Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, employed as a juvenile detention officer, filed suit against the County, alleging discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 12 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. Plaintiff also alleged that the County retaliated against her in violation of the ADA, Section 504, Arkansas law , and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. The County terminated plaintiff's employment because she could not meet the job requirement of lifting 40 pounds. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claims of discrimination under the ADA and Section 504 because plaintiff was not a qualified individual where she could not perform the essential functions of her position with or without reasonable accommodation. Even if the court were to find that extending plaintiff's FMLA leave was a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, plaintiff failed to carry her burden of showing that she could perform the essential functions of her job with that accommodation. Likewise, the court agreed with the district court that the County was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's discrimination claim. The court further held that plaintiff failed to present a submissible case of retaliation under the ADA where plaintiff's request for additional time to obtain a new FMLA certification was not a reasonable accommodation, and therefore it was not protected activity. And because plaintiff still was unable to perform an essential function of her job at the end of her FMLA leave period, the County did not violate FMLA by terminating her after her FMLA expired. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Scruggs v. Pulaski County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Wal-Mart, alleging disability discrimination, failure to continue to accommodate, retaliation, and harassment. After being diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, plaintiff was transferred to a new position at Wal-Mart. The district court granted summary judgment to Wal-Mart on all claims. Plaintiff has conceded that the new overnight cashier position is less physically strenuous than stocking, and her acceptance of that position was accompanied by a $.20/hour raise. The court concluded that, because plaintiff failed to show she suffered an underlying adverse employment action, she has not made out a prima facie case of discrimination, and she cannot prove her claim that Wal-Mart failed to accommodate her disability; with temporal proximity alone to support her argument for pretext, plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue for trial on her retaliation claim; in regard to her workplace harassment claim, plaintiff failed to identify any discriminatory statements made to her or any evidence sufficiently severe to affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment; and plaintiff failed to successfully establish that she faced a hostile work environment where plaintiff offers no examples or evidence of an increased workload beyond stating that she had four pallets to stock one night. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kelleher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

MikLin, owner and operator of a Jimmy John's franchise, petitioned for review of the Board's order holding that the company engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) and (3). The court concluded that that the Board did not err in determining that MikLIn violated the Act by terminating or disciplining employees for engaging in protected concerted activity, and by soliciting the removal of protected material from public places, removing union literature from an unrestricted employee bulletin board, and encouraging employees on Facebook to harass union supporters. In regard to the Sandwich Poster campaign, the court concluded that the Board's decisions were supported by substantial evidence where the communications at issue were not made with either actual knowledge of its falsehood or with reckless disregard for its veracity, and the statements were not so disloyal or recklessly disparaging as to lose protection under the Act. In regard to the Facebook postings, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that the postings were sufficiently linked to the employee’s protected activity. In regard to removal of the in-store posters, the record shows that MikLin had no policy as to what could be posted on the in-store bulletin boards, and management approval was not required. Therefore, MikLin's selective removal of the flyer and the charge was an unfair labor practice. Accordingly, the court granted the Board's application for enforcement. View "MikLin Enter., Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Securitas petitioned for review of the Board's order allowing certain class of Securitas's workers to seek union representation when the Board determined that Securitas failed to show the workers were supervisors under Section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 152(11). The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the Board's determination that Securitas failed to carry its burden of proving that the employees at issue, lieutenants, were supervisors under section 152(11). Furthermore, the disclosure of "safeguards information" was not the exclusive means by which Securitas could have satisfied its burden of proof. The court agreed with the Board that Securitas failed to present any specific exemplar evidence of a lieutenant exercising independent judgment as a response team leader. Therefore, it was unnecessary to address whether the Board erred by stating Securitas could have submitted safeguards information under a protective order. Accordingly, the court denied Securitas's petition for review and granted the Board's cross-petition for enforcement. View "Securitas Critical v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Homecare providers challenge the constitutionality of a Minnesota statute designating them state employees for the purpose of unionization, Minn. Stat. 179A.54. In this interlocutory appeal, the homecare providers renew their motion preliminarily to enjoin the state from holding an election and certifying an exclusive representation. The court dismissed the appeal as moot because the event the homecare providers attempted to stop - the election and subsequent certification of the Services Employees International Union Healthcare Minnesota (SEIU) as the exclusive representative - has already occurred.The court also concluded that the resulting harm from the certification of SEIU as the exclusive representative is not capable of repetition because SEIU has already been certified, and the underlying legal issues do not evade review because the homecare providers’ challenge to the Act is still pending before the district court. Accordingly, because no exception applies, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Bierman v. Dayton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, CSL, alleging violations of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), Mo. Rev. 213.055, 213.070. The district court granted CSL's motion for summary judgment. In regard to the sex discrimination claim, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding the credibility of his written warnings, and plaintiff's version of the events immediately preceding his firing fails to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the credibility of CSL’s stated basis for terminating his employment. Because plaintiff admitted that he failed to comply with CSL’s policies, no genuine issue of material fact remained with respect to the credibility of CSL’s assertion that plaintiff’s failure was the basis for the termination of his employment. Because plaintiff failed to show how he and a female employee engaged in similar conduct, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether CSL treated plaintiff less favorably than similarly situated female employees. Further, no genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether CSL treated plaintiff unfavorably relative to similarly situated employees; without facts connecting the comment at issue, made by one of Denn’s peers, to CSL’s decision to fire Denn, the statement does not give rise to a genuine issue of material fact regarding Denn’s discrimination claim; and the fact that other male employees were disciplined was insufficient to render summary judgment improper. In regard to the retaliation claim, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to point to any evidence showing that his discrimination complaint was a “contributing factor” to any adverse action taken by CSL. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Denn v. CSL Plasma" on Justia Law

FedEx petitioned for review of the Board's orders forcing it to bargain with the unions, arguing that the Specialty Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center of Mobile standard violates the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 159(a); circuit law; and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. Determining that the court has jurisdiction to review FedEx's claims, the court concluded that the first step in the analysis described by Specialty Healthcare, in which the Board analyzes the union's proposed bargaining unit under the traditional community of interest test, is not a departure from the Board's precedent and is consistent with the requirements of section 9(b) of the NLRA; because the Specialty Healthcare framework does not make the extent of union organization "controlling," the court concluded that it does not violate section 9(c)(5); and the Board did not violate the APA by announcing the overwhelming community of interest standard in the course of adjudicating Specialty Healthcare rather than by notice and comment rulemaking. In this case, the court concluded that the Board's decisions to certify bargaining units consisting of the road and city drivers were supported by substantial evidence and were not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court denied FedEx's petitions for review and granted the Board's cross-petitions for enforcement. View "FedEx Freight v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an independent lease truck driver for FMC Transport, filed suit against FMC Transport, alleging racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of FMC Transport. FMC Transport's accident review board had concluded that plaintiff's accident was preventable and the company later terminated him. Although plaintiff is a member of a protected class and he did suffer an adverse employment action, and even if he did meet FMC Transport's legitimate expectations, the court concluded that he failed to present evidence that supports an inference of discrimination. Further, plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework, because he has not shown that the circumstances of his termination gave rise to an inference of discrimination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Macklin v. FMC Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

Higgins and the Union filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Missouri law against the District, alleging violations of the United States and Missouri Constitutions and state law. The district court dismissed the federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and declined to exercise jurisdiction as to the state law claims. The court concluded that the Union does not have standing in this case to pursue its claims on behalf of its members. In regard to Higgins, the court concluded that Higgins failed to state an equal protection claim where the District explicitly reserved the right to award the contract at issue in its best interest, and to select a bidder other than the lowest. The court also concluded that Higgins failed to state a claim for deprivation of due process where, under Missouri law, an unsuccessful bidder obtains no property right in the award of a construction contract, and Higgins failed to state a violation of the First Amendment where it does not provide any plausible account of how the District interfered with Higgins's ability to associate with the Union or with its employees who are members of the Union. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Higgins Electric, Inc. v. O'Fallon Fire Protection Dist." on Justia Law

The Board issued a complaint alleging that ConAgra violated the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), 29 U.S.C. 151-169, by censuring an employee for soliciting union membership and by posting a sign prohibiting discussion of unions during working time. General Counsel for the Board moved for a default judgment against ConAgra under a settlement agreement to an earlier dispute. The ALJ ruled in favor of the Union on both allegations. The court adopted the Board's findings of fact that accord with the employee's testimony. The court held that in answering the factual question of whether a statement amounts to solicitation of union support, neither the presentation of a card for signature at the time nor the duration of the conversation are determinative. The court concluded that the Board's novel construction of the Act in this case is unreasonable, contrary to the policies of the Act, and therefore an incorrect application of the law. The court concluded that there is not substantial evidence supporting the finding that the employee did not engage in solicitation where the Board cites no evidence that the employee was merely providing information divorced from an effort to obtain signed authorization cards. Therefore, the court reversed the Board's conclusion that ConAgra violated the Act when it censured the employee for violating its no-solicitation policy. The court concluded that the Board's conclusion that ConAgra violated the Act by posting an overbroad no-solicitation rule is supported by substantial evidence. Because the court declined to enforce the Board's order as to the warning, it refrained from enforcing the default judgment and remanded the case to the Board to determine whether the posted-letter violation constitutes grounds for granting the General Counsel's motion. View "ConAgra Foods v. NLRB" on Justia Law