 29 U.S.C. § 1381. Perfection Bakeries challenged the Fund's calculation, arguing that a specific calculation was performed at the wrong step.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama reviewed the case. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Fund, holding that the statutory text unambiguously required the credit to be applied as part of the second adjustment step.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that the Fund correctly applied the partial-withdrawal credit at step two of the four-step formula. The court concluded that the statute's language and structure supported the Fund's interpretation, which incorporated all of section 1386, including the credit for previous partial withdrawals, at step two. The court found that this interpretation was consistent with the statutory context and the repeated cross-references to section 1386 throughout the four-step formula. The court rejected Perfection Bakeries' arguments, including the contention that the partial-withdrawal credit should be applied after all four steps, and upheld the Fund's calculation method. View "Perfection Bakeries Inc v. Retail Wholesale & Dept Store International Union" on Justia Law

Jeanne Weinstein, a former server at The Ridge Great Steaks & Seafood, filed a collective action complaint alleging that the restaurant and its operator, Stephen Campbell, violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by not meeting the federal minimum wage requirement. The Ridge paid servers and bartenders $2.15 per hour, supplementing their income with tips to meet the $7.25 minimum wage. The Ridge also required servers and bartenders to contribute 3% of their gross food sales to a tip pool, which was used to pay support staff. Any excess tips were supposed to be distributed to bartenders, but there were inconsistencies in the record-keeping and distribution process.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted unopposed motions to voluntarily dismiss five opt-in plaintiffs. The court also ruled partially in favor of the defendants on summary judgment, finding that the tip pool funds were not distributed to non-tipped employees. The remaining issue for trial was whether the defendants retained any portion of the tip pool funds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Rule 41(a) permits the dismissal of a single plaintiff in a multiple-plaintiff case if all claims brought by that plaintiff are dismissed. The court also found no error in the district court's conclusion that the defendants did not retain any of the extra tips and operated a lawful tip pool within the parameters of the FLSA. Consequently, the defendants successfully asserted the tip credit defense, and the plaintiffs could not prevail on their minimum wage claim. View "Weinstein v. 440 Corp." on Justia Law

Dr. Joseph Jimenez, a former medical officer for the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), alleged race and national origin discrimination, retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. Dr. Jimenez, who identifies as Hispanic, claimed that his employer required him to work as a correctional officer while non-Hispanic doctors were exempt. He also alleged that the BOP denied him a reasonable accommodation for his mental health conditions.The district court dismissed Dr. Jimenez’s Title VII claims related to certain adverse employment actions for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court granted summary judgment to the BOP on the remaining Title VII claims, finding no evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory motives. The court later dismissed Dr. Jimenez’s Rehabilitation Act claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, rejecting his attempt to correct a citation error in his complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that Dr. Jimenez failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his claims related to the denial of bonuses and failure to promote. The court also found that Dr. Jimenez did not present sufficient evidence to show that his race, national origin, or protected activity influenced the BOP’s actions. Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of the Rehabilitation Act claim, agreeing that the citation error was not a mere scrivener’s error and that Dr. Jimenez did not demonstrate good cause to amend his complaint after the scheduling order deadline. View "Jimenez v. Acting United States Attorney General" on Justia Law