Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of the City's motion for summary judgment on his Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat 636A, claims. The court held that plaintiff was unable to show that the City's justification for not hiring him was not pretext. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's ADA claim because plaintiff had not put forth either direct or indirect evidence that the City regarded him as disabled person due to his knee injury. The court also held that the facts did not show how plaintiff was materially limited in the major life activity of working or regarded as such and therefore, the district court correctly dismissed his MHRA claim.

Defendants appealed from the district court's denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Plaintiff, an Intake and Placement Director in the Arkansas Department of Human Services, Division of Youth Services (DYS), claimed gender discrimination after being fired for untruthfulness in connection with the release of a youth resident from residential custody. The court reversed, finding that defendants where entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff had not established a constitutional violation where plaintiff failed to offer evidence that could convince a reasonable jury that defendant Angel's and DYS's stated reason for firing her was pretext for intentional discrimination.

Plaintiff sued his former employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act (NFEPA), Neb. Rev Stat. Ann. 48-1101 et seq. The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims and plaintiff appealed with respect to his ADA and NFEPA claims. The court concluded that plaintiff had not met his burden of demonstrating pretext at the summary judgment stage of his wrongful termination claim where there was no evidence showing that the difference in consequences for plaintiff and a co-worker was a result of anything except their different conduct and different roles in the company. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed as a matter of law to demonstrate the elements necessary to establish a hostile work environment claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendants on various claims arising from plaintiff's unsuccessful application for appointment as director of the City's Department of Human Rights and Equal Economic Opportunity, as well as denial of his motion to compel various depositions. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's due process claims because he had no protected property interest in the position; because plaintiff had not presented evidence that he was treated differently from similarly situated candidates or that he was the victim of intentional or purposeful discrimination, plaintiff's equal protection claim failed as a matter of law; the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's conspiracy claim because plaintiff's assertion did not demonstrate a class-based invidiously discriminatory animus; and the court affirmed the district court's remaining rulings.

Appellant, as counsel for a group of 64 retired city firefighters and their families, appealed the district court's approval of a class-action settlement agreement between the city and a certified class of active and retired firefighters, police officers, civilian employees, and their unions. The court held that, given the nature of the case and the potential conflict at issue, the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class or by ensuring fair and adequate representation for the entire class by means other than appointing separate counsel for each subclass. The district court's conclusion that the settlement agreement was a fair, reasonable, and adequate settlement for all of the class members was well within its discretion. Finally, the court rejected appellant's argument that the district court abused its discretion under Rule 23(d) by failing to hold a special hearing on the ability of class counsel to represent the subclass. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Comcast claiming that the company interfered with his ability to request an excused absence under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601-54, and that his termination from employment was based on the interference, as well as retaliation of his prior FMLA absences. Plaintiff lost his employment with Comcast when he failed to show up for work on three consecutive shifts and failed to notify his department of his absences or to request leave under the FMLA. Plaintiff's unilateral determination that he was fired did not excuse him from his responsibility to return Comcast's phonecalls or otherwise confirm his employment status before he stopped showing up to work or calling in to request additional FMLA leave. Plaintiff had many opportunities to correct his misperception that he had been terminated before missing three consecutive work shifts. Therefore, the court held that the record did not support plaintiff's claim of interference against Comcast and the court affirmed the judgment.

Northwest and the Pilots Association filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that their post-bankruptcy retirement benefit plan (MP3) complied with the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461. Appellants (older Pilots) counterclaimed arguing that the MP3 retirement benefit plan violated ERISA, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634, and several state laws prohibiting age discrimination. Under the MP3, the contributions of all of the pilots were based on their protected final average earnings, which could not be calculated without the use of age. However, that did not mean that the older Pilots' contributions have been reduced because of their age. There were several factors in the MP3 that could reduce an older pilots' projected final average earnings. While promotions and pay increases were correlated with age, they were analytically distinct and therefore not reductions in contributions because of age. Service ration and the frozen Pension Plan offset also both contributed to potential differences in contribution. Finally, the court rejected older Pilots' argument that the district court improperly disregarded the declaration of their expert witness. Therefore, the court held that the MP3 did not reduce the older Pilots' benefits because of age and therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff sued his employer, alleging that his termination was the result of interference with and retaliation for his exercise of his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., and racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer and plaintiff appealed. The court affirmed the judgment because plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the employer's actions were a pretext for discrimination. Plaintiff's testimony that the racially hostile environment had abated since his first lawsuit was settled in his numerous uses of FMLA leave without negative consequences supported the employer's non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory justification for plaintiff's termination.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order affirming the Commissioner's denial of his application for supplemental security income benefits. Specifically, he objected to the ALJ's finding, without considering the testimony of a vocational expert, that plaintiff was able to engage in gainful activity. The court concluded that the ALJ erred by relying solely on the guidelines to determine plaintiff was "not disabled." Because the ALJ determined that plaintiff suffered from severe mental impairments, the ALJ should have consulted a vocational expert in determining whether plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform other jobs that existed in significant number in the national economy. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff sued her former employer for national-origin discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. 363A. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer, dismissing all claims with prejudice. The court held that plaintiff did not present direct evidence of national-origin discrimination in violation of Title VII or MHRA and that her claim was properly analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.