Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff was seriously injured on the job, BNSF disciplined him for violations of BNSF rules that led to his injury. Plaintiff filed suit, alleging that BNSF's discipline violated the employee-protections provision of the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 20109(a)(4). The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for BNSF, concluding that plaintiff failed to establish that his supervisors intentionally retaliated against him for filing his injury report. In this case, without more specific evidence of an improper retaliatory motive, the court found that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case. View "Heim v. BNSF Railway" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was disciplined by his employer, BNSF, for not promptly reporting a workplace injury, he filed suit claiming that BNSF's discipline violated the employee-protections provision of the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 20109(a)(4). The jury awarded plaintiff damages for emotion distress. The court concluded, however, that its decision in Kuduk v. BNSF Railway Co. required plaintiff to establish intentional retaliation and that the jury instructions did not compel such a finding. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Blackorby v. BNSF Railway" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Chipotle, alleging claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. State. 363A et seq., for reprisal, age discrimination, and sexual orientation discrimination. On appeal, plaintiff challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment on his reprisal claim. Chipotle claims that he was discharged due to declining work effort and performance. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Chipotle’s stated reason for terminating his employment was pretextual. Therefore, the district court correctly determined that his reprisal claim under the MHRA fails as a matter of law and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sieden v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc." on Justia Law

Semmie John Guenther, Jr., filed an administrative charge with the EEOC, alleging that his former employer, Griffin Construction, discriminated against him on the basis of his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. When Guenther passed away while his charge was pending, the special administrator of his estate filed suit on his behalf when he received the EEOC right-to-sue letter. The district court dismissed the action based on Ark. Code Ann. 16-62-101(a)(1) and found the claim had abated. The court held that federal common law does not incorporate state law to determine whether an ADA claim for compensatory damages survives or abates upon the death of the aggrieved party. The court joined its sister circuits that have allowed the individual’s estate to bring and maintain a suit for compensatory damages under the ADA in place of the aggrieved party. Therefore, Guenther’s ADA claim for compensatory damages survived his death and Griffin Construction is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Guenther v. Griffin Construction Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City, alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated from his job on account of his race and age after being employed by the City for twenty-seven years. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the City's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court did not err in setting aside the entry of default judgment where the City's delay in filing its answer was excusable and there was no bad faith or intentional effort to delay on the City's part; plaintiff failed to identify no similarly situated employee outside plaintiff's protected class who was treated more favorably by the City, and thus the inference-of-discrimination element of plaintiff's prima facie case has not been established on this basis; plaintiff failed to identify any biased comments made by a decisionmaker that might establish an animus-based inference of discrimination; there has been no showing that the City failed to follow any applicable policy in making the decision to fire plaintiff and no inference of discrimination has been established on this basis; and the City consistently cited insubordination as its reason for firing plaintiff, and thus there is no record-based shifting-reasons basis for an inference of discrimination. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to substantiate his claims of race and age discrimination with sufficient probative evidence to permit a rational trier of fact to find in his favor. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Grant v. City of Blytheville, Arkansas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former building commissioner of the city, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she was fired in retaliation for engaging in protected speech. The district court granted summary judgment to the city. The court concluded that the present record does not support a conclusion that the city is liable because a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor. In this case, plaintiff maintains that the city is liable because her harm stemmed from an official municipal policy or an unofficial municipal custom. The court explained that plaintiff tangentially refers to other evidence of the custom that she claims victimized her, but the materials cited reveal only unsubstantiated suspicions. Because no reasonable jury could conclude that the evidence demonstrated a reasonable dispute about the presence of a continuing, widespread, and persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct that led to her termination, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bolderson v. City of Wentzville" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that her former employer, Trinity Health, and former supervisors violated her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the North Dakota Human Rights Act, N.D. Cent. Code 14-02.4-03(1). The district court granted summary judgment against plaintiff, concluding that she failed to show she was capable of performing the essential functions of her position, and that Trinity did not have a duty to reassign plaintiff to an alternate position. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff produced evidence that she could have performed the essential functions of her position with reasonable accommodation. In this case, plaintiff's written notification that she would be unable to complete the basic life support certification without medical clearance, and her statement that she required four months of physical therapy before completing the certification, could readily have been understood to constitute a request for a reasonable accommodation of her condition. Consequently, there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff made a request for an accommodation sufficient to trigger Trinity’s duty to engage in the interactive process of identifying a reasonable accommodation. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kowitz v. Trinity Health" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, Crete, alleging it violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., by requiring a medical examination and discriminating on the basis of a perceived disability. Crete required its truck drivers with Body Mass Indexes (BMIs) of 35 or greater to get medical examinations to determine whether they had obstructive sleep apnea. When Crete ordered plaintiff to undergo an examination because his BMI was over 35, he refused. The district court granted summary judgment to Crete. The court concluded that the district court property admitted an expert's testimony regarding obesity and obstructive sleep apnea; by the undisputed facts, the sleep study requirement is job-related because it deals with a condition that impairs drivers’ abilities to operate their vehicle; the requirement is also consistent with business necessity; the district court correctly granted Crete summary judgment on the medical-examination claim where Crete carried its burden of showing it defined the class reasonably; and the undisputed evidence shows that Crete suspended plaintiff for refusing to submit to a lawful medical examination, which does not violate the ADA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Parker v. Crete Carrier Corp." on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated from her job at ABM, she filed suit against her former employer, alleging that she was unlawfully terminated based on age in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. 363A.08. The court concluded that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to ABM. In this case, plaintiff did not meet her burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact that ABM’s proffered legitimate reason for her termination was pretext for age discrimination. View "Haggenmiller v. ABM Parking Serv." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Air Methods, in state court for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Air Methods removed to federal court and the district court, relying on this court's decision in Botz v. Omni Air International, dismissed the complaint. In Botz, the court construed the effect of the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), 49 U.S.C. 4173(b)(1), pre-emption clause on state whistleblower-protection laws. Although three circuits have disagreed with Botz in relevant part, the court concluded that plaintiff's claim cannot be distinguished from the second claim dismissed in Botz. Botz ruled that the plain language of section 41713(b)(1), bolstered by enactment of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (WPP), 49 U.S.C. 42121, pre-empted a whistleblower-retaliation claim based on reporting an alleged safety violation to an employer. Plaintiff argued that if Botz cannot be distinguished, then it should be overruled in relevant part. But one three-judge panel cannot overrule another. Plaintiff may raise this contention in a petition for rehearing en banc. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Watson v. Air Methods Corp." on Justia Law