Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In 2003, a joint venture formed between llcs, TABFG and NT Prop, to trade securities. TABFG was responsible for trading and was comprised of three individual traders. NT Prop was to fund the venture, and included two limited liability corporations: NT Financial and Pfeil Commodities. The sole member of Pfeil Commodities was Richard Pfeil, the “money man.” NT Prop was managed by Pfeil’s attorney, and another. NT Prop provided $2 million start-up money and the traders earned profits of $3.4 million. Before forming TABFG, the traders were employees of SIG and were subject to restrictive covenants. The Agreement provided for payment of attorneys’ fees and costs necessary to escape the restriction. The traders sought a declaratory judgment. SIG responded by adding TABFG and NT Prop to the lawsuit, seeking disgorgement of profits. SIG obtained an injunction covering nine months after their departure from SIG, ending the joint venture. The parties failed to agree to a final accounting, but TABFG needed funds for a defense in the SIG lawsuit. Pfeil caused NT Prop to distribute $360,000 to TABFG, $533,023.69 to NT Financial, and $2,742,182.02 to Pfeil Commodities. TABFG sued, alleging that Pfeil, who was not an officer, director or manager of NT Prop, engineered a distribution of the bulk of the joint venture funds to himself and tortiously caused NT Prop to breach its obligations to TABFG under the Agreement. The district court judge agreed and awarded $957,659.68. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "TABFG, LLC v. Pfeil" on Justia Law

The employees of the Chicago poultry processing plant are represented by a union. Before beginning work, they are required to put on a sterilized jacket, plastic apron, cut‐resistant gloves, plastic sleeves, earplugs, and a hairnet. They must remove this sanitary gear at the start of their half‐hour lunch break and put it back on before returning to work. They are not compensated for the time spent changing. They alleged that the employer violated overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 and of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law. The district judge granted the employer summary judgment and denied class certification with respect to the state‐law claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Act excludes from time for which an employee must be compensated for “any time spent in changing clothes at the beginning or end of each workday which was excluded from measured working time … by the express terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective‐ bargaining agreement applicable to the particular employee.” The cause of amicable labor relations would be impaired by reading broadly laws that remove wage and hour issues from the scope of collective bargaining. Employer and union in this case agreed not to count the tiny changing times as compensated work. The plaintiffs were trying to upend the deal struck by their own union. View "Mitchell v. JCG Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Days after the collective bargaining agreement expired, a bargaining-unit employee asked the Labor Board to conduct a decertification election. Neither the company nor the union opposed the request. In the election 19 votes were cast for the union and 18 against, with the remaining ballot not opened. The union claimed that the employee who had cast it was not a bargaining unit member. The Board rejected that challenge, the ballot was opened, and the vote was against the union. The union also claimed that the company used objectionable conduct to turn employees against the union, including sending a letter of unknown origin to a member, threatening jail if she voted for the union. The Board agreed with three of the charges and ordered a new election. Before then, however, the company announced that it would no longer cooperate with the union. The union filed an unfair labor practice complaint, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (5), which was upheld. The Board ordered the company to recognize the union and bargain on request and sought enforcement of its order. The Seventh Circuit enforced the order. The order refusing to decertify the union and ordering a new election is outside of the court’s jurisdiction: the result of the old election has not been vindicated and a new election has not been held. The union remains certified and the employer must continue to recognize it. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Heartland Human Servs." on Justia Law

The general contractor of a Wisconsin construction project, hired Harsco to supply scaffolding. Krien, injured in a fall when a plank on a scaffold on which he was standing, broke, sued Harsco. The parties settled his claim for $900,000. Harsco filed a third‐party complaint against the contractor, seeking indemnification plus interest and attorneys’ fees. The district judge granted the contractor summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded after examining the complex provisions of the contract between the two. The plank may or may have been supplied by Harsco and may or may not have been defective, as claimed by Krien, who could not sue Riley in tort, because against his employer his only remedy for a work‐related accident was a claim for workers’ compensation, but there has never been judicial resolution of these questions, because Krien’s suit was settled before there was any judgment. Indemnification, however, is a form of insurance, and could apply even if the party seeking indemnification was negligent. Riley’s duty to indemnify Harsco extends to legal expenses incurred by Harsco in defending against Krien’s suit and in litigating this suit. View "Krien v. Harsco Corp." on Justia Law

The Brotherhood represents Norfolk employees who work to ensure that railways remain clear, safe, and navigable. The collective bargaining agreements entitle Brotherhood members to an investigation before Norfolk takes disciplinary action. Norfolk fired four Brotherhood members for making false statements about injuries they suffered while on duty. The investigation followed the procedures typical of a minor dispute under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151. As part of the investigation before the firing, Norfolk submitted reports from a consulting engineer, but the engineer did not testify. The Brotherhood sought an injunction to ban the use of accident reconstruction reports in employee disciplinary investigations unless Norfolk adheres to additional pre-hearing procedures. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The dispute arose from application of the collective bargaining agreement in employee disciplinary actions. Norfolk met its burden of proving that its use of the disputed reports at investigations was justified by a contractual right, albeit an implied one. The suit is a “quintessential” minor dispute under the Act and there is “no basis for asserting jurisdiction over the subject matter of this dispute.” View "Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Chaib, born in France in 1957, married an American, immigrated, and became a citizen in 1991. In 2008, Chaib began work at a maximum security prison. During her probationary period, Chaib alleged, training officer Van Dine made sexually offensive remarks. Van Dine admitted to making remarks to another co-worker while Chaib was present, but denied making comments to her. Chaib completed her probation and was granted permanent status. Van Dine claims Chaib was regularly sent back to him for retraining because she had trouble with supervisors. After Van Dine yelled at Chaib to do her job and pointed his finger in her face, Chaib filed an internal personnel complaint. Human resources found no evidence of harassment, but noted evidence that both had engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer. Both received reprimands. Van Dine ceased all harassing behavior. During two-and-a-half years of employment, Chaib had several encounters with other coworkers that she identified as discriminatory. Her evaluations were not satisfactory. Chaib complained to the EEOC, which resulted in a conclusion that her “appraisal was properly administered” and that its result was proper. Chaib was subsequently denied a transfer and, after an incident involving an inmate, requested time off based on stress, anxiety, and depression. While on FMLA leave, Chaib resigned, filed a second EEOC complaint, and filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, reasserting previous complaints and alleging retaliation. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Chaib v. Indiana" on Justia Law

Andrews, a white woman, started working at a Cracker Barrel restaurant in 1999. In 2002 she filed a discrimination claim, which settled. Stewart, a black man, then an associate manager, told Andrews that if he became manager, he would fire her. After Stewart became general manager in 2006, he said he was going to make the restaurant the first all-black Cracker Barrel. He also made daily comments about Andrews’s age, calling her “old woman” and “grandma.” Andrews complained to an associate manager and attempted to complain to the district manager, but the person responsible for scheduling an appointment never did so. In 2007 Andrews complained to an Employee Relations Specialist, who determined that no action needed to be taken. Eventually Andrews asked Stewart to initiate her transfer to another restaurant. She claims he told her that the transfer went through, but he denies doing so. She never made contact with the other restaurant and, after three weeks during which she did not work, the company’s system listed her as having quit. In the meantime, Stewart was fired for violating an asset-protection policy. The district court rejected claims that Stewart fired Andrews because of her sex, age, and race and that he retaliated for her prior Title VII suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Andrews did not suffer an adverse employment action, but quit in anticipation of a transfer that never occurred. View "Andrews v. CBOCS West, Inc." on Justia Law

Phillips worked at CTA as a trucker for 22 years, until, in 2010, he visited CTA’s onsite health services department to report that his fingers went numb at work and to initiate a workers’ compensation claim. CTA had a written substance abuse policy that required drug testing in certain situations, including initiation of workers’ compensation claim. Refusal to submit to testing was cause for immediate suspension pending termination. An injured employee could receive medical treatment in the health services department and return to work without being required to submit to a drug test if the employee did not seek to initiate a workers’ compensation claim and the situation did not fall into one of the other categories for which drug testing was required. Phillips was advised that if he didn’t take the drug test, his employment would be terminated. He refused to take the drug test and was terminated for refusing to submit to drug testing upon his initiation of a workers’ compensation claim. Phillips did file a workers’ compensation claim and eventually received benefits. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting his claim that his termination was retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Phillips v. Cont'l Tire Americas, LLC" on Justia Law

Until 1998, Vanaria was employed by the Cook County Probation Department. He was terminated following investigation of allegations that he had sought sexual favors in exchange for looser conditions of probation. In 2002 the county rehired Vanaria, who was a political operative. He began working at a county hospital in a position excluded from decrees prohibiting hiring decisions based on politics. The hospital did not conduct background investigations of patronage hires. A pharmaceutical representative alleged that Vanaria had attempted to condition her participation in a hospital program on her giving him a massage. An investigation resulted in oral counseling for Vanaria, but no discipline. In 2007, Vanaria offered Krystal, an unemployed massage therapist, a position as a physical therapist. When she stated that she was not qualified as a physical therapist, he explained that he could make things happen because people owed him favors. He provided her with legitimate application forms and insurance paperwork. When Krystal returned to his office with her Social Security card, Vanaria asked Krystal to close the door and told her that if she truly wanted the job, she had to kiss and massage him. Krystal agreed to have Vanaria visit her at her home massage studio, where they had sexual contact. Krystal eventually called the hospital’s HR department and learned that no position had ever existed, Vanaria eventually pled guilty to official misconduct and bribery. The district court rejected Krystal’s Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000e), equal protection, and due process claims and state law claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Wilson v. Cook County" on Justia Law

A large group of African-American police officers and firefighters sued the City of Indianapolis, alleging that the examination process it uses to rank candidates for promotion in the police and fire departments has a disparate impact on black candidates and is intentionally discriminatory. They filed lawsuits targeting promotion decisions made in successive promotion cycles starting inv2002, but most of the challenged decisions were based on scores generated by testing administered by the police department in 2008 and the fire department in 2007. The district court dismissed many of the claims as either time-barred or substantively flawed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the district court mistakenly assumed that allegations of intentional discrimination necessarily defeat a disparate-impact claim, here the disparate-impact claims fail because they are stated as legal conclusions, without any factual content to support an inference that the examination procedures caused a disparate impact on black applicants for promotion. The disparate-treatment claims lacked evidentiary support and were properly resolved on summary judgment. Although the second complaint concerns a different set of promotion decisions, it attacked the same eligibility list that was at issue in the first case and was, therefore, barred. View "Adams v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law