Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, three former employees, filed suit against Lumber One, claiming that Lumber One incorrectly classified them as executive employees who were exempt from overtime pay regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1). After overturning the jury verdict, the district court awarded plaintiffs overtime pay and attorneys' fees. The court concluded that Lumber One failed to show that Plaintiffs Madden and O'Bar met the executive exemption standard where Lumber One failed to prove that these plaintiffs had the authority to hire or fire employees, or that their recommendations regarding personnel decisions were given "particular weight" by the decisionmaker. The court concluded, however, that Lumber One did prove that Plaintiff Wortman was eligible for the executive exemption. Accordingly, the court affirmed with respect to Madden and O'Bar, reversed with respect to Wortman, and remanded for a new determination of attorneys' fees. View "Madden, et al. v. Lumber One Home Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed sex- and pregnancy-based employment discrimination claims against Nationwide under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code 216.6. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of demonstrating constructive discharge, where, even if her supervisor's comment that it was best that plaintiff go home with her babies might support a finding of intent to force plaintiff to resign, plaintiff did not give Nationwide a reasonable opportunity to address and ameliorate the conditions that she claimed constituted constructive discharge. The court also concluded that plaintiff waived her argument that she was actually discharged because she did not raise it in the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Nationwide. View "Ames v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., et al." on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's (BAP) judgment holding that the bankruptcy estate of her former employer, Racing Services, was entitled to the liquidation proceeds of a cash-value life insurance policy the employer purchased for her. Because the trustee had presented no evidence demonstrating that appellant could have demonstrated insurability, the court rejected the argument that the purported "equities" of this case required that the court deem appellant's failure to reinstate the policy as an act of surrender. The terms of the agreement between appellant and Racing Services granted Racing Services only the limited right to receive a repayment of policy premiums from the cash value upon surrender of the policy. Accordingly, the court reversed where appellant at no time surrendered the policy and the estate did not possess a right to control the policy or receive its liquidation proceeds. View "Kaler v. Bala" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a member of the National Guard, filed suit against TXD, alleging that TXD violated the Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301 et seq., when it terminated him while he was deployed on active duty in Iraq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of TXD. At issue was whether TXD violated its USERRA obligations to plaintiff while he was on leave by not including him on an asset list of TXD employees provided to Foxxe, which took over TXD's operations without interruption. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the modified claim turned on one or more essential facts that the summary judgment record did not address. View "Dorris v. TXD Services, LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Timothy Geithner, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Treasury, for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court concluded that no senior-international-agent position was available to which plaintiff could be promoted based on his work in the "M" case and plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the IRS's failure to promote him to a senior international agent for his work on the "M" case constituted a materially adverse employment action; failed to demonstrate unlawful retaliation because no reasonable juror could determine that the IRS undertook material adverse employment actions; and failed to demonstrate constructive discharge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "AuBuchon v. Geitner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging, inter alia, a state-law defamation claim arising out of a fact-finding meeting concerning a workplace dispute. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court held that because plaintiff failed to follow Rule 15's procedures and nothing in the district court's order or the record suggested that leave to amend the complaint was granted, the federal claims were not withdrawn from the second amended complaint and remained before the district court until those claims were dismissed by the court in its order. The court construed plaintiff's purported dismissal as a declaration that he was abandoning all claims except the defamation and breach of union constitution claims and would present no further evidence or argument supporting those abandoned claims. Therefore, the claims were merely abandoned for purposes of argument, not removed from the second amended complaint. The court also concluded that the district court properly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state-law defamation claim. On the merits, the district court's grant of summary judgment was improper because plaintiff satisfied all elements of his defamation claim for summary judgment purposes and the vice president of the union's statements were not privileged. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Thomas v. United Steelworkers Local 1938, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Open Harvest on plaintiff's claim alleging a violation of section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1140. Because plaintiff has not identified direct evidence of a specific intent to interfere with her ERISA benefits, the court must analyze her claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. In this case, Open Harvest articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for its failure to pay the August policy premium. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the burden shifted back to plaintiff to show a genuine dispute whether Open Harvest's justification was pretextual. Plaintiff failed to show a genuine dispute whether Open Harvest terminated her employment with a specific intent to interfere with her ERISA benefits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Open Harvest. View "Barnhardt v. Open Harvest Cooperative" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, African American officers who worked in a state penitentiary, filed suit under 41 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983 against supervisors for race based harassment and retaliation. On appeal, the officers challenged the district court's dismissal of their claims against Lieutenants Stoner, Haney, and Runge and against Sergeants Miles and Furby. The court concluded that the evidence revealed acts, comments, and inaction by Sergeant Miles sufficient to make out prima facie harassment claims against him, which must be reinstated and remanded; there was insufficient evidence of harassment by the other supervisors and therefore the claims against Lieutenant Stoner, Runge, and Haney, and Sergeant Furby were affirmed; the retaliation claims by supervisors were affirmed; and Sergeant Miles has not shown that he was entitled to qualified immunity on the officers' harassment claims, nor have Lieutenants Stoner and Haney shown they were entitled to qualified immunity on the retaliation claims of Officer Ellis. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ellis, et al. v. Houston, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and other union members filed suit against US Foods and the Union for breach of duty of fair representation in a hybrid action under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 1985. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Union. The court affirmed, concluding that plaintiff's claim was time-barred because the claim accrued when plaintiff filed a charge against the Union with the NLRB. Plaintiff's claim accrued on that date when he should reasonably have known of the Union's alleged breach. View "Becker, et al. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 120" on Justia Law

Maverick petitioned for review of the ARB's affirmance of an ALJ's finding that Maverick was liable for taking retaliatory action against an employee in violation of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA), 49 U.S.C. 31105. The court applied Chevron deference in regards to the agency's interpretation that the limitations period in the STAA began to run when the employee received notice of the employer's adverse action; the court also agreed with the ARB that the ALJ's finding that the employee received such notice within 180 days of filing his claim was supported by substantial evidence; and, therefore, the ARB's determination that the employee timely filed his claim was not contrary to law. The court also concluded that all of the facts found by the ALJ, including those pertaining to the retaliation claim, were supported by substantial evidence. Finally, the ALJ's decision not to reduce the back pay award on the basis that the employee failed to mitigate damages by voluntarily leaving his position was not contrary to law and the court found no abuse of discretion in the ALJ's award of compensatory damages for the employee's emotional distress. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Maverick Transp., LLC v. U.S. Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law