Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a former Arizona state prisoner, filed suit against defendants, alleging that they violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131-12134, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA), 29 U.S.C. 794, by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability. Plaintiff picked tomatoes for Eurofresh as a part of a convict labor force. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims against Eurofresh were properly dismissed because plaintiff and Eurofresh were not in an employment relationship, and Eurofresh did not receive federal financial assistance. The court concluded, however, that judgment was improperly granted to the State Defendants where they were liable for disability discrimination committed by a contractor. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court to determine in the first instance whether such discrimination occurred. View "Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a welder who injured his back in 2003, petitioned for review of the Benefits Review Board's affirmance of an ALJ's finding that petitioner's pay increases after the date of injury were reflective of his wage-earning capacity and shall be used to calculate his disability benefits. The court held that, under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901-950, scheduled wage increases given by a non-union employer to all employees in a certain class based solely upon seniority are a general increase in wages and did not increase a claimant's wage-earning capacity. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board's decision, and remanded for recalculation of petitioner's partial disability benefits. View "Petitt v. Sause Brothers" on Justia Law

I-TAP, an approved apprenticeship program for Federal purposes, but not recognized by California as a state-approved apprenticeship program, filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that the CDIR's actions were inconsistent with the National Apprenticeship Act of 1937 (Fitzgerald Act). The court concluded that federal subject-matter jurisdiction existed in this case; the court declined to afford controlling deference to the DOL's new interpretation of the meaning of "Federal purposes" under 29 C.F.R. 29.2 under Auer v. Robbins, but nevertheless adopted that interpretation as the most persuasive construction of the regulation at issue; the court adopted the DOL's new interpretation of Federal purposes, which required of agreements, contracts, etc., that conformity with federal apprenticeship standards be a condition for the federal assistance at issue; plaintiffs' preemption claim failed where the three projects at issue did not qualify as Federal purposes, and it was not impermissible for the CDIR to require the contractors on the projects to comply with California's apprenticeship standards; and plaintiffs' dormant Commerce Clause, equal protection, and substantive due process challenges failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Indep. Training v. Cal. Dep't Indus. Relations" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, former President of the United Steel Workers Local 12-369, filed suit against defendants alleging claims of discrimination on the basis of race and gender, and retaliation for having engaged in protected speech under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. 401 et seq. The court concluded that, because the alleged retaliatory actions directed toward plaintiff impinged only upon her status as a union officer, she could not seek redress for these actions under section 609. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding defendants did not discriminate or retaliate against plaintiff given the district court's analysis of plaintiff's allegations, both as discrete incidents and as part of a broader course of conduct. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USW Local 12-369 v. USW Int'l" on Justia Law

Debtor was required to make contributions to the Carpenters Pension Trust Fund pursuant to a multiemployer bargaining agreement (the Agreement). When the Agreement expired, debtor no longer was a signatory to a collective bargaining agreement and stopped making payments. The Fund subsequently filed suit because debtor was still doing work covered by the Agreement and was subject to withdrawal liability under 29 U.S.C. 1381. Debtor then filed for bankruptcy and sought a discharge of his debt to the Fund. The Fund filed a complaint under 11 U.S.C. 523(c) to prevent discharge, seeking to establish that the debt qualified as one created via defalcation by a fiduciary under section 523(a)(4). The court concluded that the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the dischargeability of the Fund's claim against debtor; debtor was not a fiduciary of the Fund because the unpaid withdrawal liability was not an asset of the Fund; and debtor's failure to challenge the withdrawal liability amount in arbitration did not act as a waiver of his right to discharge the debt. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Moxley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the CDCR and others after she was terminated from her independent contractor position as a nurse and was unable to find other work within the CDCR. The court held that a state agency did not create constitutionally protected property interests for its independent contractors simply by instituting performance review procedures. Even assuming independent contractors could ever have constitutionally protected property interests in their positions, something more was required: either an affirmative grant of tenure or a guarantee from the government. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's federal deprivation of property claim where her orientation documents did not contain any such assurances. The court also affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's federal deprivation of liberty claim where her liberty interest was in her profession as a nurse, not her placement with a particular employer. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of claims against Defendant Hill where plaintiff's allegations concerning him were conclusory and implausible on their face. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blantz v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a representative Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), Cal. Lab. Code 2699, action against defendants alleging that they illegally deprived him and other nonexempt employees of meal periods, overtime and vacation wages, and accurate itemized wage statements. At issue on appeal was whether the penalties recoverable on behalf of all aggrieved employees could be considered in their totality to clear the federal diversity jurisdiction amount in controversy requirement under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). The court concluded that the recoveries at issue could not be aggregated to meet the amount in controversy requirement. To the extent plaintiff could assert anything but his individual interest, the court was unpersuaded that such a suit, the primary benefit of which would inure to the state, satisfied the requirements of federal diversity jurisdiction. The state, as the real party in interest, was not a "citizen" for diversity purposes. Accordingly, the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this quintessential California dispute. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded, directing the district court to return the matter to state court for resolution. View " Urbino v. Orkin Services of California, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901-950, for injuries he sustained after falling off a dock while attempting to urinate while intoxicated. The court concluded that an injury "occasioned solely by" intoxication means that the legal cause of the injury was intoxication, regardless of the surface material of the landing on which the intoxicated person fell; the court rejected petitioner's broad definition of the term "injury;" the Board did not err in concluding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusions; there was no error in the Board's conclusion that petitioner's employer did not have to "rule out" all other possible causes of injury in order to rebut the presumption under section 920(c); and the Board correctly concluded that the ALJ's decision to deny disability benefits, based on the record as a whole, was proper. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Schwirse v. Director, OWCP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that her employer discriminated against her based upon her sex. While pursuing the discrimination action, plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, failing to list the bankruptcy action in her bankruptcy schedules. The employer subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment in the discrimination action on the ground that judicial estoppel prohibited plaintiff from proceeding. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. However, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in determining whether plaintiff's bankruptcy omission was "mistaken" or "inadvertent." View "Quin v. County of Kauai Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute between the parties over who could claim certain longshore work handling cargo at the Port of Seward, Alaska. At issue on appeal was whether Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 187, permitted an action challenging the union's conduct at the arbitration when plaintiff had admittedly failed to challenge the arbitration award itself in court under Section 301 of the LMRA. The court reversed the district court's dismissal for lack of statutory standing because nothing in section 303 precluded plaintiffs to first exhaust a petition to vacate the arbitration award before they could claim section 303's remedy. Nothing in section 303 barred an employer - whether primary or neutral - from seeking compensatory damages for a union's alleged unfair labor practice, even if that practice occurred during arbitration. View "American President Lines, Ltd. v. ILWU" on Justia Law