Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued her employer and its workers' compensation insurer for intentional obstruction of workers' compensation in violation of Minnesota statute 176.82. The employer and insurer moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The court held that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the employer intentionally obstructed her receipt of workers' compensation benefits through her manager's fabrications and its 17-month delay in payment. The court also held that genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the insurer intentionally obstructed her receipt of workers' compensation benefits by concealing the manager's first statement about the purpose of the meeting at issue, filing a factually-inaccurate claim denial, and continuing to deny the claim through trial. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, a licensed Iowa educator, filed suit in Iowa state court against his employer, school officials, and private citizens following his termination. Plaintiff alleged various state-law claims as well as violations of his procedural and substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the denial of his motion to remand and the dismissal of his section 1983 claims. The court held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to remand where, based upon the facts of the case, the unanimity requirement was satisfied. The court also held that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's procedural due process claims as unexhausted where he failed to appeal his termination to an adjudicator under Iowa Code 279.17 and in dismissing plaintiff's substantive due process claim where he failed to plausibly plead a substantive due process claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff claimed that her termination by EMC because of excessive work absences unlawfully interfered with her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1) and (a)(2). On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing her claims because a reasonable jury could conclude that her protected leave was a "negative factor" in her termination. The court held that the undisputed facts showed that EMC would have made the same adverse decisions whether or not plaintiff was afforded the retroactively designated FMLA leave; the district court did not err in dismissing her retaliation claim as invalid; the district court properly rejected plaintiff's alternative pretext theories; and, as plaintiff failed to present evidence creating an issue of fact as to whether EMC's non-discriminatory reasons were a pretext for FMLA retaliation, the district court properly granted summary judgment.

The Union filed a charge alleging that AFS had engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of subsections 8(a)(1) and 8 (a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (a)(5). After a hearing, an ALJ held in favor of the Union and ordered AFS, inter alia, to bargain with the Union and pay damages. AFS appealed to the Board, which accepted the ALJ's factual findings and legal conclusions, altering only the remedies that the ALJ fashioned. The court held that the Board did not err in holding that the Union represented the AFS employees under section 9(a) of the Act, rather than under section 8(f). Accordingly, the court granted the petition to enforce the order of the Board.

Local 36 obtained an arbitration award against Whitney d/b/a Whitney Industrial, a non-signatory to any collective bargaining agreement, under an alter-ego theory. Whitney appealed the district court's order enforcing the arbitration award. The court held that a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement need not participate in the arbitration while expressly reserving jurisdictional questions, file a preemptive declaratory judgment action, notify the arbitrator of its refusal to participate, or timely initiate a court action to vacate the arbitrator's award in order to have "the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate . . . decided by the court, not the arbitrator." Accordingly, the court agreed with Whitney that the joint adjustment board had no authority to determine whether his new company was the alter ego of Whitney Mechanical, and thus, bound by the collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded.

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of AGC on their race and discrimination retaliation claims. The court held that, even assuming both husband and wife presented sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination, they both have failed to present adequate proof to overcome AGC's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment actions - limiting wife's cross-training opportunities and terminating husband. The court also held that wife did not produce sufficient evidence to indicate AGC's employment actions allegedly denying her cross-training were retaliatory in nature and husband did not provide evidence that his termination was pretextual. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of AGC on all claims.

Plaintiff, born in Jordan, filed suit alleging that the City discriminated against him based on his national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The court affirmed and held that plaintiff failed to establish that Captain Adler was a decisionmaker and thus had not presented direct evidence of discrimination; the record failed to support an inference that Adler's discriminatory animus was a proximate cause of the police chief's decision to forego hiring plaintiff for a full-time position; plaintiff failed to establish that he was a more qualified candidate; and the police chief's explanation had some basis in fact and did not support an inference of pretext.

Plaintiff sued her former employer for retaliation in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(2). The district court granted the employer's motion for judgment as a matter of law. Because the employer did not offer a non-discriminatory reason for its alleged act, the proper inquiry for the district court was whether plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Because plaintiff failed to provide any other evidence linking her termination to her use of FMLA leave, a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for her on that issue. Therefore, the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

An Arkansas jury found in favor of plaintiff on her Title VII claims of race discrimination and constructive discharge against the school district and individual members of the County's Board of Education and awarded her compensatory damages, wage and fringe benefits, and punitive damages. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's judgment. The court held that, under the circumstances, it believed that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude defendant was constructively discharged. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision to grant the Rule 50 motion on that claim. The court held that the jury was not instructed to consider whether the individual Board members affirmatively proved ignorance of federal law when discriminating against defendant on the basis of her race. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's Rule 50 motion vacating the punitive damage award, but remanded this issue to the district court. Because the court's resolution of the constructive discharge claim and the punitive damage awards directly affected the degree of success plaintiff obtained in her civil rights action, the court remanded the issue of attorneys' fees.

The EEOC filed suit against CRST, one of the country's largest interstate trucking companies, alleging that CRST subjected Monika Starke "and approximately 270 similarly situated female employees" to a hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The EEOC alleged that CRST was responsible for severe and pervasive sexual harassment in its New-Driver Training program. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the EEOC's claims as to Starke because the EEOC, suing as plaintiff in its own name under section 706 of Title VII, could not be judicially estopped because of Starke's independent conduct; reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the EEOC's claims on behalf of Tillie Jones because the EEOC had produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine fact issue as to the severity or pervasiveness of harassment that she allegedly suffered; vacated, without prejudice, the district court's award of attorneys' fees to CRST because CRST was no longer a "prevailing" defendant under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k); and affirmed the remainder of the district court's orders and remanded for further proceedings.