Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In 1999 Brooks, an assembly-line operator for Prairie Packaging, was seriously injured on the job and lost his left hand, wrist, and forearm. He filed a workers’ compensation claim seeking recovery for permanent and total disability, which remains pending. Prairie treated Brooks as a disabled employee on a company-approved leave of absence, so that he continued to receive healthcare coverage. Pactiv acquired Prairie in 2007 and continued this arrangement. In 2010 Pactiv sent Brooks a letter instructing him to submit documents verifying his ability to return to work; failure to submit would mean termination of employment. Because his injury was totally disabling, Brooks did not submit verification and Pactiv fired him; he lost his healthcare coverage under the employee-benefits plan. Brooks sued Pactiv and Prairie under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001–1461, for benefits due and breach of fiduciary duty and asserted an Illinois law claim for retaliatory discharge. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to ERISA because Brooks did not allege that the employee-benefits plan promised him post-employment benefits. Pactiv acted as an employer, not as a fiduciary, in terminating Brooks’s employment and cancelling his health insurance. The court reinstated the state law claim. View "Brooks v. Pactiv Corp." on Justia Law

Wilson worked as an admissions representative, recruiting students to enroll in CEC’s culinary arts college. CEC admissions representatives worked under a contract that gave them a bonus for each student they recruited, above a threshold, who completed a full course or a year of study. In 2010, the U.S. Department of Education issued regulations prohibiting this kind of arrangement; new rules were scheduled to take effect in July 2011. CEC decided announced to its admissions representatives that it would cease paying bonuses at the end of February 2011 and that no bonuses would be regarded as earned by that date unless the relevant student had completed the year of study or course by that time. Wilson sued, asserting that CEC owed him bonuses for “pipeline” students, whom he had recruited and who were on target to complete a full course or year of study between March and June 2011. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Wilson successfully pleaded that CEC exercised its right to terminate the agreement in bad faith and in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. View "Wilson v. Career Educ. Corp," on Justia Law

Laskin worked for Jefco from 1966-1974 and participated in the company pension plan, accumulating a fully vested retirement account balance of $5,976.09. Soon after she left the company Laskin contacted Siegel, a trustee of the pension plan, and asked whether she could withdraw the funds to buy real estate. Siegel sent Laskin a letter explaining that her account would accrue interest at the passbook rate and that the plan had been amended in 1975, raising the retirement eligibility age from 55 to 65. Over the next 10 years, Laskin received statements, indicating that she was receiving from 5% to 5.5% interest on her balance. In 1988, a statement indicated that her balance was $12,602.86. The pension plan dissolved on December 31, 1991. In 2008, Laskin contacted Siegel’s son (who had purchased his father’s interest in Jefco) and was told that pension funds had been completely disbursed and that she did not receive a payout because she could not be located. The district court dismissed her claims as barred by the limitations period in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1113. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Laskin v. Siegel" on Justia Law

Laskin worked for Jefco from 1966-1974 and participated in the company pension plan, accumulating a fully vested retirement account balance of $5,976.09. Soon after she left the company Laskin contacted Siegel, a trustee of the pension plan, and asked whether she could withdraw the funds to buy real estate. Siegel sent Laskin a letter explaining that her account would accrue interest at the passbook rate and that the plan had been amended in 1975, raising the retirement eligibility age from 55 to 65. Over the next 10 years, Laskin received statements, indicating that she was receiving from 5% to 5.5% interest on her balance. In 1988, a statement indicated that her balance was $12,602.86. The pension plan dissolved on December 31, 1991. In 2008, Laskin contacted Siegel’s son (who had purchased his father’s interest in Jefco) and was told that pension funds had been completely disbursed and that she did not receive a payout because she could not be located. The district court dismissed her claims as barred by the limitations period in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1113. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Laskin v. Siegel" on Justia Law

Safety National sold an excess liability insurance policy to TKK, to cover excess losses resulting from liability imposed “by the Workers’ Compensation or Employers’ Liability Laws” of Illinois. The widow of a former TKK employee sued, alleging that TKK’s negligence caused the employee to become ill with and die from mesothelioma. The claim was subject to an affirmative defense: the Illinois Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act bars common law claims by or on behalf of an employee against a covered employer “on account of damage, disability or death caused or contributed to by any disease contracted or sustained in the course of the employment.” After Safety National denied coverage, TKK filed suit. The district court granted TKK summary judgment for its costs in defending and settling the widow’s suit, reasoning that the reference to “Employers’ Liability Laws” included the common law negligence claim even if the claim ultimately must fail because of the statutory bar. The court denied TKK’s claim for attorney fees and costs in the coverage lawsuit itself, except a modest award for what the court considered a vexatious motion to reconsider. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The key policy term, “Employers’ Liability Laws,” is broad enough to include claims under the common law, including “groundless” claims. View "TKK USA, Inc. v. Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp." on Justia Law

Bates, a black firefighter, joined the Chicago Fire Department in 1977 and rose through the ranks. In 2000, Fire Commissioner Joyce appointed Bates to one of seven District Chief positions. A District Chief is a member of the personnel management team and holds an at-will position. Bates’s work was well-regarded. Joyce resigned as Fire Commissioner in 2004, and Trotter, also black, became the new Fire Commissioner and chose his own management team; he issued a personnel order that contained eith black and 10 non-black promotions, three black and five non-black demotions, and four lateral reassignments for at-will positions. Bates was demoted to a Deputy District Chief position in Operation Relief, which is a floating assignment. The district court dismissed Bates’s 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983 claims of racial discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of pretext. Trotter had sufficient experience with Bates and the Chicago Fire Department to support his assertion that Bates’s demeanor and level of enthusiasm were not compatible with his management style. View "Bates v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Hester, a white male, began working for the Department’s laboratory in 1994. In 2007 he was reprimanded for failing to timely report test results. Hester later applied for promotion. Liu interviewed him, but chose another white male. When the supervisory position opened again, Hester again applied and was interviewed. Liu chose a white female in her mid-twenties, Gentry, who had been working in the lab for four years, citing Gentry’s performance record and concern that Hester did not have a good working relationship with others. In 2009, Hester received a form listing his “performance deficiencies.” A second performance appraisal report found that Hester still did not meet expectations for “job knowledge” and “communication.” The Department terminated his employment. Hester, then in his 50s, could be fired only for just cause. The State Employees Appeals Commission rejected his challenge. Hester sued, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court entered summary judgment, holding that Indiana was immune from liability for private damages under the ADEA, and that Hester did not adequately show that the Department discharged Hester because of a protected characteristic. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hester v. IN Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

Johnson, an African-American woman, was employed at Koppers’ plant from 1995 until her termination in 2008. She had been disciplined for sleeping at her desk in the laboratory, for smoking in the lunch room, for not punching out on the time clock, for fighting with a security guard, and for an altercation with a white male co-worker, O’Connell. Without interviewing Johnson, the plant manager determined that both O’Connell and Johnson were at fault and decided that Johnson should be punished more severely because of her disciplinary history and O’Connell’s allegations of racial harassment. The plant manager warned Johnson that future incidents would lead to termination. O’Connell received a less severe warning letter. The Union filed a grievance on Johnson’s behalf and Johnson’s warning was reduced to a memo that summarized her work obligations and employment status. Johnson was fired after another altercation with O’Connell. A witness indicated that Johnson shoved O’Connell, who filed a police report. Johnson filed suit, alleging discrimination on the basis of her race and gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Koppers. View "Johnson v. Koppers, Inc." on Justia Law

Part of Crosby’s finger was amputated while using a “kicking method” of removing metal from bundles. His employer, Cooper, discouraged that method as dangerous. Crosby claimed medical and temporary total disability benefits under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. When he returned, Crosby stated that he would continue using the “kicking method.” Cooper suspended him for three days and stated that any future safety policy violation would result in immediate termination. The president of Crosby’s union, Zimmerman, filed a grievance on Crosby’s behalf. After returning from suspension, Crosby was given additional training during which, he alleges, Cooper introduced new safety rules and procedures. Within hours of Crosby’s return to work, Cooper’s safety specialist accused him of violating a new safety rule by tossing a pallet. Crosby denied doing so. Zimmerman notified Crosby that Cooper had decided to fire him and suggested that Crosby ask Cooper to call the decision a “permanent layoff with no recall rights,” so that Crosby would be eligible for unemployment benefits and a neutral job reference. Cooper accepted on the condition that Crosby dismiss the grievance. Crosby later claimed that the settlement was a sham and that he was fired for filing a workers’ compensation claim. Cooper removed his retaliatory discharge suit to federal court, claiming that the suit was a disguised action under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, which preempts state‐law claims that require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Cooper asserted that the suit should be dismissed for failure to exhaust remedies under the CBA. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court and remanded to state court, rejecting the claim of complete preemption. View "Crosby v. Cooper B-Line, Inc." on Justia Law

From 2006 until he was fired in 2011, Chrzanowski was an assistant state’s attorney. In 2011, a special prosecutor began investigating Chrzanowski’s boss, Bianchi. Bianchi allegedly had improperly influenced cases involving his relatives and political allies. Under subpoena, Chrzanowski testified before a grand jury, and later, again under subpoena, he testified at Bianchi’s trial. A few months later, Chrzanowski was interrogated by Bianchi and fired. Chrzanowski believed that the firing was retaliation for his testimony and filed suit, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights and state statutes. The district court dismissed the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, finding that First Amendment protections did not apply because the testimony was “pursuant to [his] official duties” and, in the alternative, that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, because any First Amendment protections were not “clearly established” at the time. The Seventh Circuit reversed. When Chrzanowski spoke out about his supervisors’ potential or actual wrongdoing, he was speaking outside the duties of employment. Providing eyewitness testimony regarding potential wrongdoing was never part of what Chrzanowski was employed to do; his rights were clearly established at all relevant times. Unlike restrictions on speech made pursuant to official duties, punishment for subpoenaed testimony chills civic discourse “in significant and pernicious ways.” View "Chrzanowski v. Bianchi" on Justia Law