Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, DSU, alleging a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The district court granted DSU's motion fro summary judgment, concluding that plaintiff suffered no adverse employment action by being exposed to floor-stripping and waxing products while employed as a custodian at DSI. In this case, plaintiff asserts facts that allegedly contradict DSU's argument, but many of those facts are not supported by the record, support claims plaintiff did not appeal, or reference incidents of alleged adverse action that are barred by the statue of limitations. Other facts, such as plaintiff's insistence that she had in fact previously applied for office jobs at DSU, while disputed, would not affect the outcome of the suit and as such, are not material. Accordingly, there are no genuine disputes of material fact preventing the district court from granting summary judgment in favor of DSU. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Dick v. Dickinson State Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff requested payment for the one year remaining on his employment contract, but the FDIC advised that the payment was a prohibited “golden parachute,” under 12 U.S.C. 1828(k) and 12 C.F.R. 359.1, which the bank could not make without prior agency approval. Plaintiff, a former executive at Reliance Bank, filed suit against the bank and the FDIC, alleging a breach of contract under Missouri law and sought a declaration that federal law does not prohibit the payment. The district court upheld the FDIC determination and granted summary judgment to the bank. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the agency determination is not worthy of deference because it is inconsistent with FDIC positions taken elsewhere. Rather, the court concluded that Chevron and Auer deference is irrelevant because the agency treats the word "contingent" as unambiguous and relies on its dictionary meaning. The court concluded that one could reasonably characterize the payment obligation as contingent on either plaintiff’s termination or his continued employment. In this case, plaintiff alleged the bank came to owe the payment because of his termination, not because of services he rendered. Therefore, the agency determined the payment was contingent on termination, and the court found this finding was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court concluded that the bank’s obligation to pay plaintiff was rendered impossible when the FDIC determined the payment was a golden parachute. The court rejected plaintiff's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment. View "Rohr v. Reliance Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under Sarbanes-Oxley, 18 U.S.C. 1514A(a)(1)(C), and Dodd-Frank, 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii), after Oracle terminated his employment in retaliation for reporting that Oracle was falsely projecting sales revenues. The district court granted summary judgment to Oracle. The court joined the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits and adopted the "reasonable belief" standard in Sylvester v. Parexel Int’l LLC standard, rejecting Platone v. FLYI, Inc.'s "definite and specific" standard, in determining that the employee must simply prove that a reasonable person in the same factual circumstances with the same training and experience would believe that the employer violated securities laws. Under the Sylvester standard, the court concluded that plaintiff's belief that Oracle was defrauding its investors was objectively unreasonable where missed projections by no more than $10 million are minor discrepancies to a company that annually generates billions of dollars. The court also concluded that plaintiff's claim under Dodd-Frank fails because he did not make a disclosure protected under Sarbanes-Oxley. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Beacom v. Oracle America, Inc." on Justia Law

Cellular Sales petitions for review of the Board's determination that it violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 157, 158(a)(1). The court concluded that Cellular Sales did not violate section 8(a)(1) by requiring its employees to enter into an arbitration agreement that included a waiver of class or collective actions in all forums to resolve employment-related disputes. Therefore, the court granted the petition for review and declined to enforce the Board’s order with respect to this issue. Because the class-action waiver did not violate section 8(a)(1), Cellular Sales’s attempt to enforce the class-action waiver likewise did not violate section 8(a)(1). Therefore, the court granted the petition for review and declined to enforce the Board’s order with respect to this issue. The court also declined to enforce the Board’s remedies related to this issue. Because Cellular Sales’s unlawful arbitration agreement remained in effect and governed a former employee both as a current and as a former employee during the section 10(b) limitations period, his unfair labor practice charge was not time-barred. Accordingly, the court granted in part and denied in part the petition for review, and denied in part and enforced in part the Board's order. View "Cellular Sales of Missouri LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and six others filed suit against Lindsey Management alleging misclassification as exempt employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-219. The jury found in favor of Lindsey Management. On appeal, Lindsey Management challenges the district court's denial of its Bill of Costs in its entirety. Section 216(b) of the FLSA is silent regarding the court's authority when the defendant is a prevailing party under Rule 54(d). Because section 216(b) addresses only an award of costs to a prevailing plaintiff and neither section 216(b) nor any other provision of the FLSA precludes an award of costs to a prevailing defendant, the court concludes that Lindsey Management is not precluded from collecting its costs incurred. The fact that a prevailing party prosecutes its rights under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to an award of costs cannot be seen as chilling the flow of litigation. Therefore, the court reversed because Lindsey Management is entitled to a decision whether its Bill of Costs should be awarded under Rule 54(d)(1) without consideration of the FLSA’s silence on the issue of prevailing defendants. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to consider whether costs should be awarded under Rule 54(d)(1). View "Lochridge v. Lindsey Mgmt. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Brentwood after he was terminated, alleging race discrimination. A jury awarded plaintiff $1 in nominal damages. Plaintiff then sought equitable relief in the form of reinstatement and front pay. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that reinstatement was neither possible nor practical where the jury made no findings as to whether plaintiff had in fact violated the safety rules or whether his plant manager's trust concerns were genuine, and that plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence that he was entitled to front pay. View "Olivares v. Brentwood Indus." on Justia Law

North Memorial and MNA, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), referred a grievance to arbitration. The district court subsequently granted in part MNA's motion to vacate the arbitral award. The arbitrator addressed whether North Memorial violated the CBA when it refused to regularly schedule the Grievant with no weekend work. The district court imposed a prospective remedy on the parties. The court concluded that the district court correctly concluded the arbitrator was without authority to issue a prospective remedy because his decision exceeded the scope of the submission presented to him by the parties. Reading the plain language of the issue as set out in the decision, the court did not believe that the arbitrator was even arguably acting within the scope of his authority. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Minnesota Nurses Association.v. North Memorial Health Care" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, BATO, alleging that BATO violated his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601. The district court ruled in favor of BATO on plaintiff's FMLA discrimination, retaliation, and harassment claims, but ruled in favor of plaintiff on his FMLA interference claim. On appeal, BATO challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff. Plaintiff cross-appealed regarding attorneys' fees and expenses. Based on BATO's overtime procedure, case law, and the statutory language, legislative history, and implementing regulations of the FMLA, the court concluded that plaintiff's overtime hours were mandatory. Therefore, hours missed for FMLA-qualifying reasons were correctly deducted from plaintiff's FMLA leave entitlement. By scheduling mandatory overtime hours that were not included in plaintiff's FMLA-leave allotment and yet were deducted from his FMLA entitlement when he missed an overtime shift, BATO denied plaintiff FMLA benefits to which he was entitled. In regard to plaintiff's cross-appeal, the court rejected plaintiff's claims that the district court erred when it reduced plaintiff's recoverable fees for lack of success on some of his claims; that the district court erred when it reduced his recoverable expenses by 20%; and that the district court erred when it excluded costs for computerized legal research. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hernandez v. Bridgestone Americas Tire" on Justia Law

Silgan and the Union challenge an arbitration award. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Silgan and the Union appealed. The court concluded that the question of validity and formation is not within the scope of the arbitration agreement. Because the arbitrator lacked authority to decide this issue, the district court did not err in vacating the award. Furthermore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Silgan and rescinding Article 36 where the mistake has resulted solely from the negligence or inattention of the party seeking relief, and the other party is without fault. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Silgan Containers Corp. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l" on Justia Law

Appellants challenged the district court's judgment under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 203(s)(1)(B), 213(a)(1), in favor of the Secretary for unpaid wages, re-judgment and post-judgment interest, as well as a prospective injunction. Because the covered enterprises listed in section 203(s)(1)(B) include both those which provide custodial care and those which provide educational services, and because the district court found that Endless Possibilities provides educational services to children of preschool age, the district court did not err in finding that Endless Possibilities fits within the meaning of “preschool” as used in section 203(s)(1)(B). The district court did not err in calculating damages where the district court's determination of hours worked, based on reasonable inferences and detailed evidence from the Secretary, does not equate to clear error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Perez v. Contingent Care, LLC" on Justia Law