Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against HUD, alleging discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to HUD. Under Circuit precedent the action complained of must be “materially adverse” to support a discrimination claim. In this case, the court affirmed the district court's finding that the denial of plaintiff's requests for lateral transfers on the basis of race and/or national origin was not cognizable under Title VII because it did not constitute an adverse employment action. View "Ortiz-Diaz v. HUD" on Justia Law

Quicken forbids its mortgage bankers to use or disclose a broad range of personnel information without Quicken’s prior written consent or to criticize publicly the company and its management. The Board determined that such rules violate the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., because they unreasonably burden the employees’ ability to discuss legitimate employment matters, to protest employer practices, and to organize. The court denied Quicken’s petition for review and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement, concluding that there was nothing arbitrary or capricious about that decision and no abuse of discretion in the Board’s hearing process. In this case, the Board appropriately determined that employees would reasonably construe the sweeping prohibitions in Quicken’s Confidentiality and Non-Disparagement Rules as trenching upon their rights to discuss and object to employment terms and conditions, and to coordinate efforts and organize to promote employee interests. View "Quicken Loans, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

In Kloeckner v. Solis, the Supreme Court held that when the Board dismisses a mixed-case appeal without reaching the merits on a procedural ground - there, untimeliness - judicial review resides in district court (as when the Board reaches the merits), not the Federal Circuit. At issue in this appeal is whether Kloeckner effectively overruled this court's decision in Powell v. Dep’t of Def. The court held that it does not and that the court's precedent requires transferring the case to the Federal Court. The court found that Powell is materially indistinguishable from this case. Like Powell, petitioner resolved a disciplinary issue by agreeing to a significant employment action that could be appealed to the Board if involuntary. Like Powell, petitioner then claimed that his agreement had been involuntary due to discrimination. As in Powell, the Board disagreed, finding that the agreement was voluntary and thus dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. And like Powell, petitioner contends that review of the Board’s dismissal lies in district court. The court rejected that argument in Powell. Accordingly, the court transferred the petition for review to the Federal Circuit. View "Perry v. MSPB" on Justia Law

The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. 501(b), sets out fiduciary duties that officers and other agents of unions owe the union that employs them. At issue is whether section 501 provides a union with a federal cause of action against its agent for breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the union. Weaver v. United Mine Workers of America holds, at least, that where union members have properly sued under section 501, the union itself may take control of the suit and displace the union members. Because the Union’s section 501 claim is properly before the district court, supplemental jurisdiction exists for the Union’s state law claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order dismissing the Union's claims under section 501 and state law for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "International Union v. Faye" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a former pilot with Spirit Airlines, challenges the DoT's refusal to consent to the release of the urine sample it says petitioner produced for a mandatory drug test. Because the sample tested positive for controlled substances, petitioner lost his job and airman medical certificate. The court held that neither the DoT’s general rule against releasing urine samples for DNA testing, nor its refusal to release the sample in this case, is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-132, 105 Stat. 952. The court also held that petitioner's constitutional challenges to the rule fail. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Swaters v. DOT" on Justia Law

The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the union and Verizon provided for arbitration of disputes arising out of that agreement. After an arbitration panel interpreted the CBA in Verizon's favor, the union took the matter to the NLRB. After the ALJ ruled in favor of Verizon, the union appealed to the Board. The Board overruled the arbitration decision, determining that the union’s waiver of its members’ right to picket did not waive their right to visibly display pro-union signs in cars on Verizon property. The court concluded that, under the Spielberg-Olin standard, the arbitration panel’s decision in this case was not clearly repugnant to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. First, the arbitration panel’s decision was susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act, because under the Act unions may waive their members’ right to display signs in cars on the employer’s premises. And second, the arbitration panel’s decision was not a “palpably wrong” interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, the court concluded that the Board’s contrary decision was unreasonable. The court granted Verizon's petition for review and denied the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Verizon New England Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek review of the Board's finding that G/M and the Carpenters Union committed unfair labor practices. The court held this case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s consideration of the validity of the President’s recess appointments to fill vacancies on the Board in NLRB v. Noel Canning. Member Becker, who was on the Board panel in this case, had been appointed to the Board by the President during a 17-day intra-session recess of the Senate. Following the Supreme Court’s decision, this court held that Becker’s appointment was valid. The court removed the case from abeyance and now hold that the Board’s orders failed to provide a reasoned justification for departing from precedent. In this case, G/M and the Carpenters Union filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Board’s determination had ignored its holding in Coamo Knitting Mills, Inc. The court concluded that the Board’s order denying reconsideration relies solely on the absence of a claim of unlawful surveillance in distinguishing Coamo, not on any factual differences between the cases. Because the Board did not adequately distinguish Coamo and grant the petitions for review on that ground, the court need not reach the remaining arguments. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review, vacated the orders, and remanded. View "NLRB v. Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters" on Justia Law

The General Counsel issued a complaint against the union, alleging that the union violated federal labor laws by failing to tell Laura Sands when she began work at Kroger how much less in dues she would have to pay if she did not join the union. The Board dismissed the complaint. Sands petitions for review. The court joined the Second Circuit in holding that an unfair labor practice case is moot when the petitioner lacks an ongoing personal interest in the proceedings. Sands ended her relationship with the union when she quit her job at the grocery store in 2005, and her counsel conceded at oral argument that there is no reason to think she will work there again. Thus, even if posting a notice about the labor violation might affect a current store employee, it cannot redress Sands’ injury. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review as moot and vacated the Board's order under the court's equitable authority. View "Sands v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Aggregate Industries transferred work from one bargaining unit to another over the objections of the union representing both units. The ALJ found that because the company had bargained over the issue to impasse, it was entitled to make the change unilaterally. The Board held, however, that the company had merely transferred work and thus it had changed the scope of the bargaining unit. Therefore, the Board determined that the company no right to insist that the union bargain over the issue. The Board also held that even if the company had merely transferred work, it had not given the union a fair chance to bargain. The court disagreed and granted the petition for review and denied the application for enforcement of all aspects of the Board’s order addressing the company’s decision to transfer material hauling work. In this case, because the company had the right to unilaterally transfer material hauling work, the union acted improperly when it refused to fill the company’s dispatch order. Under Article 3 of the Ready-Mix Agreement, Aggregate therefore had the right to hire anyone it wanted, including its own drivers. Thus, Aggregate did not engage in unlawful direct dealing when it made its proposal to the construction drivers. The court upheld the Board's decision in a collateral matter. View "Aggregate Indus. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The Companies, operators of nursing homes, petitioned for review of the Board's determination that the Companies violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., by engaging in bad-faith bargaining with the Union. The Companies challenged two of the remedies the Board imposed: reimbursement of litigation costs incurred by both the Board and the Union during Board proceedings; and reimbursement of “all” of the negotiation expenses the Union incurred during its bargaining sessions with the Companies. The court concluded that the Board lacks authority to require the reimbursement of litigation costs incurred during Board proceedings. The court held, however, that the Board may require an employer to reimburse a union’s bargaining expenses pursuant to its remedial authority under section 10(c) of the Act. The court also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Companies’ alternative challenge to the amount of the bargaining-costs award because they failed to raise it before the Board. Accordingly, the court granted the Companies’ joint petition in part and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement in part. View "Camelot Terrace, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law