Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Drivers Management and Werner Enterprises on behalf of Victor Robinson, a deaf individual, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The jury found in favor of the EEOC, awarding Robinson compensatory and punitive damages. The district court awarded Robinson backpay, reduced the damages to comply with the statutory cap, ordered injunctive relief, and granted prejudgment interest. Werner appealed, challenging multiple aspects of the proceedings.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted a directed verdict on causation, dismissed Werner’s affirmative defenses of direct threat and undue hardship, and made several evidentiary rulings against Werner. The jury found that Werner failed to hire and accommodate Robinson in violation of the ADA. The district court reduced the punitive damages award to the statutory maximum and awarded backpay and prejudgment interest. Werner’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decisions, holding that there was direct evidence of discrimination, justifying the directed verdict on causation. The court found that Werner failed to provide sufficient evidence for its undue hardship and direct threat defenses. The evidentiary rulings were deemed appropriate, as the comments and policies of other companies were relevant to the case. The court also upheld the jury’s finding that Robinson was qualified for the position and that Werner acted with malice or reckless indifference, justifying the punitive damages award. The court affirmed the district court’s equitable awards of injunctive relief and prejudgment interest, finding no abuse of discretion. View "EEOC v. Drivers Management, LLC" on Justia Law

Jacqueline Pilot applied for a promotion with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in Kansas City, Missouri. After another candidate was selected, Pilot sued the Secretary of Transportation under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging race, sex, and age discrimination, as well as retaliation for a previous employment discrimination complaint. The district court granted summary judgment to the Secretary.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary. The court found that Pilot did not provide sufficient evidence to support her claims of discrimination and retaliation. Pilot then appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court applied the burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, which is used for claims lacking direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation. The court found that while Pilot made a prima facie case for her claims, the Secretary provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision: the FAA hired the highest-ranked candidate based on a standardized hiring process. The court concluded that Pilot failed to show that the Secretary's reason was pretextual. The court noted that the hiring process used a mix of objective and subjective criteria, and the top-ranked candidate was selected based on a standardized rubric. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Secretary, finding no evidence of pretext or discrimination. View "Pilot v. Duffy" on Justia Law

In several Minnesota cities, only members of a pre-approved union can work on municipal construction jobs. Multiple contractors, a carpenter, and a union objected to this requirement, alleging it violated the First Amendment. The contractors, Kaski, Inc.; Nordic Group, Inc.; and Roen Salvage Co., claimed they missed out on lucrative work due to these project-labor agreements. Luke Krhin, a carpenter, and the Christian Labor Association, which has a local chapter in Minnesota, also joined the lawsuit.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota determined that none of the plaintiffs had standing to sue. The court found that the contractors, Krhin, and the Christian Labor Association could not succeed on their First Amendment claim. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court focused on the issue of standing, a jurisdictional requirement. The court found that the contractors did not have standing because the relevant constitutional claims belonged to their employees, not to them. The court also found that Krhin, who opposed joining a pre-approved union, was exempt from the requirement as a supervisor, thus lacking standing. The Christian Labor Association also lacked standing because it failed to identify any members who would have standing to sue in their own right.The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss based on a lack of standing. View "Christian Labor Association v. City of Duluth" on Justia Law

Workers United initiated a unionizing campaign at a Starbucks store in Los Angeles in May 2022. The store manager, Leticia Nolda, held one-on-one meetings with employees to discuss unionization. During a meeting with shift supervisor Yesenia Alarcon, Nolda expressed her opposition to the union, mentioned potential union dues, and suggested that unionization could affect benefits and raises. Alarcon did not feel free to leave the meeting but did not face any adverse consequences or feel discouraged from supporting the union. The store later voted to unionize.An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Nolda's statements to Alarcon violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by threatening economic retaliation and coercively interrogating her about union activities. The ALJ disregarded Nolda's intent and Alarcon's subjective impressions as "immaterial." The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) affirmed the ALJ's decision. Starbucks petitioned for review, arguing that the Board applied an incorrect standard for Section 8(a)(1) violations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the NLRB applied an improper legal standard by disregarding the factual context, including the employee's reactions, in evaluating the alleged Section 8 violations. The court emphasized that the totality of circumstances, including employees' subjective impressions, should be considered to determine if an employer's conduct would reasonably tend to coerce an employee. The court vacated the NLRB's opinion and order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Starbucks Corporation v. NLRB" on Justia Law

James Hess filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against Union Pacific Railroad Company, claiming he was unlawfully terminated due to his disability. Union Pacific has a "Fitness-for-Duty" policy requiring employees to disclose certain health conditions. Hess, who began working for Union Pacific in May 2013, was prescribed Xanax for post-traumatic stress disorder in 2015. In 2016, Union Pacific prohibited medications like Xanax, and in January 2017, Hess was removed from service and later disqualified from his job following a fitness-for-duty evaluation.The District Court for the District of Nebraska dismissed Hess's action as untimely, agreeing with Union Pacific that the statute of limitations was not tolled while the Harris class action was pending because Hess was not a member of the certified class. The Harris class action, filed in 2016, alleged that Union Pacific's fitness-for-duty policy discriminated against employees with disabilities. The class was initially defined broadly but was later certified under a narrower definition, excluding Hess. The class was decertified by the Eighth Circuit in March 2020, after which Hess filed an EEOC charge and received a right-to-sue letter.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Citing its recent decision in DeGeer v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., the court held that Hess was entitled to American Pipe tolling because he was not unambiguously excluded from the certified class. Therefore, the statute of limitations was tolled until the class was decertified. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, concluding that Hess's lawsuit was timely filed. View "Hess v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Robert L. Palmer, a long-time employee of Union Pacific, alleged that the company discriminated against him due to his disability, diabetes, which led to diabetic retinopathy. After undergoing surgery for his right eye in 2011, Palmer continued working until November 2013, when his left eye developed blurred vision. Union Pacific then initiated a fitness-for-duty evaluation, resulting in a February 2014 letter from Dr. Holland, the Chief Medical Officer, imposing permanent work restrictions on Palmer. Despite submitting medical information from his eye doctor in May 2014, which cleared him for work, Palmer received a December 2014 letter reaffirming the permanent restrictions and stating that no further medical information would be considered.Palmer was part of a putative class action (Harris class) filed in February 2016, which alleged that Union Pacific's fitness-for-duty policy discriminated against employees with disabilities. The class was certified in February 2019 but decertified in March 2020. Palmer then filed an individual charge of discrimination with the EEOC in April 2020 and subsequently filed this action under the ADA, claiming his suit was timely due to tolling during the class action.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska dismissed Palmer's claims as time-barred, concluding that the only adverse employment action occurred in February 2014, outside the class definition period. Palmer's motion to reconsider or amend was denied, as the court found the December 2014 letter was not a separate adverse action but a consequence of the February 2014 action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court relied on an outdated standard for adverse employment actions. Under the new standard from Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Palmer's allegations that the December 2014 letter caused him harm by denying future review opportunities were sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action. The appellate court reversed the district court's denial of reconsideration and leave to amend, remanding for further proceedings. View "Palmer v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Petra Brokken sued her employer, Hennepin County, alleging religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), and wrongful discharge under Minnesota’s Refusal of Treatment statute. Brokken claimed that the County's Covid-19 vaccine and testing policy conflicted with her religious beliefs. After initially granting her a religious exemption, the County revised its policy, threatening termination and loss of accrued benefits if she did not comply. Brokken retired under duress and subsequently filed her lawsuit.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Brokken's claims. The court ruled that she failed to plead an adverse employment action, did not plausibly plead religious beliefs conflicting with the County’s policy, and that the MHRA does not provide a cause of action for failure to accommodate religious beliefs. Additionally, the court found that Minnesota’s Refusal of Treatment statute does not create a private right of action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the wrongful discharge claim under Minnesota’s Refusal of Treatment statute, agreeing that it does not create a private right of action. However, the court reversed the dismissal of Brokken’s Title VII and MHRA claims. The appellate court held that Brokken plausibly pled an adverse employment action and sufficiently alleged that her religious beliefs conflicted with the County’s policy. The court also recognized that the MHRA provides protection against failures to accommodate religious beliefs. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Brokken v. Hennepin County" on Justia Law

Matthew Kale sued his employer, Aero Simulation, Inc. (ASI), alleging religious and disability discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Constitution, and state law. ASI required all employees to receive the Covid-19 vaccine, with non-compliance resulting in disciplinary action, including termination. Kale requested a religious exemption, citing his belief that his body is a temple of the Holy Spirit and should not be subjected to unwanted intrusions. ASI denied his request, and Kale was terminated. He filed a charge with the EEOC, which issued a right to sue letter.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota dismissed Kale’s claims, ruling that he failed to plausibly plead religious beliefs conflicting with ASI’s Covid-19 policy, did not allege that ASI regarded him as disabled due to his unvaccinated status, and that his proposed amended complaint was futile. Kale appealed the dismissal of his federal law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that Kale failed to allege facts showing that ASI’s testing requirement conflicted with his bona fide religious beliefs. The court noted that Kale’s complaint did not adequately connect his objection to testing with specific religious principles. Additionally, the court found that Kale did not exhaust his administrative remedies for his ADA claim, as he only asserted religious discrimination in his EEOC charge. The court also upheld the denial of Kale’s motion to amend his complaint, deeming it futile as it contained the same deficiencies as the original complaint. The judgment was affirmed. View "Kale v. Aero Simulation, Inc." on Justia Law

Brett Jens resigned from his position at Wilbur-Ellis Company, LLC, and subsequently joined a competitor, J.R. Simplot Company. Wilbur-Ellis filed a lawsuit against Jens and Simplot, seeking a preliminary injunction to enforce restrictive covenants in Jens’s employment agreement and to prevent Simplot’s alleged tortious interference with the agreement. The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the restrictive covenants were no longer enforceable.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota reviewed the case and determined that Wilbur-Ellis was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its breach of contract claim against Jens. The court found that the restrictive covenants in Jens’s employment agreement did not survive past the agreement’s expiration date of February 28, 2010. Wilbur-Ellis appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction, arguing that the restrictive covenants were intended to begin when Jens’s employment ended. Simplot cross-appealed, contending that Wilbur-Ellis could not enforce the restrictive covenants because the employer in the agreement was Wilbur-Ellis Air, LLC, not Wilbur-Ellis Company, LLC.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction, agreeing that the restrictive covenants did not survive the expiration of the employment agreement. The court emphasized that the agreement did not contain a survival clause or any language indicating that the restrictive covenants were intended to extend beyond the termination of the agreement. Consequently, the court concluded that Wilbur-Ellis was unlikely to succeed on the merits, which is the most significant factor in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction. View "Wilbur-Ellis Company LLC v. Jens" on Justia Law

Danette Hester, a Special Agent for the IRS in Iowa, applied for a Criminal Investigator position in Georgia but was not hired. After filing a discrimination complaint, the IRS proposed her termination for alleged misconduct. Hester sued, claiming discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to the IRS, and Hester appealed.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa granted summary judgment in favor of the IRS on all counts. Hester, a 53-year-old Black woman, alleged retaliation and race, sex, and age discrimination. The district court found that Hester did not provide sufficient evidence to support her claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Hester met her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of race and sex discrimination but failed to show that the IRS's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring her was pretextual. The court noted that the IRS limited the hiring to one position due to an upcoming reorganization and that the selected candidate had qualifications Hester lacked, such as fluency in Spanish.Regarding age discrimination, the court found that the four-year age difference between Hester and the selected candidate was not significant enough to support her claim. For the retaliation claim, the court held that Hester did not establish a causal connection between her discrimination complaint and the proposed termination, as the seven-month gap was insufficient to infer causation.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Hester failed to provide evidence that the IRS's reasons for its actions were pretextual or that her age, race, or sex played a role in the decision not to promote her. View "Hester v. U.S. Department of Treasury" on Justia Law