Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sued defendant, their former employer, for age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. 623(a), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Chapter 363A. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant. The court affirmed summary judgment and held that defendant articulated legitimate non-discriminatory grounds for plaintiffs' terminations and plaintiffs failed to show that the reasons were pretexts for age discrimination because defendant maintained a consistent explanation for the termination-shifting client needs and an anticipated reduction in workload and profitability.

Appellees sued the Catholic Archdiocese of St. Louis ("Archdiocese"), alleging that one of its priests sexually abused them when they were children and asserted Missouri common law claims against the Archdiocese for negligent hiring and for negligent retention and supervision. The Archdiocese moved for an interlocutory review of the district court's denial of its motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) where the Archdiocese principally relied on Gibson v. Brewer, in which the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the dismissal of some materially indistinguishable claims. The court held that assuming the district court correctly held Gibson advanced a faulty First Amendment analysis, the district court erred in failing to predict the impact of the Missouri Constitution upon the negligence claims. Because the Supreme Court of Missouri in Gibson indicated the First Amendment was a complete defense to the negligence claims and reiterated the religious freedom provisions of the Missouri Constitution were broader than those of the First Amendment, it seemed highly likely that the Supreme Court of Missouri would bar the negligence claims under the Missouri Constitution, if its First Amendment analysis were later abrogated by the Supreme Court of the United States. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for dismissal of the negligence claims, as well as for further proceedings.

Appellant sued appellees, alleging violations of procedural and substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment for not reappointing him to a certain college faculty position. At issue was whether the district court erred in dismissing appellant's complaint with prejudice based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction where he failed to allege violations of his constitutional rights. The court held that appellant lacked a constitutional protected interest in regards to his procedural due process claim and therefore, the district court correctly dismissed this claim. The court also held that appellant had not challenged the district court's conclusion that he lacked a constitutionally protected liberty interest and could not show that he had a constitutionally protected property interest, therefore, the district court correctly dismissed appellant's substantive due process claim.

Plaintiff sued defendant under the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Chapter 363A, alleging that defendant terminated her and took other adverse employment actions against her because she made complaints of discrimination. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's retaliation claims. The court affirmed summary judgment and held that plaintiff failed to create a triable issue of fact regarding whether defendant retaliated against her for reporting alleged discrimination where defendant articulated a non-discriminatory ground for plaintiff's termination, violation of a work rule, in which plaintiff failed to show pretext for retaliation.

Appellants appealed from an order granting summary judgment to appellee on a claim arising under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act ("WARN"), 29 U.S.C. 21202, and dismissing without prejudice supplemental state law claims. Appellants alleged that appellee hired them as temporary workers in the midst of a strike and then summarily dismissed them at the strike's conclusion without providing the notice required under the WARN Act. The court held that the district court properly weighed the evidence when determining how to classify the striking workers and did not err in determining that appellants had failed to provided a viable legal theory on which to base its calculations. Moreover, though appellants complained that it was unrealistic to think that 32 striking workers would depart voluntarily, they produced no evidence supporting an alternative scenario. Therefore, appellants' conclusory statements on these issues failed to create a genuine issue of material fact and did not preclude the grant of summary judgment. The court also rejected appellants' claim that the district court erred in considering and rejecting only two of the four theories it proffered where the district court may not have addressed each theory they put forth, but it clearly rejected them all by concluding that the reduction in force was insufficient to satisfy the numerosity threshold. Therefore, the court agreed with the district court that the various theories offered by appellants failed, as a matter of law, to establish that a mass layoff occurred that would trigger notice requirements of the WARN Act. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Appellant, who had been on a medical leave of absence from appellee for nearly four months, sued appellee alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1), and the benefits-termination notice provisions of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("COBRA"), 29 U.S.C. 1166(a)(4)(A), when appellee fired him for job abandonment. Appellant appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee on each of his claims. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to appellee on appellant's interference claim under the FMLA where appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice as a result of his firing on May 1, 2007. The court also held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to appellee on appellant's claim that appellee failed to provide him with notice of the termination of his benefits as required by COBRA where appellant failed to show that a genuine factual dispute existed regarding the means used by appellee to send the notice and where the undisputed facts showed that appellee used a notice method "reasonably calculated to reach" appellant.

Defendant appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, compelling arbitration of a dispute related to healthcare benefits under an expired collective bargaining agreement. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and issuing an order compelling the arbitration. The court reversed and held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment and compelling arbitration where both parties vigorously disputed issues of both law and fact, including whether the 1994 agreement was ambiguous and whether the summary plan descriptions constituted an intrinsic or extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent. The parties also point to various other extrinsic evidence and vehemently disagree as to whether the bargained for fully-paid health insurance premiums for life or just for the term of the agreement. Under these circumstances, the court held that the question of whether the right to fully-paid premiums vested under the 1994 agreement was best decided in the first instance by the district court and therefore, remanded for further proceedings.

Appellants, David Torgerson and Jami Mundell, sued the City of Rochester ("city") alleging, respectively, disparate-treatment discrimination based on national origin and based on gender when the city decided not to hire them as firefighters. Appellants claimed that the city violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2000e-17, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minn. Stat. 363A.01-.41. Torgerson also sued under 42 U.S.C. 1981. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the city. As a preliminary matter, the court held that summary judgment was not disfavored, was designed for every action, and there was no employment discrimination case exception. The court affirmed summary judgment and held that appellants failed to present direct evidence of gender or national origin discrimination against them in violation of Title VII; appellants made a prima facie case of discrimination but the city advanced nondiscriminatory grounds for its hiring decisions and appellants failed to show the grounds were pretexts for discrimination; the fact that appellants and hired candidates had relatively similar qualifications did not create a material issue of fact as to pretext. The court also held that Torgerson's section 1981 claim was properly dismissed where he alleged he was discriminated against based on national origin, not race.

The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainment ("BLET") filed a claim with the Union Pacific Railroad Company ("UP") seeking reinstatement and backpay for a member of the BLET when UP terminated him while he was working under a governing collective-bargaining agreement between the UP and the United Transportation Union ("UTU"). At issue was whether the National Railroad Adjustment Board ("NRAB") properly dismissed the claim. The court affirmed the dismissal and held that the NRAB did not ignore the Article C-17 contract provision in the agreement while interpreting the contract; that the NRAB's interpretation of Article C-17 did not violate 45 U.S.C. 153 First (j); the NRAB acted well within its power by invoking a "claim-processsing" rule; the NRAB was well within its authority in construing the agreement as enunciating the "usual manner" in this workplace; once the NRAB determined that the agreement was controlling, the other agreements and bargaining history became largely irrelevant; and the district court did not abuse its discretion where discovery would not have justified setting aside the NRAB's interpretation of the agreement, nor would it have uncovered a due process violation by the NRAB.

Plaintiff, a former Senior Investigator for the St. Louis office of the Department of Labor's ("DOL") Employee Benefits Security Administration, filed an equal employment opportunity ("EEO") complaint alleging hostile work environment and discrimination on account of her sex and age. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the complaint on the ground that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had exclusive subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the district court properly ruled that the Federal Circuit had exclusive jurisdiction to review the Merit Systems Protection Board's ("MSPB") dismissal where the MSPB had not reached the merits of plaintiff's discrimination claims in dismissing her mixed case appeal as untimely.