Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant and appellee entered into two collective bargaining agreements ("2002 Agreement" and "2006 Agreement") covering retiree healthcare benefits that contained dispute resolution procedures. Appellant brought a suit to compel appellee to arbitration pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, and 28 U.S.C. 1337, when appellee unilaterally modified certain retirees' healthcare coverage in October 2008. Before the district court ruled on the motion, appellee again unilaterally modified the health care coverage wherein appellant filed another grievance under the 2002 and 2006 Agreements and amended its first complaint to include the grievance. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that the district court properly dismissed the amended complaint where the district court concluded that the matters were not arbitrable because they occurred after the agreements terminated and were thus not within the scope of arbitrability as defined by Article XI, Section 4.

Appellant, a pediatric urologist, sued appellees alleging that appellees engaged in a "sham peer review" when they suspended his hospital privileges and reported the suspension to the national practitioner data bank ("NPDB") without a required hearing. At issue was whether the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and dismissed appellant's remaining causes of actions without prejudice, where it found that only appellant's state claims remained. The court affirmed the district court's judgment and held that the district court correctly dismissed appellant's Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, claim where the parties had previously agreed to settlement; the district court properly dismissed appellant's 42 U.S.C. 1981 claim where section 1981 did not apply to his claims based on his Egyptian national origins and where there was no evidence that appellees' legitimate race-neutral reasons for the suspension of his privileges were pretextual; the district court correctly dismissed appellant's Title VI claim, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, where appellant failed to present sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find any of appellees' acts were a pretext for national origin discrimination; and the district court committed no error in dismissing appellant's state claims where he agreed to a settlement.

Appellant, a firefighter for the City of Sioux Fall's ("City") Fire Rescue Department ("SFFR") and 15 other SFFR firefighters, filed suit against the City seeking overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. 207(p)(1), for work performed at the request of the State of South Dakota ("State") to help fight wildfires in western South Dakota and Nebraska. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to the City, finding that the special detail exemption of the FLSA applied because the City firefighters volunteered for the State firefighting assignment and that the State and City were separate and independent employers and therefore, the hours the firefighters worked for the State were not combined with the hours worked for the City for purposes of overtime compensation. The court held that the section 207(p)(1) prong of voluntariness was satisfied where the firefighters have failed to present evidence that those of them who said "no" to the deployment were punished or reprimanded in any way and the firefighters who rejected deployment did so in spite of their refusal causing them to move down on the overtime list. The court also held that the record could be viewed to establish that the City, not the State, was the firefighter's employer during their deployment. Therefore, the court reversed summary judgment and remanded because genuine issues of fact existed as to which entity the firefighters were actually employed by.

Trans State Airlines, LLC ("TSA") appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Air Line Pilots Association International ("ALPA") enforcing an arbitrator's award of backpay to a pilot after TSA fired him. At issue was whether the award violated public policy against large loans to union officials embodied in the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. 401-531. After concluding that TSA had standing to pursue an appeal and that the arbitrator's unreviewed decision in a prior arbitration did not preclude TSA's public policy challenge, the court held that the lack of control, combined with the purpose and structure of the section 60 payments in ALPA's Administrative Manual, weighed against finding the payments were an illegal loan.

Plaintiff sued his former employer for alleged violations of state and federal discrimination claims after he was terminated by the former employer when he was 57-years-old. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the former employer on plaintiff's federal claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. 623 (a)(1), but the court remanded and instructed the district court to dismiss without prejudice plaintiff's claim under the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Mo. Ann. Stat. 213.055(1). Plaintiff petitioned for a panel or en banc rehearing to have the court's disposition of the MHRA claim reconsidered where diversity of citizenship jurisdiction existed over plaintiff's MHRA claim. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the former employer on plaintiff's MHRA claim. The court agreed that diversity of citizenship jurisprudence existed over plaintiff's claim which required it to revisit its prior disposition and granted the former employer's petition for a panel rehearing. The court also held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment where it would not be unreasonable for a jury to conclude that plaintiff's age played a part in producing the adverse employment actions he alleged.

The United States Secretary of Labor ("Secretary") appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1005 ("Local 1005) on the claim that Local 1005's November 2008 election procedures violated the "adequate safeguards" provision of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. 481(c). At issue was whether the district court applied the wrong legal standard in its analysis and whether the district erred when it determined that Local 1005 did not violate the "adequate safeguards provision" of the LMRDA. The court held that the district court did not apply the wrong legal standard where the district court found no violation of section 481(c). The court also affirmed summary judgment and held that Local 1005's actions regarding the accurate announcement of the sole requirement to stand for elected office, coupled with the fully accurate notices posted both on Local 1005's job site bulletin and boards, as well as on its website, amounted to "adequate safeguards" under the LMRDA.

Appellant filed suit against the United States Department of Health and Human Services ("Department") alleging, inter alia, that the Department violated her rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000, when the administrative officer and acting chief executive officer ("CEO") of the medical clinic operated by the Department began making sexually suggestive comments to her, called her at home while intoxicated, and appeared unannounced at her home on different occasions including one instance where she came home to find him sleeping naked in her bed. At issue was whether the district court erred in its findings. The court affirmed and held that appellant's claims for misconduct that occurred before June 18, 2005 were barred where she failed to report the incidents within 45 days of their occurrence, instead of a year later, and denied her claims for equitable tolling. The court also held that the CEO's alleged rumor-spreading was not harassment so severe or pervasive that it met the high threshold for a hostile work environment and that this single act of discriminatory conduct was insufficient to establish a hostile work environment or constructive discharge claim. The court further held that appellant failed to prove that she suffered an adverse employment action and was treated differently than similarly situated males where neither party disputed that the Department never terminated her, cut her pay or benefits, or changed her job duties or responsibilities. Therefore, appellant's retaliation claim necessarily failed where she did not demonstrate that the Department took a materially adverse action against her.

Defendant, Whitesell Corporation, appealed the district court's order granting an injunction when plaintiffs requested the injunction under section 10(j) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 160(j). At issue was whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to grant the injunction under section 10(j). The court held that the district court did have subject matter jurisdiction but vacated the order and held that the district court failed to met minimal requirements for granting or refusing an injunction. Accordingly, on remand, the district should specially make factual findings, detailing specific actions in the bargaining process and the facts underlying each element of the four-factor injunction tests.

The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") petitioned for enforcement of its order finding that Whitesell Corporation ("Whitesell") violated various provisions of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. 151-69, while negotiating a new collective-bargaining agreement with the Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics, and Allied Workers International Union, AFL-CIO ("Union"). At issue was whether the NLRB had jurisdiction to issue a new decision and order following this court's denial of its previous application of enforcement; whether substantial evidence supported the NLRB's findings that Whitesell had failed to bargain in good faith; whether contrary to the NLRB's finding, Whitesell provided proper notice to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service ("FMCS") and therefore the NLRB improperly ordered Whitesell to reimburse the Union's dues; and whether substantial evidence supported the NLRB's finding that Whitesell improperly failed to provide further information concerning its vacation proposal. The court enforced the NLRB's order and held that the NLRB had jurisdiction where the court had not considered the merits of the case; the record provided substantial evidence clearly supporting the NLRB's findings; the Union's communications with the FMCS on July 10th to request a mediator did not meet the clear mandate of section 8(d)(3) of the NLRA; and there was substantial evidence to find that Whitesell violated sections 8(a)(1) and (a)(5) of the NLRA.

Applebee's International, Inc. ("Applebee's") appealed the district court's denial of summary judgment where current and former servers and bartenders ("employees") brought an employment wage dispute under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. 203(m), 206(a)(1), based on Applebee's use of the "tip credit" to calculate their wages for purposes of meeting the minimum wage requirements of the FLSA. At issue was how to properly apply the "tip credit" to employees whom both sides agree are "tipped employees" under the FLSA. The court agreed with the district court and held that the Department of Labor's interpretation of the FLSA as contained in the Wage and Hour Division's Field Operations Handbook was reasonable, persuasive, and entitled to deference. The court also held that the district court properly applied the Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. burden of proof standard where employees could meet the standard by producing sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.