Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Semmie John Guenther, Jr., filed an administrative charge with the EEOC, alleging that his former employer, Griffin Construction, discriminated against him on the basis of his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. When Guenther passed away while his charge was pending, the special administrator of his estate filed suit on his behalf when he received the EEOC right-to-sue letter. The district court dismissed the action based on Ark. Code Ann. 16-62-101(a)(1) and found the claim had abated. The court held that federal common law does not incorporate state law to determine whether an ADA claim for compensatory damages survives or abates upon the death of the aggrieved party. The court joined its sister circuits that have allowed the individual’s estate to bring and maintain a suit for compensatory damages under the ADA in place of the aggrieved party. Therefore, Guenther’s ADA claim for compensatory damages survived his death and Griffin Construction is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Guenther v. Griffin Construction Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City, alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated from his job on account of his race and age after being employed by the City for twenty-seven years. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the City's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court did not err in setting aside the entry of default judgment where the City's delay in filing its answer was excusable and there was no bad faith or intentional effort to delay on the City's part; plaintiff failed to identify no similarly situated employee outside plaintiff's protected class who was treated more favorably by the City, and thus the inference-of-discrimination element of plaintiff's prima facie case has not been established on this basis; plaintiff failed to identify any biased comments made by a decisionmaker that might establish an animus-based inference of discrimination; there has been no showing that the City failed to follow any applicable policy in making the decision to fire plaintiff and no inference of discrimination has been established on this basis; and the City consistently cited insubordination as its reason for firing plaintiff, and thus there is no record-based shifting-reasons basis for an inference of discrimination. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to substantiate his claims of race and age discrimination with sufficient probative evidence to permit a rational trier of fact to find in his favor. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Grant v. City of Blytheville, Arkansas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former building commissioner of the city, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she was fired in retaliation for engaging in protected speech. The district court granted summary judgment to the city. The court concluded that the present record does not support a conclusion that the city is liable because a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor. In this case, plaintiff maintains that the city is liable because her harm stemmed from an official municipal policy or an unofficial municipal custom. The court explained that plaintiff tangentially refers to other evidence of the custom that she claims victimized her, but the materials cited reveal only unsubstantiated suspicions. Because no reasonable jury could conclude that the evidence demonstrated a reasonable dispute about the presence of a continuing, widespread, and persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct that led to her termination, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bolderson v. City of Wentzville" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that her former employer, Trinity Health, and former supervisors violated her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the North Dakota Human Rights Act, N.D. Cent. Code 14-02.4-03(1). The district court granted summary judgment against plaintiff, concluding that she failed to show she was capable of performing the essential functions of her position, and that Trinity did not have a duty to reassign plaintiff to an alternate position. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff produced evidence that she could have performed the essential functions of her position with reasonable accommodation. In this case, plaintiff's written notification that she would be unable to complete the basic life support certification without medical clearance, and her statement that she required four months of physical therapy before completing the certification, could readily have been understood to constitute a request for a reasonable accommodation of her condition. Consequently, there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff made a request for an accommodation sufficient to trigger Trinity’s duty to engage in the interactive process of identifying a reasonable accommodation. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kowitz v. Trinity Health" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, Crete, alleging it violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., by requiring a medical examination and discriminating on the basis of a perceived disability. Crete required its truck drivers with Body Mass Indexes (BMIs) of 35 or greater to get medical examinations to determine whether they had obstructive sleep apnea. When Crete ordered plaintiff to undergo an examination because his BMI was over 35, he refused. The district court granted summary judgment to Crete. The court concluded that the district court property admitted an expert's testimony regarding obesity and obstructive sleep apnea; by the undisputed facts, the sleep study requirement is job-related because it deals with a condition that impairs drivers’ abilities to operate their vehicle; the requirement is also consistent with business necessity; the district court correctly granted Crete summary judgment on the medical-examination claim where Crete carried its burden of showing it defined the class reasonably; and the undisputed evidence shows that Crete suspended plaintiff for refusing to submit to a lawful medical examination, which does not violate the ADA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Parker v. Crete Carrier Corp." on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated from her job at ABM, she filed suit against her former employer, alleging that she was unlawfully terminated based on age in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. 363A.08. The court concluded that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to ABM. In this case, plaintiff did not meet her burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact that ABM’s proffered legitimate reason for her termination was pretext for age discrimination. View "Haggenmiller v. ABM Parking Serv." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Air Methods, in state court for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Air Methods removed to federal court and the district court, relying on this court's decision in Botz v. Omni Air International, dismissed the complaint. In Botz, the court construed the effect of the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), 49 U.S.C. 4173(b)(1), pre-emption clause on state whistleblower-protection laws. Although three circuits have disagreed with Botz in relevant part, the court concluded that plaintiff's claim cannot be distinguished from the second claim dismissed in Botz. Botz ruled that the plain language of section 41713(b)(1), bolstered by enactment of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (WPP), 49 U.S.C. 42121, pre-empted a whistleblower-retaliation claim based on reporting an alleged safety violation to an employer. Plaintiff argued that if Botz cannot be distinguished, then it should be overruled in relevant part. But one three-judge panel cannot overrule another. Plaintiff may raise this contention in a petition for rehearing en banc. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Watson v. Air Methods Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, hourly production employees, filed suit against their employer, EaglePicher, under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-219, and the Missouri Minimum Wage Law, Mo. Rev. Stat. 290.500-290.530. Plaintiffs seek payment for time spent on various tasks, including the donning and doffing of work clothing and protective gear, walking to and from production lines, and waiting in line to clock in and out for work. The district court granted summary judgment for EaglePicher. The court concluded that, the interim labor agreement here was an implied-in-fact contract between the employer and the union regulating employment conditions, wages, benefits, and grievances. It was made in good faith, without fraud or deceit. As such, it met the ordinary definitions of “bona fide” and “collective bargaining agreement.” The court also concluded that there is no genuine dispute that donning and doffing time was excluded from measured working time by “custom or practice” under the implied-in-fact agreement. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court correctly ruled that section 203(o) excluded that donning and doffing time from “hours worked” for which compensation was due, and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Jackson v. Old EPT, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employed as truck drivers, filed suit against Tutle and Schlumberger, alleging that defendants failed to pay them overtime compensation in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act (AMWA), Ark. Code Ann. 11-4-211(a). The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs are exempt under the federal Motor Carrier Act, 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(1), where the evidence establishes that the character of plaintiffs' job duties was such that they were called upon “either regularly or from time to time” to drive in interstate commerce. There was a reasonable expectation of interstate travel, the Motor Carrier Act exemption applies to plaintiffs, and plaintiffs thus are not entitled to overtime compensation. View "Alexander v. Tutle and Tutle Trucking" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, alleging that the company terminated his position and then refused to rehire him because of his age, in violation of federal and Minnesota law. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer where plaintiff has not presented a submissible case of age discrimination under Minnesota law. It follows that plaintiff’s claim under the more demanding federal standard fails as well. In this case, plaintiff is understandably frustrated that the employer deviated from written guidelines under which he likely would have been retained as a pharmacist. But plaintiff cannot prevail in this lawsuit by showing sloppy management or arbitrary decisionmaking. The company’s regular practice of ranking all pharmacists together and terminating those with the lowest score is not sufficient evidence of age discrimination to defeat summary judgment. The balance of the evidence does not establish a submissible case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Noreen v. PharMerica Corp." on Justia Law