Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted for the theft or embezzlement of funds from his employee's IRA accounts in violation of 18 U.S.C. 664. On appeal, defendant argued that his conviction should be reversed because, at trial, the district court barred him from presenting evidence to the jury that he eventually repaid all of the embezzled funds. The court held that because the intent to permanently deprive was neither a required element of, nor a defense to, the conversion or stealing that section 664 criminalized, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence of defendant's eventual repayment of his employees' funds in a bankruptcy proceeding as irrelevant.

Appellant sued his former employer, alleging that it wrongfully terminated his employment by violating Missouri's public policy exception to the state's at-will employment doctrine. Appellant alleged that the employer discharged him either because he refused to "validate" adulterated drugs or because he acted as a "whistle blower" by reporting that the employer manufactured adulterated drugs. The court held that appellant failed to create a genuine fact issue as to whether the employer's validation processes violated a clearly established stated public policy. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer.

Plaintiff, a jailer in Miller County, filed a civil rights action against Miller County, its sheriff, three of its county commissioners, and several other defendants to recover for her serious injuries which were caused by two inmates who took her hostage and attacked her after she honored their request to visit the jail's law library. The Miller County individual defendants filed this interlocutory appeal, alleging that the district court erred in concluding that a reasonable jury could find that they violated plaintiff's substantive due process rights. The court held that the Miller County individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where their conduct was not conscience shocking and therefore did not violate plaintiff's substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings against Miller County, the remaining defendant.

Appellant appealed the district court's orders granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Lake Lotawana, and its mayor, and the subsequent dismissal of her wrongful termination and retaliation claims. On appeal, appellant contended that the city breached her employment contract and that she established triable issues of fact as to her retaliation claims. The court held that the city was entitled to summary judgment on appellant's wrongful termination claim where she did not have an enforceable contract or viable tort claim. The court also held that appellant was terminated because of her inappropriate activities and therefore, the dismissal of appellant's retaliation claims was affirmed because nothing in the record indicated that her opposition to unlawful discrimination was a contributing factor to her termination. The court further held, for the same reasons, that appellant could not succeed under the more stringent standard applied in the Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgement of the district court.

Appellant appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer in a wrongful-termination suit brought pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) 38 U.S.C. 4316. The court held that appellant failed to raise a genuine factual dispute about whether the employer's conduct was reasonable and whether the employer had notice that such conduct would be a ground for discharge because the employer's decision to terminate appellant was reasonable where appellant violated a clear written policy by failing to personally report his absences.

Plaintiff sued Judge Larry Williams for wrongful termination, in violation of plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment and the Family Medical leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, et seq. Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Williams. The court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Williams terminated plaintiff's employment because of the letter plaintiff wrote to the editor of a local paper in 2007 regarding the judge's financial committee. The court also held that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Williams in his individual capacity on plaintiff's FMLA claims where plaintiff failed to argue how Williams personally received adequate notice and, given the undisputed record that Williams generally delegated the operation of the Road Department to others. Therefore, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment against plaintiff on his First Amendment claims; erred in granting summary judgment against plaintiff on his official-capacity claims under the FMLA; but properly granted summary judgment against plaintiff on his individual-capacity FMLA claims against Williams.

This case arose when Leiferman Enterprises LLC (Leiferman) unilaterally suspended negotiations with the International Union of Painters and Allied Trades District Council 82 (Union) regarding the renewal of the two parties' collective-bargaining agreement. The NLRB eventually filed a complaint but, during the litigation's pendency, a secured creditor forced Leiferman into receivership. During the receivership, the secured creditor sold Leiferman to Auto Glass Repair and Windshield Replacement Service (WRS), agreeing to indemnify WRS against any potential Board liability. At length, the Board found Leiferman liable for certain unfair labor practices and imposed that liability on WRS, which it determined to be a liable successor-in-interest under Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB. The Board subsequently petitioned the court to enforce its order and Leiferman cross-petitioned for review of the order. The court held that the record, reviewed as a whole, contained substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion that WRS was Leiferman's Golden State successor-in-interest and therefore, the court enforced the Board's order and denied WRS's petition for review.

Appellant filed suit against her former employer, alleging that it wrongfully denied (or delayed) her promotion and subsequently, wrongfully terminated her. Appellant challenged four of the district court's interlocutory orders, contended that the district court erred by awarding costs to the employer, and asserted that the district court erroneously dismissed some of her claims and erroneously granted summary judgment to the employer on her remaining claims. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion where it repeatedly attempted to accommodate appellant despite her attorney's repeated failures to comply with court orders and court-imposed deadlines. The court also held that appellant had not shown that the district court abused its discretion by awarding costs to the employer. The court further held that the district court did not err by dismissing appellant's duplicative claims and affirmed the district court's dismissal of her claim under the Ledbetter Act, which she attempted to add without permission from the employer or leave from the court. The court finally held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the hostile work environment claim and the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2615, claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant entered into an Employment Agreement with his employer before the employer entered into a merger. After defendant was terminated by his employer and post-merger disputes arose as to the amounts his employer owed him, defendant filed a demand for arbitration under the Employment Agreement's arbitration provision. The employer commenced this action to enjoin the arbitration as preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. The employer alleged federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 because the severance dispute "arises out of an [ERISA] employee benefit plan" and therefore state law claims were preempted, and supplemental jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 1367 over non-ERISA claims. The court considered ERISA's statutory language, purpose, and historical context and held that an individual contract providing severance benefits to a single executive employee was not an ERISA employee welfare benefit plan within the meaning of section 1002(1). The court also held that ERISA preempted state laws that "relate to" an employee benefit plan. Consequently, further questions arose because the Employment Agreement included two provisions that could "relate" to the Employment Agreement to other programs of the employer that were ERISA plans. As neither parties nor the district court considered this jurisdictional issue, the court remanded for further proceedings.

The Minnesota Law Enforcement Association (MLEA) appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), concluding as a matter of law that the MLEA's retirement plan arbitrarily discriminated against older employees on the basis of age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 623. The court held that this exclusively age-based reduction in benefits typified "arbitrary age discrimination" and therefore failed to meet the ADEA's safe harbor requirements. The court also held that, although the Department of Corrections was not obligated under federal law to employ certain persons over the age of 55 for reasons that could include age, it could not discriminate against all persons over age 55 solely due to their age. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment.