Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Appellees brought this declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that there was no coverage for an accident involving a company car driven by Daniel Brandt and injuring Donald Bunch. At issue was whether liability coverage extended to Brandt and whether Donald Bunch was entitled to uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage because the policy at issue was ambiguous. The court concluded that the Bunches conceded that Brandt did not have express or implied permission from his employer to drive the car and that Patricia Bunch lacked the authority to give Brandt permission to use the vehicle as either a named insured or as a second permitee. Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that liability coverage did not extend to Brandt. The court also concluded that there was no indication that the term "vehicle" was ambiguous or that a person reading the policy would not understand that the vehicle referred to in the exclusion would have included the car involved in the accident. Therefore, the district court did not err in determining that Donald Bunch did not qualify for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage.

Plaintiff brought this suit under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461, and the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. 2601-2654, against the state, the Iowa Department of Administrative Services (DAS), and two officials of the DAS. At issue was whether the district court properly granted defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment barred plaintiff's FMLA claims against all of the defendants. The court held that the state's waiver of its state court immunity in FMLA cases had no bearing on the state's immunity from suit in federal court. Therefore, the state had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and summary judgment was affirmed.

Monarch Fire Protection District of St. Louis County (Monarch) appealed several adverse rulings in favor of Freedom Consulting & Auditing Services, Inc. (Freedom), Freedom's owner, and a Freedom employee. The International Association of Firefighters Local 2665 (Firefighters Union), representing Monarch employees, requested an independent audit of Monarch's self-funded group health plan because union representatives believed that Monarch's board of directors had illegally approved a non-covered medical procedure for a plan member. Monarch hired Freedom to conduct the audit and Monarch subsequently sued Freedom, alleging that protected health information (PHI) had been improperly disclosed to Firefighters Union attorneys in violation of the Business Associate Agreement (BIA) between Monarch and Firefighters Union. Monarch subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of its conversion claim and underlying claim for punitive damages, the district court's decision that the BAA's indemnity clause did not entitle Monarch to attorneys' fees and costs, and that the district court's denial of its motion for sanctions. The court held that Monarch could not show that Freedom deprived it of the right to possession, which it must do to establish conversion under Missouri law. The court also held that Freedom was not contractually obligated to pay the attorneys' fees and costs that Monarch incurred in the litigation and that Monarch could not survive summary judgment on its claim that the indemnity clause entitled it to attorneys' fees. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to impose a sanction on the Freedom employee when the case did not proceed to trial because nothing in the record suggested that the district court based its ruling on a legal error or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Appellant filed a lawsuit, after she was terminated from her position as a clerk-typist at Iowa State University (University), claiming that those responsible for the termination violated her rights under federal statutes, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Iowa law. The district court dismissed her complaint in its entirety and denied a motion to alter or amend the judgment. Appellant appealed the dismissal of her due process claim, the denial of her post-judgment motion, and the dismissal of the state-law claims. The court affirmed the dismissal of appellant's "freestanding" due process claim for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's post-judgment motion. The court held, however, that the state law claim against the president of the University and appellant's supervisor, in their individual capacities, must be remanded for further proceedings because the court had no basis to say how the district court would have exercised its discretion under 28 U.S.C. 1367 if the district court believed that it had authority to do so. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed in part and denied in part.

ABF sued YRC, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and two of its locals (collectively, Union), and the bargaining representatives of YRC and the Union (collectively, defendants) for violation of a collective bargaining agreement. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed ABF's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that ABF lacked standing to sue because it did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that it had rights under the collective bargaining agreement. The court held that ABF had constitutional standing where it satisfied each element necessary to demonstrate an injury-in-fact to a judicially cognizable interest and that the injury was fairly traceable to defendants' challenged conduct. The court also held that because the district court had original jurisdiction, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over ABF's claims. The court further held that the case did not turn on primarily representational issues but whether defendants breached any contractual duties to ABF. The court finally held that the district court's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) ruling resolved factual issues that courts could not resolve on motions under Rule 12(b)(6) and did not provide proper notice of such a conversion. Accordingly, the district court's judgment was vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

After the city did not hire appellant for a position with the Minneapolis Police Department, appellant, who was born in Afghanistan, filed suit alleging that the city discriminated against him based on his race, color, and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. 1981. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The court held that the city had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision not to hire appellant because it had serious concerns about his temperament. The court also held that appellant failed to meet his burden of providing sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact that the city's proffered reason was mere pretext for discrimination. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Appellant appealed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment in her employment discrimination action against UPS, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. Defendant initiated two actions: the first challenging the promotion decisions in 2004 and 2005 and the second claiming that appellant's manager retaliated against her in 2007 and gave her a failing score on the initial assessment for the promotion. The court held that appellant failed to carry her burden of showing a prima facie case of race or sex discrimination based on UPS's promotions of Virginia Fry, a white female, and Christopher Lee, a white male, and therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment on appellant's claims with respect to the 2004 promotion decisions. The court also held that the district court properly granted summary judgment on claims arising from UPS's 2005 promotion decisions where the continuing violation doctrine was not applicable to failure-to-promote claims which arose from discrete employment actions and where appellant failed to allege a claim concerning the promotion of the two white male employees in 2005 and that she was similarly situated to them. The court further held that the district court properly determined that appellant failed to make a prima facie showing of retaliation and even if appellant had presented a prima facie case, UPS proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for why she received a failing score on her initial assessment, which she failed to rebut. The court finally held that appellant failed to offer any argument as to why the district court's striking of the statement for noncompliance with the local rule was error and therefore, there was no abuse of discretion.

Plaintiff sued defendant alleging that defendant retaliated against him for seeking accommodation for a disabled subordinate contrary to the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code 216.6 & 216.11. At issue was whether a jury should decide whether an intermediate supervisor's retaliatory animus was a proximate cause of the plant manager's decision to fire plaintiff. The court held that plaintiff failed to create a genuine dispute for trial as to whether retaliatory animus was the proximate cause of his termination and therefore, the district court did not err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue.

Plaintiff alleged that defendants violated his procedural due process rights when he was relieved of his responsibilities to fight, inspect, and investigate fires for the Pleasant Hill Volunteer Fire Department. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants when plaintiff maintained that a reasonable jury could find that he was a fire code official because he performed some of the duties of a fire code official. Also at issue was whether the district court properly denied plaintiff's motion to reconsider. The court affirmed summary judgment and held that it was undisputed that plaintiff did not exercise many of the most significant responsibilities of a "fire code official" and that there was no evidence in the record that one of the defendants, in her capacity as fire code official, or anyone else, appointed plaintiff as defendants' "duly authorized representative." Therefore, plaintiff did not have a protected property interest in his position to support a due process claim. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to reconsider where his motion was improper for repeating arguments the district court had already rejected in granting defendants' motions for summary judgment and belatedly bringing the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") applications to the district court's attention, even though the DHS applications were available to him at the time he resisted defendants' summary judgment motion. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Appellant appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer on his claims of race discrimination, hostile work environment, and termination as a result of retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 41 U.S.C. 2000e-2000e-17, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. 363A.15 ("MHRA"). The court held that the district court correctly determined that the former employer was entitled to summary judgment on the harassment/hostile work environment claim where appellant failed to establish the threshold of actionable harm necessary to constitute a hostile work environment. The court also held that the district court correctly granted summary judgment on appellant's claims that he was fired on the basis of his race, and treated less favorably than similarly-situated white employees on the job where appellant presented no direct evidence that his termination or alleged lack of training or job change opportunities were racially motivated. The court held, however, that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on appellant's retaliation claims where he had produced sufficient evidence of retaliation.