Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals
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Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Red Cross on her claims, inter alia, of race discrimination and retaliation. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination based on the Red Cross' decision not to promote her and based on the failure to train her; the decision to suspend and terminate plaintiff was not a result of race discrimination but, rather, because plaintiff failed to meet her employer's legitimate expectations; even if plaintiff was able to show that she had met her employer's legitimate expectations, she failed to show that similarly situated employees committed the same conduct but were treated differently. The court concluded that the district court did not err in granting Red Cross summary judgment on the retaliation claim where plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact to show a causal link between her protected activity and the adverse employment actions taken against her. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting the Red Cross summary judgment on plaintiff's outrage claim. View "Robinson v. American Red Cross" on Justia Law

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AECI filed suit against the Union seeking to vacate the arbitrator's award and the Union counterclaimed for enforcement. Relying on the court's decision in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, the district court ruled that the last chance agreement (LCA) superseded the collective bargaining agreement and therefore, when the arbitrator ignored the clear and unambiguous terms of the LCA, he imposed his personal standards of industrial justice. The court concluded that the district court read the Coca-Cola bottling decision too broadly. Where a CBA requires "just cause" to discipline or discharge an employee but fails to define the term, the arbitrator's broad authority to interpret the contract, to which the court must defer, includes defining and applying that term of the contract. Viewed from this perspective, the arbitrator's decision to sustain the Union's grievance must be enforced. Because the arbitrator specifically invoked and applied the just cause provision of the CBA, the contract between AECI and the Union that defined his authority, his decision "draws its essence" from the CBA. Accordingly, the arbitrator's decision sustaining the Union's grievance must be enforced. The court declined to enforce the portion of the award granting the employee back pay from the day he was suspended until the day he was discharged. The court reversed and remanded. View "Associated Electric Coop. v. IBEW" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against the city, alleging claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601; Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.; section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701; and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA), Ark. Code 16-123-107. Both parties appealed the judgment of the district court. The court concluded that a reasonable juror could find that plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job for which he interviewed and that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support an inference of a retaliatory motive on the part of the city. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the city's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the FMLA retaliation claim. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the city's motion for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's ACRA disability-discrimination claim where plaintiff introduced no evidence to demonstrate that the city knew about his conditions when he sought to be rehired; affirmed the district court's vacatur of the jury's award for emotional-distress where the ACRA claim submitted to the jury did not provide a basis for the jury's award of emotional-distress damages; and reversed the denial of liquidated damages because the city cited no evidence in support of the district court's finding that it acted in good faith in refusing to rehire plaintiff and the court could find none. View "Jackson v. City of Hot Springs" on Justia Law

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The Secretary petitioned for review of OSHA's order approving without comment an underlying ALJ's decision that addressed competing interpretations of a Department of Labor safety regulation, 29 U.S.C. 1910.212(a)(1). The Secretary determined that the regulation requires lathes such as those used by Loren Cook to have guards to protect workers from ejected workpieces. The court concluded that the Secretary's interpretation of the regulation in this matter was reasonable and well supported by the plain meaning of the regulation's text. Pursuant to Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, the court deferred to the Secretary's interpretation rather than the Commission. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, reversed the order of the Commission, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Perez v. Loren Cook Co." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., against H&R Block, alleging that H&R Block must compensate tax professionals for the time spent completing twenty-four hours of rehire training. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of H&R Block, holding that the district court engaged in the appropriate inquiry when it considered whether, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, plaintiffs were employees or trainees when they completed rehire training. The court held that tax professionals were not employees of H&R Block when they completed rehire training where H&R Block received no immediate advantage from the rehire training completed by the tax professionals. The court found further support for this conclusion in the Wage and Hour Division Field Operations Handbook. View "Petroski, et al. v. H&R Block Enterprises, et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging claims of unlawful sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq., and the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code 216.6. On appeal, defendants challenged the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, arguing that they were entitled to a new trial. Defendants argued that the district court erred in overruling their objection to improper rebuttal closing argument by plaintiff's counsel, and then abused its discretion in denying defendants' post-trial motion because this argument, while improper, was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. Counsel made emotionally-charged comments at the end of rebuttal closing argument, referencing her own sexual harassment during law school and assurances to the jury that her client testified truthfully about past sexual abuse. The court concluded that the timing and emotional nature of counsel's improper and repeated personal vouching for her client, using direct references to facts not in evidence, combined with the critical importance of plaintiff's credibility to issues of both liability and damages, made the improper comments unfairly prejudicial and required that the court remand for a new trial. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gilster v. Primebank, et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after she was terminated by the law school of Hamline University. Plaintiff alleged that the university, the dean, and the president of the St. Paul Police Federation (SPPF) conspired with the St. Paul Police Department to deny her constitutional right to freedom of speech. The court concluded that plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts that a police officer was acting under color of state law; plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts about the University or the Dean to demonstrate that they participated in a concerted action to terminate plaintiff; concerning leave to amend, plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a meeting of the minds between the Department, the SPPF, and the University; and the district court properly ruled that adding the SPPF would be futile. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Magee v. Trustees of Hamline University, et al." on Justia Law

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The Union sought to set aside an arbitration award that ruled in favor of the MADA and several member car dealerships. At issue was the transition between the 2006 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and the 2010 CBA and its impact on above-scale time allowances for hybrid car warranty and recall work. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The court agreed with the district court and found that the arbitrator was "warranted" in determining the CBA's plain language to be "silent or ambiguous with respect to the disputed issue - how the above-scale time allowances could be legitimately terminated." With MADA's attorney's unrebutted testimony and the letters documenting other dealerships' similar conduct to help the parties' past practice with respect to the ambiguous CBA language at issue, the court concluded that the arbitration award drew its essence from the CBA. Therefore, the court found no basis to vacate the arbitration award. The court affirmed the district court's order granting MADA's motion to dismiss with prejudice. View "Garage Maintenance, etc. v. Greater Metropolitan, etc., et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983. The district court concluded on remand that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity on any ground. Determining that the court had jurisdiction in this interlocutory appeal, the court concluded that plaintiffs had not put forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate that defendant's decisions were motivated by racial animus; plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that defendant made stigmatizing comments about Plaintiff Jones that deprived Jones of his liberty interest to earn a living in his profession as a substance abuse counselor; and, therefore, the court concluded that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity on the sections 1981 and 1983 claims. The court reversed the judgment of the district court with instructions to dismiss the complaint. View "Jones, et al. v. McNeese" on Justia Law

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Sara Lee and the Unions entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and an outsourcing agreement which permitted Sara Lee to outsource covered functions to a contract company. After Sara Lee did outsource one of the covered functions and the contract company hired Sara Lee's displaced employees, Sara Lee refused to require the contract company to adhere to the CBA for its remaining terms. The Unions argued that Sara Lee breached the outsourcing agreement. The court concluded that Sara Lee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law where the Unions failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Sara Lee subsequently changed subcontractors. The court found it unnecessary to address the extension agreement's impact on the old CBA's term or to reconcile this tangle of agreements, because the proposition that Sara Lee never subsequently changed subcontractors provided a clear basis upon which to affirm. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Allied Sales Drivers, et al. v. Sara Lee Bakery Group, et al." on Justia Law