Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging that the surviving spouse benefit provided by the city to its retired employees discriminated on the basis of sex. Plaintiff's theory of liability was that because, in the aggregate, the city paid a larger amount of money to the married retirees who selected the surviving spouse benefits than it did to single retirees who did the same, and male retirees were more likely to be married, the surviving spouse benefit had an unlawful disparate impact on female retirees. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's disparate treatment claim because she failed to allege intentional discrimination and affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's disparate impact claim because, even assuming she had Article III stand, her claim failed as a matter of law.

This case arose when plaintiff, a neo-natal intensive care unit (NICU) nurse, sought an accommodation from her employer that would have allowed her an unspecified number of unplanned absences from her job. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on her reasonable accommodation claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), (b)(5)(A). The court held that plaintiff's performance was predicated on her attendance; reliable, dependable performance required reliable and dependable attendance. An employer need not provide accommodations that compromise performance quality. Because regular attendance was an essential function of a neo-natal nursing position, the court affirmed.

Two non-Indian entities brought this action to enjoin Navajo Nation tribal officials from applying tribal law to them in tribal courts. They claimed that both their contract with the tribe and federal law deprived tribal officials of authority to regulate them. At issue was whether the Navajo Nation itself was a necessary party under Rule 19. The court held that the tribe was not a necessary party because the tribal officials could be expected to adequately represent the tribe's interests in this action and because complete relief could be accorded among the existing parties without the tribe. Thus, this lawsuit for prospective injunctive relief could proceed against the officials under a routine application of Ex parte Young and should not be dismissed.

Plaintiff, and drivers similarly situated, filed a class action against Affinity alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and California laws, including failure to pay overtime, failure to pay wages, improper charges for workers' compensation insurance, and the unfair business practice of wrongfully classifying California drivers. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the district court, after applying California's choice of law framework, erred when it concluded that Georgia law applied. The district court concluded that under Georgia law there was a presumption of independent contractor status and to rebut this presumption, plaintiff must establish that an employer-employee relationship existed. The district court found that plaintiff was unable to establish such a relationship and failed to rebut Georgia's presumption. The court held that the parties' choice of Georgia law was unenforceable in California. The court also held that under California's choice of law framework, the law of California applied. Accordingly, on remand, the district court shall apply California law to determine whether the drivers were employees or independent contractors.

Plaintiff, the former in-house counsel for Toyota Motor Corp. (TMS), presented TMS with a claim asserting, inter alia, constructive wrongful discharge related to TMS's alleged unethical discovery practices. TMS and plaintiff settled the claims and entered into a Severance Agreement. TMS subsequently sued in state superior court seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and permanent injunctive relieve to prevent plaintiff from violating the attorney-client privilege and plaintiff filed a cross complaint for a TRO and a permanent injunction prohibiting TMS from interfering with his business practices and those of his consulting business. The court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., governed the Severance Agreement; the FAA authorized limited review of the Final Award; and the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law governing the Severance Agreement where the arbitrator's writing was sufficient under the terms of the Severance Agreement and the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard California law in addressing plaintiff's affirmative defenses. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's contempt motion. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

After her first termination from the City of Pasadena Police Department and subsequent reinstatement, plaintiff brought a lawsuit in state court claiming that she had been discriminated against and harassed by the City due to its perception that she had a disability. After her second termination, she reinstated her discrimination and harassment claims in an administrative proceeding, where she also argued that the termination was retaliatory. Both of plaintiff's actions resulted in a decision in favor of the City. Plaintiff subsequently brought claims in federal court based on the same theories in state proceedings. The court held that California principles of issue preclusion prevented the court from reaching these issues.

Plaintiff sued the Corps for violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., by failing to interview him and rejecting his applications for two promotions. The court found that plaintiff presented a prima facie case of age discrimination and evidence of pretext sufficient to create a material dispute as to whether age-related bias was the "but-for" cause of the Corps' failure to interview and promote him. Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Corps was reversed.

PAC sought review of an order of the Board holding that PAC violated section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), by firing an employee for his outburst during a meeting with PAC management regarding PAC's compensation policies. The court remanded to the Board for proper balancing of the Atlantic Steel factors in light of its conclusion that the Board erred in its initial assessment that the nature of the employee's outburst weighed in favor of protection. The court granted the Board's petition for enforcement of the order with regard to the Board's findings that PAC committed unfair labor practices by inviting the employee to quit in response to his protected concerted protests of labor conditions. Accordingly, Paragraphs 2(a)-(c) of the Board's order were vacated and Paragraphs 1 and 2(d)-(e) were enforced.

Three nonresidents of California brought a would-be class action against Oracle seeking damages under California law for failure to pay overtime. Plaintiffs' first two claims were based on work performed in California. The third claim was based on work performed anywhere in the United States. The district court granted summary judgment to Oracle on all three claims, on the ground that the relevant provisions of California law did not, or could not, apply to the work performed by plaintiffs. After certifying several questions of state law to the California Supreme Court and receiving answers from that court, the court reversed summary judgment on the first two claims and affirmed the third claim. In regards to the Labor Code claim, the court rejected Oracle's due process clause and commerce clause arguments; in regards to the California Business and Professions Code 17200 claim, the court held that the California court's holding was conclusive (that section 17200 did not apply to overtime work performed by plaintiffs); and in regards to the Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(1), claim, the court held that the California court's holding was conclusive (section 17200 did not apply to overtime work performed outside California for a California-based employer by out-of-state plaintiffs based solely on the employer's failure to comply with the overtime provisions of the FLSA).

Plaintiff, a former recruiter for Nielsen Media Research, Inc. (Nielsen), appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on her age and disability discrimination and wrongful termination claims under California law against Nielsen. The court held that, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, reasonable jurors could find that Nielsen's proffered reason for terminating plaintiff's employment was a pretext for age discrimination. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff on her age discrimination and wrongful termination claims. The court affirmed summary judgment against plaintiff on her disability discrimination claim.