Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

This case concerned the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA), 26 U.S.C. 3101 et seq., and certain employment taxes FICA imposed upon employers. After a bench trial on the merits, the district rendered a tax deficiency judgment against DEWPC for unpaid FICA taxes and DEWPC appealed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the government's expert testimony on the issue of reasonable compensation and, because the district court applied the correct legal standard, its determination on Watson's FICA wages was affirmed. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing her claims against her former employer for defamation; breach of a unilateral contract to pay a performance bonus; failure to timely pay wages after discharge in violation of Minn. Stat. 181.13(a); age discrimination; and interference with her rights to employee benefits in violation of section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1140, and the court's denial of her motion to continue the summary judgment proceedings. The court agreed with the district court that the employer was entitled to the qualified privilege as a matter of law for plaintiff's defamation claims. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the breach of contract and unpaid wages claims because all the employer's documents clearly stated that the awarding of bonuses was discretionary. The court further held that the district court properly granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's age discrimination claim where plaintiff failed to show that either of her replacements were "sufficiently younger" or that there was a material question of fact regarding pretext; the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of employee benefit plan interference under section 510 of ERISA; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion for continuance.

The EEOC alleged that under Product Fabricators' drug policy, Product Fabricators made unlawful medical inquiries of employees, failed to keep confidential their medical information, and discharged a shear operator employee because of his disability and/or as a result of an unlawful application of the drug policy - all in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). The district court subsequently rejected a proposed decree to ensure compliance with the ADA on the ground that the EEOC did not identify a basis for the court to continue jurisdiction over the case for two years. The court concluded that the district court gave no consideration to the strong preference for settlement agreements as a means of protecting the federal interest in employment discrimination cases, or to the fact that jurisdiction was a usual component of such agreements, in part due to its deterrent effect. The district court also improperly gave significant weight to Product Fabricators' contention that its acts of discrimination were insufficiently widespread to justify continuing jurisdiction in the face of the EEOC's allegations. As a result, the district court did not explain why continuing jurisdiction was not fair, reasonable, and adequate, and thus abused its discretion.

Plaintiff, a white male, employed as a forklift operator, supported another employee's racial discrimination claim by testifying that he also routinely failed to sign a forklift checkout sheet and had never been disciplined. After an investigation, two operators were determined to be the individuals signing the checkout sheet on behalf of other employees and were issued disciplinary warnings; plaintiff was not disciplined. Plaintiff subsequently had a conflict with another employee that resulted in multiple complaints by fellow workers. The company terminated his employment for "violations of company policies, including ... creation of a hostile and intimidating work environment and engaging in unsafe work practices." The union filed a grievance but decided not to pursue it. The district court rejected his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and alleging defamation on summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff failed to prove pretext.

Plaintiffs sued their employer, alleging that they had been subjected to sexual and racial discrimination harassment by their supervisor in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment, concluding that it was entitled to the affirmative defense for supervisor harassment recognized in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton. The court agreed with the district court that the employer had established both parts of the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense as a matter of law and affirmed summary judgment on that basis.

Plaintiff, producer of ready-mix concrete, commenced this action to vacate an arbitrator's order to provide plaintiff's employee with a second Functional Capacity Evaluation (FCE) under the company's return-to-work policy and to assign the employee work as a ready-mix truck driver, restoring his seniority if he passed the FCE. The district court granted summary judgment for the union and enforced the award. The court held that the district court properly rejected plaintiff's petition to vacate the award where the arbitrator's decision drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement's management rights provision as construed by the parties. The court also held that plaintiff's contention that the award was contrary to federal law was without merit.

Plaintiff, a hearing-impaired employee of the USDA, brought this action under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., for workplace discrimination and retaliation. Defendant appealed an adverse bench trial verdict. The court held that plaintiff's failure to apply for a loan specialist position advertised in a job announcement was not excused for futility where the court found no clear error in the district court's finding that the death of plaintiff's father caused her failure to apply for the position; as plaintiff did not make every reasonable attempt to convey her interest in an accretion-of-duties promotion, her claim failed; the court found no clear error in the district court's finding that the reclassifications of certain positions to higher grade levels were not made with discriminatory or retaliatory intent; the district court was correct in refusing to consider incidents in 2009 where these incidents were not included in her complaint or amended complaint; and the district court's determination that plaintiff's allegations considered cumulatively did not amount to discrimination or retaliation was a permissible view of the evidence and was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff sued ATI alleging that it violated his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, et seq., and under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA), Ark. Code Ann. 16-123-101 et seq. The district court dismissed, finding that plaintiff's claims were subject to a mandatory arbitration provision contained in a collective bargaining agreement between plaintiff's union and ATI. Plaintiff argued that the arbitration provision was invalid because it was joined with an illegal and non-severable waiver of his FMLA claims. The court concluded that the waiver referenced in the last sentence of the arbitration clause was the waiver of judicial forum, not the waiver of plaintiff's claims. The court also concluded that employment-related civil rights claims, like plaintiff's claims, could be subject to a mandatory arbitration provision. Accordingly, the district court was correct in determining that plaintiff's claims must be arbitrated.

Plaintiff brought suit against defendant, claiming workplace gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, Ark. Code Ann. 16-123-101 et seq. The jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor and the district entered judgment against defendant. The court held that improperly admitted compromise evidence, a separation agreement and related testimony, materially prejudiced the jury's verdict and therefore, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing her 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against the Dean of the University of Iowa's College of Law. Plaintiff alleged that the Dean discriminated against her in violation of her First Amendment rights of political belief and association when plaintiff was not hired to be a full-time instructor or part-time adjunct instructor. The court held that plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence for a fact finder to infer that the Dean's repeated decisions not to hire her were in part motivated by her constitutionally protected First Amendment rights of political belief and association; the facts viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff were sufficient to establish a violation of her First Amendment rights where it was apparent that a dispute existed regarding a material issue of fact, namely whether the Dean would have made the same hiring decisions in the absence of plaintiff's political affiliations and beliefs; the Dean had not shown that a reasonable university dean in her position would have believed that failing to hire plaintiff was lawful in light of clearly established law; and the district court erred in finding that qualified immunity protected the Dean from liability in her individual capacity. Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.