Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a former police captain, filed suit against the City and city officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the City violated her constitutional right to due procedural process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by terminating her employment. The district court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion for summary judgment. The district court denied the defense of qualified immunity asserted by Chief Burton in response to plaintiff's procedural due process claim. Chief Burton appealed. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Chief Burton's role in the termination of plaintiff. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Bramblet v. City of Columbia, MO" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Central Transport violated the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), when it employed him as a "switcher" at its St. Louis terminal. The district court granted summary judgment to Central Transport. The FLSA exempts “any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service” under the Motor Carrier Act (MCA), 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(1). Based on the Supreme Court’s controlling precedents, the court concluded that, if an employee spends a substantial part of his time participating in or directing the actual loading of a motor vehicle common carrier’s trailers operating in interstate or foreign commerce, the Secretary of Transportation has the authority to regulate that employee’s hours of service and the MCA Exemption applies, regardless of the employee’s precise role in the loading process. Because the summary judgment record conclusively establishes that a substantial part of plaintiff's time during the relevant period was spent loading Central Transport trailers for interstate transportation, the MCA Exemption applies in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Williams v. Central Transport Int'l" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Siemens, her former employer, alleging unlawful discrimination based on race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. Plaintiff, an African American, was terminated as part of a reduction in force. The district court granted summary judgment to Siemens. The court concluded that the district court did not err by proceeding to the McDonnell Douglas analysis because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, does not show a genuine issue of material fact as to Siemens’ liability under a cat’s paw theory. Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the court concluded that there is no evidence in the record to support a finding of pretext as to the actual decisionmaker. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cherry v. Siemens Healthcare Diagnostics" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a negligence action against Nucor after sustaining injuries while working at Nucor's steel mill. The district court granted summary judgment to Nucor, finding that the third-party waiver's (TPW) language and the circumstances of its execution met the standard for enforcement of exculpatory contracts under Arkansas law and that the agreement was not unconscionable. The court agreed with the district court that the TPW was enforceable where the parties stipulated that plaintiff had the opportunity to read the TPW, that he did not ask the trainer any questions concerning the meaning of the TPW, and that he had the ability to read and understand the contract. The court also concluded that the contract provision at issue is not unconscionable where there is no evidence rebutting Nucor's affidavit showing the availability of other work in the region at that time, plaintiff had the opportunity to read and understand the TPW, and there is no evidence of fraud, duress, misrepresentation, or any other inequitable conduct on the part of Vesuvius or Nucor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Stewart, Jr. v. Nucor Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an African American man, filed suit against his employer, John Deere, alleging race discrimination and harassment in employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965 (ICRA), Iowa Code 216.1 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to John Deere. The court concluded that, even if the court assumed that plaintiff ultimately suffered an adverse employment action, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any evidence that race was a motivating factor in John Deere's decision to discipline plaintiff. In this case, strong evidence supported John Deere's conclusion that plaintiff failed to follow instructions and ran scrap. Therefore, plaintiff's race discrimination claim failed. In regard to the race harassment/hostile work environment claim, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to John Deere in light of plaintiff's reliance on incompetent and inadmissible evidence. The unsworn and unattested statements purportedly from plaintiff’s co-workers and plaintiff’s related interrogatory answers do not meet the standards of FRCP 56(c)(4). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Banks v. John Deere & Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against ASB, claiming wrongful interference with his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 26 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in its factual determination that, at the time ASB fired him, plaintiff’s back condition met the objective criteria of a chronic condition; the district court acted well within its discretion in awarding liquidated damages to plaintiff where the district court found that ASB knew plaintiff was attempting to take FMLA leave, but fired him before it even received, let alone reviewed, plaintiff’s application for FMLA leave; and the court rejected ASB's challenges to the award of attorney's fees and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exclude any evidence of plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply judicial estoppel to the facts of this case, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in not limiting the attorney's fees. In regard to plaintiff's cross-appeal, the court concluded that the district court's finding that ASB met its burden to prove that plaintiff was released from jail on July 20, 2011, was clearly erroneous under the after-acquired evidence doctrine. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Smith v. AS America, Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated from UPS, he filed suit alleging race discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to UPS. The court affirmed, concluding that the totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding of unlawful discrimination. Plaintiff has not put forth evidence to rebut UPS's contention that it fired him due to his conduct. The record shows that plaintiff cursed in the workplace, arguably threatened his supervisor, had multiple conflicts with other employees, and disagreed with company efforts to address the problems. Because plaintiff failed to present any evidence to establish that UPS's given reason for his termination was pretextual, the district court did not commit reversible error by concluding that plaintiff failed to show that a material question of fact remains as to pretext. View "Smith v. UPS" on Justia Law

After Ozark was sold to Mobilex, Mobilex filed suit against defendant to enforce the non-compete and confidentiality agreements defendants had signed with Ozark. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on the basis that a personal services contract cannot be assigned to a subsequent employer under Missouri law without the employee’s contemporaneous consent. The court adopted the majority rule and held that covenants not to compete can be assigned to a successor employer without contemporaneous consent. In this case, the non-compete agreements precluded only working in the field of medical diagnostics or soliciting business from certain clients within a specified geographical area. A reasonable jury, looking at the facts in the record, could find that defendants did not agree to the non-compete and confidentiality agreements because of Ozark’s unique characteristics. Because the court found that the non-compete and confidentiality agreements at issue here were not personal services contracts and could be assigned without the consent of defendants, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Symphony Diagnostic Serv. v. Greenbaum" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a class of former employees of Continental, filed suit against Celadon, alleging that Celadon violated the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, 29 U.S.C. 2102. The district court certified the class, granted partial summary judgment to the employees, and awarded damages. Viewing the Celadon–Continental transaction in light of a common-sense approach, the court agreed with the district court that the transaction was more than merely a sale of assets. Consequently, responsibility to provide notice passed from Continental to Celadon under the WARN Act where plaintiffs became employees of Celadon. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Celadon to bear the burden of establishing that certain members of the certified class should be excluded; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Celadon's motion to decertify the class; and the district court did not err in not adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation regarding class membership. In regard to the issue of damages, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by shifting the burden to Celadon after the employees made their initial showing. After thoroughly reviewing the evidentiary rulings of the district court in light of the burden-shifting framework it employed, the court held that the district court did not commit a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reduce Celadon's liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Day v. Celadon Trucking Servs." on Justia Law

The Hospital challenged the Board's decision affirming an ALJ's finding that the Hospital violated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5) and (1). The court agreed with the Hospital that the Board erred in holding that the one-year-long collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Union established a status quo of annual, compounded raises that, under the NLRA, must be continued after the agreement's expiration. In this case, the plain language of the CBA does not, as the Board states, provide for periodic wage increases or annual raises; rather, the language sets forth a straight forward, singular pay increase on a particular day during the one-year contract. Therefore, the new salary at the time the CBA expired, not the alleged practice of 3% annual pay raises, is the status quo that must be maintained throughout negotiations. Because the Hospital did not violate section 158(a)(5) by discontinuing annual pay raises, the Hospital also did not violate section 158(a)(1) by informing employees that it would no longer give annual pay raises after the expiration of the CBA. Accordingly, the court granted the Hospital's petition for review and set aside the portion of the Board's order regarding the Hospital's discontinuance of annual pay raises. View "The Finley Hospital v. NLRB" on Justia Law