Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985 against the City, code inspector Peterson, and chief code inspector Denker, and various other defendants, alleging federal and state constitutional violations, and that defendants conspired to deter her from seeking judicial relief from their conduct and to deprive her of equal protection of the law and equal privileges and immunities under the law. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that plaintiff's allegations of sexual harassment against Peterson failed to state a claim of municipal liability under section 1983; plaintiff failed to state a claim with respect to the alleged actions of Denker and the unidentified Jane and John Does - either in connection with her sexual harassment claim against Petersen or as an independent claim that these defendants violated her federally protected rights; and plaintiff failed to state a claim independent of Petersen’s alleged sexual harassment. Because plaintiff’s complaint contained no facts showing that Denker or any unnamed City employee violated her constitutional rights, the court did not reach whether Denker, as chief code inspector, was a policymaking official or whether his role in the alleged conduct permits an inference that the City adopted a policy targeting plaintiff. Further, plaintiff failed to allege a conspiracy under section 1985 because the City could not conspire with itself through its agents acting within the scope of their employment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kelly v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

The Board filed a complaint alleging that Seedorff had violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (5), by repudiating a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between QBA and Local 150 to which Seedorff has agreed to be bound. The ALJ ruled that Seedorff did indeed violate sections 8(a)(1) and (5) by repudiating a valid pre-hire CBA and by failing to abide by the hiring hall and benefit provisions of the contract. The Board affirmed the ALJ's analysis. The court denied enforcement and vacated the Board's Decision and Order, concluding that the Board's analysis was contrary to the NLRA and pre-hire CBAs as construed in prior judicial decisions and the Board's own precedent. View "NLRB v. Seedorff Masonry, Inc." on Justia Law

Parsons petitioned for review of the Board's order, concluding that Parsons engaged in an unfair labor practice in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (5), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (5), of the National Labor Relations Act (Act), 29 U.S.C. 151-169. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Parsons violated the Act by unilaterally modifying its employee-break policy without notifying the Union or affording it an opportunity to bargain. The Board also reasonably rejected Parsons’s contentions that the 2012 Break Policy merely clarified the 2005 Break Policy and existing practice. Finally, the court rejected Parsons’s assertion that it was authorized to unilaterally change its employee-break policy because it lacked authority to bargain directly with the Union. The court denied the petition for review and enforced the Board's cross-petition for enforcement. View "Parsons Electric, LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, Bob Evans, alleging employment discrimination in violation of federal and Missouri law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bob Evans. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying judicial estoppel to bar plaintiff's claims where, pursuant to the New Hampshire v. Maine factors, plaintiff took inconsistent positions between his bankruptcy case and this case; the bankruptcy court, by discharging plaintiff's unsecured debts, adopted the position that his discrimination claims did not exist; and plaintiff could have derived an unfair advantage in the bankruptcy proceedings by concealing his claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Jones v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a white man, filed suit against officials of the St. Louis Police Department, alleging race discrimination and conspiracy to discriminate when an African-American woman was chosen for the position in which plaintiff applied. A jury found in favor of plaintiff on his claims against three of his superiors (Defendants Muxo, Harris, and Isom). Defendants appealed. The court concluded that materially different working conditions provided sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action. Because there were “probative facts to support the verdict,” the district court did not err by denying defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s discrimination claims. The court also concluded that a reasonable jury could find evidence of a conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bonenberger v. St. Louis Metro. Police Dept." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Lisa and Frederic Fezard, employees of UCP, filed suit seeking overtime pay contending that the living arrangement in private residences requires additional work time that should be compensated as overtime. At issue is the phrase "private home" in a regulatory provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(15). The district court granted summary judgment to UCP. The court concluded that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to UCP because the dwelling units in which the employees provided services were private homes. The court also concluded that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to UCP because Ms. Fezard failed to provide evidence from which a jury could conclude that the nonretaliatory bases for termination asserted by UCP are pretextual. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fezard v. United Cerebral Palsy etc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against TNI, alleging that TNI discriminated against her on the basis of race, terminated her in retaliation for her complaints, and violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681. Plaintiff also filed suit against a fellow truck driver, James Paris, for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim and in analyzing plaintiff's sexual harassment claim by not considering all that had occurred during the 34 hour rest period in Pharr, Texas; the record contains genuine issues of material fact about all that happened on the trip and whether plaintiff subjectively perceived Paris' actions as offensive; and the district court erred in finding that plaintiff did not report Paris' conduct to TNI in a timely manner. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's sex discrimination claims under Title VII and Arkansas' civil rights statute because genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether plaintiff subjectively felt abused by Paris, that TNI was aware of his conduct, and that TNI failed to take appropriate action. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Nichols v. Tri-National Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., alleging that her former employer, Mosaic, interfered with her FMLA rights and terminated her employment in violation of public policy. The district court granted summary judgment for Mosaic. The court concluded that because plaintiff exhausted her FMLA benefits, she had not been denied any entitlement under the statute. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to make a submissible case of FMLA discrimination. In this case, there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that plaintiff was able to return to work even if Mosaic had maintained what she viewed as a welcoming environment; plaintiff has not presented evidence of any tangible loss actually incurred and directly caused by her one-month suspension; plaintiff's alleged mistreatment are not actions that will deter reasonable employees from exercising their FMLA rights and are therefore not actionable under the statute; and where, as here, the employee presents insufficient evidence to show that she was discharged in violation of the FMLA, her termination does not undermine a clearly defined public policy, and Iowa law does not provide a separate cause of action based on the tort of wrongful discharge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hasenwinkel v. Mosaic" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against NSP under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-219, for failure to pay overtime wages. On appeal, NSP challenged the district court's denial of its motion for summary judgement and grant of partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether plaintiff was an exempt employee and not entitled to overtime pay. In this case, there are genuine issues related to whether plaintiff's primary duties were directly related to management and general business operations, and whether plaintiff exercised discretion and independent judgment in matters of significance. View "Grage v. Northern States Power Co." on Justia Law

Mechanics, members of the Union and employees of Metro, filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration under section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 (UMTA), 49 U.S.C. 5333, that Metro must establish a framework through which they could form a bargaining unit separate from the Union. The Union intervened and the district court granted the Union's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that section 13(c) does not entitle mechanics to the relief they seek because Congress did not intend to provide a federal forum for disputes between unions and transit authorities; the language and structure of section 13(c) does not suggest that Congress intended to create a federal private cause of action; and the consistent theme in Section 13(c)’s legislative history was that “Congress intended that labor relations between transit workers and local governments would be controlled by state law[.]" Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Stenger v. Bi-State Dev. Agency" on Justia Law