Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Holder was an Illinois correctional officer since 2006. His wife began to suffer from mental health problems relating to opiate dependency. The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) entitles eligible employees to 12 work weeks of leave during a 12-month period to care for a spouse with a serious medical condition, 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1). In October 2007, Holder submitted an FMLA certification form. His wife’s psychiatrist indicated that it would “be necessary for the employee to take off work only intermittently or to work less than a full schedule as a result of the condition,” and that the need for leave would continue for an “unknown” duration. The request was approved. The state never asked for additional medical documentation and paid its share of his health insurance premium until April 18, 2008. About 130 days of absence were recorded on a day-by-day basis. On April 18, 2008, Holder was advised that his FMLA leave had expired and that additional leave would be under the Illinois Family Responsibility Leave program, which allows up to a year of unpaid leave; the state only covers insurance premiums for six months. In April-June 2008, Holder took 29 absences, citing the state program. The Warden disapproved requests for June 8-9 and on the denied form, Holder wrote “last one!!!” Eight months later Central Management Services informed Holder that the state had mistakenly paid for his health insurance premiums beyond his entitlement and began deducting 25% of his earnings until he had refunded $8,291.83. Holder sued, claiming interference with FLMA rights. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the state, but the judge entered judgment awarding Holder $1,222.10 for January 2008, but entered a judgment for the state for the rest of the months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Holder v. IL Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Lomanto worked as a U.S. Postal Service custodian in a “bid job,” with a fixed schedule, awarded on a seniority basis under a collective bargaining agreement. In 2005, Lomanto started working as a temporary maintenance supervisor on an as-needed basis. The CBA limits such assignments to four months; between assignments temporary supervisors must return to their regular jobs for a two-week pay period. Bid jobs are reserved for four months and then declared vacant, so that another union member can obtain a steady schedule. Union steward LaFoe warned Lomanto that she had violated the four-month rule; although she had worked as a custodian for two consecutive weeks, the weeks did not align with a pay period. LaFoe did not file a grievance. Lomanto, again assigned as a temporary supervisor, reported that Szczesny, another union steward, had falsified his timesheet. Szczesny received a warning. Subsequently, LaFoe grieved Lomanto, concerning sick leave. LaFoe told Lomanto: “this is what happens when you issue action on a fellow steward.” It was denied for lack of evidence. LaFoe filed another grievance: Before the end of a four-month assignment, Lomanto had received travel time at the supervisory pay rate for attending training. Her return fell on the first day of a new pay period. For the rest of that period, she returned to custodial work. The next day, she was again assigned as a temporary supervisor. Management concluded that Lomanto had violated the four-month rule. She lost her bid job. Lomanto sued the union for breaching its duty of fair representation (Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185). The district court dismissed. While there was a fact question about the union’s motive for the grievance, Lomanto could not obtain her requested relief. Only the Postal Service could reinstate her, but it was not party to the suit. Neither punitive nor emotional-distress damages are available. View "Zepperi-Lomanto v. Am. Postal Workers Union" on Justia Law

Macon runs group homes for disabled individuals and has a policy requiring any employee who “witnesses, is told of, or has reason to believe an incident of abuse or neglect … has occurred” to report the incident. A 2009 Illinois law requires a report to a state agency. Baker, hired in 1991, twice saw a coworker, Carter, use his finger to flick a resident’s neck. She told supervisors. A decade later state officials investigated allegations that Carter had abused the same resident. Cross, a 39-year-old caregiver, told investigators that she had seen the resident agitated and gesturing at his genitals after Carter had worked the overnight shift. Cross asked the resident “who did that to him,” but could not understand his answer. A week later, she overheard Carter state, “Yes, I pulled it,” and a month later, she saw the resident point to his genitals and toward Carter. Though Cross and Baker discussed Cross’s observations, Cross did not report. Baker and a third caregiver described seeing Carter flick the resident in the neck. The third caregiver told investigators that she had heard Carter “joking” about squeezing the resident’s testicles. The report concluded that the resident had been abused and recommended that Macon address the failure of the employees to comply state law. A disciplinary report for Cross observed that she had “direct evidence” of and “suspected” abuse. The report for Baker and the third worker found that each had been “an eyewitness” and failed to report. Macon fired Baker, age 56, and a 61-year-old caregiver, but suspended Cross for three days. Baker sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit reversed; a jury reasonably could find that Macon discriminated based on age by treating a younger employee more leniently.View "Baker v. Macon Res., Inc." on Justia Law

Banks sued her former employer, the Board of Education, and her former supervisor, Gonzales, alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and related violations of federal and state law. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims; 29 after the district court entered judgment, Banks filed “a motion to alter the entry of summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e),” which the district court denied six days later. Banks then filed a notice of appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment. Because Banks missed that deadline, her motion was not effective as a Rule 59(e) motion that could have tolled the time to file a notice of appeal from the judgment. Treating her post‐judgment motion as a Rule 60(b) motion that did not toll the time to appeal the summary judgment, her notice of appeal was timely only as to the district court’s denial of her post‐judgment motion. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying that motion. View " Banks v. Chicago Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Wisconsin’s Act 10 significantly changed Wisconsin public‐sector labor law: it prohibited government employers from collectively bargaining with their general employees (not public safety employees) over anything except base wages and precluded general‐employee unions from using automatic payroll deductions and fair‐share agreements. Act 10 mandated that general‐employee unions submit to a recertification election every year (instead of remaining certified indefinitely) and certification requires affirmative votes from an absolute majority of the bargaining unit, not just those voting. Public‐employee unions and an individual union member sued, claiming that these changes infringe their First Amendment petition and association rights and deny union members the equal protection of the laws. The district court rejected the challenges. The Seventh Circuit, having previously held that Act 10’s prohibition on payroll deductions did not violate the First Amendment and that Act 10’s distinction between public safety and general employees was viewpoint‐neutral, affirmed. The court concluded that the law does not implicate the First Amendment and applied rational basis review. Its limitations on the scope of statutory collective bargaining are rationally related to a legitimate government interest: promoting flexibility in state and local government budgets by providing public employers more leverage in negotiations. View "Laborers Local 236, AFLO-CIO v. Walker" on Justia Law

Aurora hired Gosey as a chef’s assistant in 2008. In September 2009 she applied for an open position as food-services manager at the hospital. The job posting stated a preference for someone with “five to seven years of progressively responsible experience in managing a food service operation,” including experience in managing “staff, budgets and multiple human resources functions.” There were more than 150 applicants. Aurora interviewed Gosey, but ultimately hired a white woman. Gosey filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, alleging that she had been denied the promotion, was assigned extra duties, and disciplined for sham infractions because of her race. She accused Aurora’s managers of trying to manufacture an excuse to fire her by altering her attendance records. Two months later, Aurora fired her. Gosey sued, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a). The district court granted Aurora summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to claims of harassment and failure to promote, but concluded that further proceedings are necessary on claims that Aurora fired Gosey because of race and in retaliation for her complaints of discrimination.View "Gosey v. Aurora Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Since 1994, Harper has served as Fulton County Treasurer, an elected position with a four-year term. The 21-member County Board sets salaries for elected officials. From 1983–2002, the County Treasurer and County Clerk were paid the same salary. When Rumler, the County Clerk, announced his retirement, the board increased his salary in order to allow him to receive greater retirement benefits. From 2003–2006, the County Clerk’s salary exceeded the County Treasurer’s salary. After Rumler’s retirement, the new County Clerk, James Nelson, and the County Treasurer were paid the same salary from 2007–2010. In the meantime, disputes between Harper and the Board apparently prompted the Finance Committee to recommend against increasing the County Treasurer’s salary in 2010. The Board adopted the recommendation, 10–8, but voted (16–2) to give the County Clerk annual pay raises. Harper filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, alleging sex discrimination in compensation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Harper failed to show that the Board’s concerns about the content and timeliness of her reports were merely excuses covering sex discrimination. View "Harper v. Fulton Cnty." on Justia Law

Reid and Sears were at-will employees at NACA, a national not-for-profit corporation that helps potential homeowners facing discriminatory or predatory lending. As mortgage consultants, they were licensed under 12 U.S.C. 5103. NACA had a Document Security Policy that required employees to scan documents into a secure digital system and shred the paper originals to protect the client’s information. Paper client files were not to be kept. The policy had been emailed to managers, but it was not enforced in the Chicago office. While working for NACA, Reid and Sears made complaints about NACA’s business practices relating to minimum wage and overtime, as well as violations of state and federal law in handling mortgage applications. At least four other individuals complained about minimum wage and overtime pay, and at least five others complained about splitting commissions between licensed and unlicensed mortgage consultants. None of the others were fired. After a regional manager discovered violations of the file policy during a visit, Reid and Sears were fired. The district court granted NACA summary judgment, finding that they had not offered sufficient evidence that they were discharged in retaliation for their complaints. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Reid v. Neighborhood Assistance Corp. of Am." on Justia Law

Bass worked as a custodian. In 2002, she was assigned to work at a single-story elementary school. In 2003 a second story was added. A male was responsible for cleaning the second floor. In 2008–09, the District commissioned a study of custodial duties at 11 schools, which revealed that second floor took tasks more time than one shift permitted, while the first floor could be finished in less than one shift. While Bass was on leave, the District had the substitute custodian try a new arrangement. She was able to finish during her shift. The District reassigned second‐floor restrooms to Bass. The study also resulted in seven male custodians being assigned additional duties. Bass then had two suspensions without pay. She did not contest the suspensions; she had failed to complete her duties. Her work improved significantly. Before 2010, Bass had taken two leaves that exceeded the leave to which she was entitled under the collective bargaining agreement. Bass injured her back in August 2010 and again took leave. The District told Bass that she would have no more available leave as of November 3, and would be fired if she failed to return to work. Bass returned to work on November 4. She injured her back again 12 days later and was out for 2.5 days. The District issued a reprimand. On January 3, Bass again did not report to work. She provided a doctor’s note, but exceeded available leave time. When asked when she would be able to return without restrictions, Bass did not reply. She was fired on February 2, for job abandonment. Three male custodians lost their jobs between 2008 and 2011 on the same ground. The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue on her sex discrimination claims. The district court dismissed her sit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Bass v. Joliet Pub. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 2006 Finkl, a Chicago steel producer, initiated termination of its defined benefit pension plan under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, apparently anticipating merger with another company. The Plan was amended in 2008, to include Section 11.6, a special provision for distributions in connection with the contemplated termination, to apply if a participant “ha[d] not begun to receive a benefit under the Plan at the time benefits are to be distributed on account of termination of the Plan.” In May 2008, Finkl decided not to terminate the Plan. Section 11.6 was deleted. Finkl notified the IRS that the Plan was not going to terminate. Seven Finkl employees sued, alleging that they were entitled to an immediate distribution of benefits while they were still working for Finkl and that repeal of Section 11.6 violated the anti-cutback terms of the Plan, I.R.C. 411(d)(6), and ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1054(g). The IRS sent Finkl a favorable determination letter that the Plan had retained its tax qualified status. In 2011, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of summary judgment to Finkl. The employees then pursued a claim in the Tax Court, which ruled that they were collaterally estopped by the Seventh Circuit decision from challenging the 2009, determination letter, which concluded that the Plan had not been terminated and continued to qualify for favorable tax treatment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Carter v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law