Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer (Nichols) for breach of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and against his union for breach of its duty of fair representation. Plaintiff alleged that Nichols breached the CBA by failing to establish rest periods for workers on the continuously operating lines as required by Section 17.1 of the CBA. In this case, the union had a duty not to pursue a grievance to arbitration that it believed did not warrant such action. The court concluded that plaintiff had not raised a genuine issue of material fact on whether the union failed in its duty of fair representation on the issue before the court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the union and the employer. View "Inechien v. Nichols Aluminum, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, aged 76, filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq, and state law, contending that Securitas fired him because of his age. Plaintiff cited evidence that prior to his termination, Securitas supervisors showed age animus through negative comments regarding plaintiff's age. Plaintiff adduced enough evidence to raise genuine doubt as to the legitimacy of Securitas's motive, even if that evidence did not directly contradict or disprove Securitas's articulated reasons for its actions. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Securitas, concluding that there were genuine issues of material fact concerning pretext. View "Johnson v. Securitas Security Services" on Justia Law

In this case, the parties disagreed about the nature of their dissolution agreement after one of them experienced a change in circumstances. Patriot Coal and Heritage Coal sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. 2201 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 57, and requested a declaration that Peabody Holding's obligations with respect to the healthcare benefits owed to the Assumed Retirees would not be affected by modification of the benefits of retirees of Heritage or Eastern Associated under 11 U.S.C. 1114. The bankruptcy court denied relief and Patriot and Heritage appealed. While Heritage's rejection of its collective bargaining agreement relieved it of its contractual obligation to pay benefits, it still has a statutory obligation to pay those same benefits, at least until all of the steps of section 1114 are complied with. Therefore, the bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) held that upon rejection of the "me too" agreement under section 1113, absent modification under section 1114, Heritage was still required to comply with the terms of the individual employer plan and provide its retirees those plan defined benefits; neither Heritage or United Mine Workers of America requested a modification; Peabody Holding's obligation under the liabilities assumption agreement remains undisturbed upon grant of the sections 1113 and 1114 motion; and Peabody Holding's remaining arguments lacked merit. Accordingly, the BAP reversed the decision of the bankruptcy court. View "Patriot Coal Corp., et al. v. Peabody Holding Co., et al." on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases, the court addressed the Board's finding that RELCO unlawfully discharged eight workers for engaging in protected labor activity and RELCO's subsequent challenge to the Board's composition. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the Board's labor law conclusions. The court also concluded that it lacked authority to decide RELCO's challenge to the recess appointments where RELCO's challenge was barred by 29 U.S.C. 160(e)'s jurisdictional exhaustion requirement. Accordingly, the court granted the Board's application for enforcement and denied RELCO's petitions for review. View "NLRB v. RELCO Locomotive" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under Titles I and V of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., against his employer and various state employees, alleging that defendants retaliated against him in response to a prior discrimination suit that he had filed against them. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because sovereign immunity barred plaintiff's claims for money damages against defendants. View "Lors v. Dean, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461, alleging that defendants violated ERISA when defendants, realizing that they had paid plaintiffs excess retirement benefits, reduced plaintiffs' monthly benefit payments and recouped overpayments through withholding. The court concluded that Count One of the complaint was time-barred; the court rejected plaintiffs' argument that defendants had no authority to either correct or recoup the benefit overpayments where the 2002 plan booklet contained broad language granting defendants such action; because the PPNPF was a defined-benefit plan, plaintiffs could not recover individualized relief in a section 1132(a)(2) claim; and plaintiffs' claim for equitable estoppel under section 1132(a)(3)(B) failed where this claim mirrored Count One's section 1132(a)(1)(B) claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "Pilger, et al. v. Sweeney, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a dispute between the Union and Carlisle over the arbitrability of a grievance concerning disability benefits. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Carlisle and denied the Union's cross-motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that Carlisle's claim for declaratory judgment was barred by the doctrine of res judicata where there was no basis for the district court to conclude that the Union acquiesced in the splitting of Carlisle's claims. Therefore, the Union did not waive its right to rely on the doctrine of res judicata. Accordingly, the court vacated the order and remanded with directions to dismiss Carlisle's action View "Carlisle Power Trans. Products v. United Steel, etc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a truck driver for Red Racks, which was operated by DAV, filed suit under section 306 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act (SAFETEA-LU) Technical Corrections Act (TCA), Pub. L. 110-244, Title III, section 306, 122 Stat. 1572, 1620, claiming that he was a "covered" employee eligible for overtime. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court properly determined that a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), covered employee under the TCA was one driving a vehicle with a gross motor vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less. The district court also correctly determined that plaintiff was not a covered employee, where the trucks he drove actually weighed less than 10,000 pounds, and properly granted summary judgment to DAV and denied partial summary judgment to plaintiff. View "McCall v. Disabled American Veterans, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Cafe and its owner and manager for willfully violating the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that plaintiffs, as aliens without work authorization, lacked standing to sue. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the FLSA did not allow employers to exploit any employee's immigration status or to profit from hiring unauthorized aliens in violation of federal law. View "Lucas, et al. v. Jerusalem Cafe, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the OHA after she was terminated. At issue on appeal was whether plaintiff's appeal must be dismissed for failure to order the necessary portions of a trial transcript. Plaintiff ordered the portion of the trial transcript that contained her testimony and the remaining portions of the transcript were not transcribed and were not available. The court could not properly review the issues in the case based on the record plaintiff provided and, therefore, the court did not address the merits of plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim. Accordingly, the court granted the OHA's motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal based on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b). View "Kelly v. Omaha Housing Authority, et al." on Justia Law