Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The NECA-IBEW Health and Welfare Fund provides health benefits to members of a local union of electrical workers. The Fund negotiated a Local Agreement with Sav-Rx, a provider of prescription-drug benefits, under which Sav-Rx reimburses pharmacies for dispensing medication and then invoices the Fund for some of its costs. The Local Agreement does not call for arbitration. A few months later, Sav-Rx negotiated a different agreement with the national organization of the IBEW, with which the local is affiliated. The National Agreement offers locals reduced charges and more services than the Local Agreement and contains a mandatory arbitration clause. Local unions and funds could opt into the National Agreement, but the Fund's trustees never voted on the matter. Over the next eight years the Fund accepted from Sav-Rx services provided by the National Agreement. The Fund sued Sav-Rx for invoicing the Fund at rates not authorized by either the Local or National Agreement. The district court dismissed, finding that Fund had accepted the benefits of the National Agreement and was bound to it; Sav-Rx established that the Fund knew it was accepting benefits under the National Agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "NECA-IBEW Rockford Local Union 364 Health & Welfare Fund v. A&A Drug Co." on Justia Law

In 1999 Brumfield was hired as a nonprobationary police officer. In 2006 she began to experience unspecified “psychological problems.” The city required her to submit to four psychological examinations. Each time Brumfield was found capable of continuing her work. Brumfield sued, alleging that subjecting her to psychological examinations amounted to discrimination on account of race, sex, and sexual orientation. The city suspended Brumfield without pay pending discharge proceedings. The Police Board rejected the discharge recommendation but suspended Brumfield without pay for 180 days. Before the suspension expired the city again suspended Brumfield pending discharge proceedings. Before the Police Board issued its second suspension order and before Brumfield returned to work, the city initiated a third discharge proceeding. Brumfield filed another lawsuit, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a) and dismissed the first case. The district court dismissed, holding that the complaint failed to state a claim under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Brumfield filed a third suit, alleging violation of Title I of the ADA, which was dismissed as barred by res judicata. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Title II of the ADA does not cover disability discrimination in public employment; such a claim must be brought under Title I, but Brumfield waived her challenge to dismissal of her Title I suit. The Rehabilitation Act claim fails because Brumfield has not alleged that she was suspended or fired by reason of disability.View "Brumfield v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Titan purchased an Illinois tire manufacturing facility, then entered into labor agreements with Local 745, which represented the Titan workers. Titan paid the full union salaries of Local 745's President and Benefit Representative for about two years, although they were on leave of absence from Titan. Titan then concluded such payments violated Section 302(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which prohibits an employer from paying money to union representatives. Titan reasoned that Local 745 also represented a bargaining unit at the school district, the union representatives were not working full-time from the Titan facility, and were not subject to Titan’s control. The union filed a grievance, arguing that such payments were exempt from Section 302(a) by Section 302(c), because the two were current or former Titan employees and the payments were “by reason of” their service. An arbitrator found the payments lawful. The district court granted enforcement. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Paying the full-time union salaries of the two representatives was so incommensurate with their former Titan employment as not to qualify as payments in compensation for or by reason of that employment. These payments are “by reason of” service to Local 745 members, including both Titan and school district employees. The court noted the statutory purpose of preventing conflicts of interest. View "Titan Tire Corp. of Freeport, Inc. v. United Steel, Paper & Forest, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. Serv. Workers Int'l Union" on Justia Law

Waupaca manufactures iron castings and provides its foundry employees with personal protective equipment (PPE), including hard hats, safety glasses, ear protection, steel-toed footwear, and a fire-retardant uniform. Waupaca requires these employees to wear PPE while working; failure to comply can result in discipline. Waupaca provides locker rooms with showers. Typically, foundry workers finish their shift, clock out and proceed to locker rooms, where they remove their PPE, shower, and change into street clothes. Because of hazards associated with chemicals and dust to which some workers are exposed, Waupaca recommends that employees shower and remove their PPE on-site. Not all employees do so. Employees, representing a class of more than 400 (an opt-in class, 29 .S.C. 216(b)) alleged that Waupaca violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, by not paying for time spent showering and changing clothes at work. The district court granted Waupaca summary judgment, ruling that those activities were not compensable under the FLSA because the Occupational Safety and Health Administration had not mandated that foundry workers shower and change clothes on-site. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that OSHA’s decision not to promulgate a rule requiring such activities does not bar a party from presenting evidence as to compensability under the FLSA and that factual disputes otherwise precluded summary judgment.View "DeKeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc." on Justia Law

Lavalais is the only black police officer employed by the Village of Melrose Park, which has about 75 officers. He has been a Melrose Park officer for more than 20 years. In 2010, Lavalais filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging race discrimination. He filed a second charge in January 2011, alleging that he was disciplined for filing the first charge. In early February 2011, Lavalais was promoted to sergeant and placed on the midnight shift. More than a year later, he was denied a requested a change of assignment from the midnight shift, and again filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The EEOC issued a right‐to‐sue letter. The district court dismissed his claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit vacated dismissal of the discrimination claims, but affirmed dismissal of the retaliation claims. View "Lavalais v. Vill. of Melrose Park" on Justia Law

Johnson was rejected for four promotions and was terminated in 2004, when her employer, General Board learned that Johnson had been recording conversations with co-workers without their consent. Johnson had filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 2001 and in 2003 and, after her termination, filed a charge, claiming sexual harassment, based on a video shown by a team leader, featuring male nudity. Johnson sued General Board, alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 981, and sexual harassment in violation of Title VII. Johnson testified that a hiring official told her that her tendency to complain about discrimination might have contributed to the decision not to promote her. Most of Johnson’s claims were dismissed. Two remaining claims for retaliation were tried; a jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings and to jury instructions. The district court failed to comply with FRCP 51(b), which requires the court to decide the content of final jury instructions and give the parties an opportunity to object before instructions and final arguments are delivered; the procedural error was ultimately harmless. View "Johnson v. Gen. Bd. of Pension & Health Benefits of the United Methodist Church" on Justia Law

American Airlines filed for bankruptcy and implemented a plan to reduce labor costs. Anticipating a reduction in the number of AA mechanics, resulting in reduction in the number of Transportation Workers Union members, the national leadership of that union consolidated local unions and shuttered offices. The district court denied a motion by local unions for a preliminary injunction preventing the consolidation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. TWU’s actions were within the scope of its authority; TWU reasonably exercised powers granted to it by the TWU Constitution. View "Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO Local Unions v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., Int'l " on Justia Law

Mullin began selling fire trucks and rescue equipment in 1990. In 2006, the employer’s new owner took an account away from Mullin because of criticism by a fire chief. In 2008 and 2009, Mullin won awards for selling the most fire trucks during the preceding fiscal year. In 2009 Mullin’s sales represented 40% of the total number of fire trucks sold in Indiana. In 2009, the employer hired a new Vice President of the Indiana sales division, which was not meeting expectations. In 2010, the employer fired an Indiana sales associate who was in his 50s. Shortly thereafter, the company hired two men, ages 24 and 29, to perform the same contractual duties as Mullin; neither had industry experience. Mullin was subsequently fired. The CEO told Mullin that “[w]e are paying you too much.” In Mullin’s suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, the district court granted the employer summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that Mullin contested the company’s assertions of poor performance and “a string of questionable conduct, from the suspicious timing of personnel decisions to ambiguous statements about age to multiple seemingly inaccurate allegations.” Mullin put forth sufficient evidence that the jury should resolve factual and credibility questions.View "Mullin v. Temco Mach., Inc." on Justia Law

The pro se plaintiff sued her former employer, a private recipient of federal funding, alleging violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, by requiring her to complete certain duties as a dental assistant that she was incapable of performing due to an unspecified disability that limits her strength and mobility, and then firing her because of her disability. The district judge dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A plaintiff under the Rehabilitation Act against a recipient of federal money is not required to exhaust the administrative remedies that the Act provides; an employee or former employee of a private company, such as the plaintiff, is not required Act to even file an administrative charge or complaint. View "Williams v. Milwaukee Health Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Perez worked for a gasoline and convenience store, 2005-2009, and was working as the store manager when she sold herself about $127 worth of candy bars for $12. She was fired for failure to “control cash and/or inventory.” A few months earlier, Perez’s non‐Hispanic male supervisor had committed a similar act and was only given a warning. The district court rejected her suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging gender and national origin discrimination, on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that, although Perez’s behavior was wrongful, and a jury might find that her firing was not tainted by unlawful bias, a jury could also find that her wrongdoing was comparable to the wrongdoing of her supervisor, and that animus against women and Hispanics tainted the termination decision. View "Perez v. Thorntons, Inc." on Justia Law