Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a former employee of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) who suffered from multiple sclerosis and systemic lupus, filed an administrative complaint based on alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The complaint was adjudicated by an ALJ, who denied relief in part. Plaintiff then filed an optional administrative appeal with the EEOC. Plaintiff withdrew her appeal without waiting 180 days as specified in 29 C.F.R. 1614.407(d) and filed suit in district court based on the same claims she asserted in her administrative complaint. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, holding that under Rivera v. USPS, it lacked jurisdiction because Plaintiff had not waited 180 days after filing her administrative appeal. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that based on Bankston v. White and on post-Rivera regulation, Bullock had exhausted her administrative remedies. Remanded. View "Bullock v. Berrien" on Justia Law

Deborah Benge, a former employee of Pacific Ship Repair and Fabrication, filed a disability claim under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act seeking compensation for her work-related injury. The ALJ found that Benge's disability at the time was permanent. The Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP) made partial permanent disability payments to Benge until Benge underwent surgery. An ALJ subsequently determined that Benge's nine-month total disability immediately following the surgery was temporary in nature. This determination absolved the OWCP from making disability payments during this time period. Instead, Pacific was liable for the payments. The Department of Labor's Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ, concluding that even if a disability is declared permanent, it may be later re-characterized as temporary when the underlying condition worsens and re-stabilizes following a surgical procedure. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under the Longshore Act, a prior finding of partial permanent disability does not preclude a later finding of temporary disability for the same underlying injury during a period of recovery following surgery; and (2) because Benge's partial disability could be re-characterized as a temporary total disability in accord with changed circumstances, Pacific was responsible for the temporary total disability payments.

Appellant, a former pilot for Vision Airlines, sued Vision on behalf of a Class of other pilots and flight crew employees to recover hazard pay, which Appellant and the Class alleged Vision had accepted on their behalf and never paid to them. After nearly two years of discovery disputes between Vision and the Class, the district court sanctioned Vision by striking its answer, entered default judgment against Vision, and held a jury trial to determine damages. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court rejected Vision's arguments that (1) the district court abused its discretion by striking Vision's answer, (2) the claims in the complaint were legally insufficient to support the default judgment, and (3) the district court abused its discretion by certifying the Class. The Court then reversed the order dismissing the Class's claim for punitive damages, holding that the district court erred in dismissing the Class's claim for punitive damages.

David Day, an ERISA plan beneficiary, elected to roll over his pension benefits into an individual retirement account (IRA) upon separation from his employer, AT&T. Exercising its discretion, the plan's claims administrator construed Day's lump sum rollover as the equivalent of his having "received" his pension benefits and, according to the terms of AT&T's Disability Income Benefit Plan, reduced Day's long-term disability (LTD) benefits by the amount of the rollover. The district court entered judgment in favor of the plan. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the administrator reasonably interpreted the plan; (2) AT&T did not breach its fiduciary duties by failing to disclose the possibility that Petitioner's LTD benefits would be reduced by his receipt of pension benefits; and (3) the administrator's actions did not violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of her claim challenging the termination of her long-term disability benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132. Plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Unum on it's counterclaim for restitution of overpaid benefits. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the claim for denial of benefits for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The exhaustion requirement should have been excused because plaintiff acted reasonably in light of Unum's ambiguous communications and failure to engage in a meaningful dialogue. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment in favor of Unum on plaintiff's claim for denial of benefits.

Defendant appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of CGI in its action seeking "appropriate equitable relief" under section 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. CGI appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of defendant's counsel and codefendant, dismissing the codefendant from the action. CGI also appealed the district court's grant of proportional fees and costs to the codefendant, deducted from CGI's recovery from defendant. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the codefendant, dismissing it from the action. However, because the court saw no indication that in fashioning "appropriate equitable relief" for CGI, the district court did more than interpret the plain terms of the reimbursement provision, and no indication that the district court considered traditional equitable principles in assigning responsibility to CGI for attorneys' fees and costs, the court vacated the judgment in favor of CGI, vacated the judgment that the codefendant deducted fees and costs from CGI's entitlement, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff alleged that defendants' determination, that plaintiff's psychological disorder made her unfit for reinstatement from disability retirement to active service with the Caltrans, deprived her of her right to a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12111-12117. At issue was whether a state employee could sue state officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged violations of Title I of the ADA. The court concluded that Congress' inclusion of a comprehensive remedial scheme in Title I precluded section 1983 claims predicated on alleged violations of the ADA Title I substantive rights. The court also concluded that plaintiff's allegations of fact did not state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause.

Plaintiffs, on behalf of thousands of retired county employees participating in county-sponsored health care plans, filed suit against the county challenging changes it made to the structure of two health benefits. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the county. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings and with the answer provided by the California Supreme Court to the certified question in the Retired Employees Association of Orange County, Inc.(REAOC) litigation. The court took judicial notice of the documents; reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' subsidy claims and remanded so that the district court could reassess those claims in light of the California Supreme Court's opinion, and coordinate those claims with the REAOC litigation; the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' grant claims because the court found that plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to amend their complaint to set out specifically the terms of those memoranda of understanding (MOUs) on which their claim predicated; and the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), California Government Code 12940 et seq., claim because the court found that Mr. McConnell's timely filed administrative complaint was sufficient to establish exhaustion of the administrative remedies for all class members.

Plaintiffs, television news reporters for KPIX-TV, brought suit alleging that KPIX discriminated against them on the basis of age and gender, in violation of California law, when they were laid off. The district court granted KPIX's motion for summary judgment, dismissing all of plaintiffs' claims. The court held that, although plaintiffs established a prima facie case of discrimination, they did not present sufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment. The court wrote to clarify that a plaintiff could make a prima facie case of disparate-treatment age discrimination using statistical evidence, even where that evidence did not account for defendant's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge.

Plaintiffs, employees at a defense plant in Arizona, collectively bargained for the right to receive employer-provided healthcare coverage after they retired. At issue was whether those employees, now retirees, were contractually entitled to receive premium-free healthcare coverage until age 65, or whether the contracts on which the retirees relied as providing that entitlement allowed their prior employer to start charging them for their insurance. The court held that Raytheon expressly agreed to provide 100% company-paid healthcare coverage for eligible retirees; that Raytheon's obligation survived the expectation of the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs); and that Raytheon's agreed-upon obligation could not be unilaterally abrogated by Raytheon, regardless of the rights Raytheon reserved for itself in Plan documents, because the CBAs did not incorporate the Plans' reservation-of-rights provisions with respect to employer contribution issues, as opposed to issues relating to the provision of monetary or in kind benefits for particular medical services. The court further held that the district court did not err in rejecting plaintiffs' claim for punitive and extra-contractual damages.