Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Nurses sued their former employer, a privately-operated jail, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1981, alleging racial discrimination and hostile work environment. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The record concerning plaintiffs' allegations about references to monkeys and skin color, clothing marked by the confederate flag, and disparate treatment, was insufficient to establish a triable issue of hostile environment. With respect to other claims of discrimination, the plaintiffs did not establish a materially adverse employment action. State law whistleblower claims failed because the plaintiffs failed to allege violation of federal, state, or local law or misuse of public resources.

The employee developed bilateral cubital tunnel syndrome while working at a supermarket, then worked as a greeter until she was laid off in 2003 because she was unable to perform the job. She subsequently started and left a dental hygiene, radiology technology, and electroencephalography training programs because of problems related to her hands and vision. At age 45 she had an extensive medical history, including fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease, bilateral mild ulnar neuropathy, and multiple eye surgeries with dry eye syndrome. In 2008 an ALJ rejected her claim for social security disability benefits. The appeals council denied review and the district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the ALJ failed to acknowledge a physician report contrary to her conclusion and to explain the weight she gave that opinion, but stating that remand would serve no purpose in light of the overwhelming evidence supporting the denial.

The employee began work at the university in 1989 and was the only African-American working in her department when racially charged discord erupted. In 2005, she began filing complaints about her coworkersâ offensive conduct, which included the use of racial epithets, references to the Ku Klux Klan, veiled threats of physical harm, and other unpleasant conduct. In 2006 she filed two complaints with the EEOC for race discrimination and, later, retaliation. After getting her right-to-sue letter, she filed in a range of federal and state discrimination claims. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that she did not establish employer liability on the hostile work environment claim or put forth sufficient facts to support her retaliation claim under Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000e). The university promptly investigated each complaint and the employee, who was promoted and got a raise, did not suffer a materially adverse employment action.

When the plaintiff left the company, the parties entered an agreement about how the company would handle requests for references. In a suit alleging breach, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the company and awarded $173,232 in attorney fees. On remand a jury returned a general verdict that the company did not breach the agreement and the court awarded $522,527 attorney fees and costs and expenses in the amount of $40,493.64. On a second appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The trial court properly allowed the company to argue waiver. Jury instructions concerning waiver, agency, breach, and damages were within the court's discretion. The award of fees was commercially reasonable and not inequitable.

The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, establishes minimum wage and requires employers to pay 150 percent of hourly wage for hours worked above 40 a week except to "any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity." Plaintiff, an account manager, acted as a bridge between software developers and her employer's customers; she did not negotiate contracts. The district court rejected her overtime claim on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffâs primary duties were directly related to the complex and varied general business operations of her employer and of customers; her hours varied each week. There are some "administrative" functions she did not perform, but she was one of many specialists below the highest executive level, as is typical of modern business.

Plaintiff, previously employed by defendant as a driver-technician, claims racial and sexual discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation, all in violation of Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000(e)), and retaliatory discharge in violation of the Illinois Workersâ Compensation Act. He had been suspended for poor performance, then injured his back, and has not been present for work since 2005. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the company, but denied the company's request for sanctions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, but reversed on the retaliation claim. The Title VII claims of discrimination were time-barred and the plaintiff did not claim discriminatory discharge before the EEOC; he filed with the EEOC after being fired, so the termination was not retaliation for that filing. There was evidence that could support a claim of retaliation of the Workers' Compensation filing.

The plaintiff claimed gender discrimination and hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, retaliation in violation of Title VII, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, retaliatory discharge in violation of Illinois law, and violations of the Fair Labor Standards Acts, 29 U.S.C. 201, and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/1. A jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages, overtime damages, and lost wages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction at the time of filing. In addition to claims based on sexual harassment, the complaint alleged that plaintiff was fired for filing a police report concerning the assault. Discharge for filing a police report is an Illinois common law tort without reference to the duties created by the state Human Rights Act, and therefore not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state Human Rights Commission.

The company filed an objection to a flyer, distributed on the eve of an election. The hearing officer found that the flyer contained a misrepresentation of the law, but did not interfere with the employeesâ ability to make a free choice and recommended that the Board certify the union. After the union was certified it filed a claim under 29 U.S.C. 158 (a). The Board issued an order requiring the company to bargain. The Seventh Circuit granted an order of enforcement. The board correctly certified the union; findings that the flyer was not a forgery and that its misleading language did not justify setting aside the election were supported by substantial evidence.

In 1995 the city gave an examination for positions in its fire department and rated applicants on a scale between highly qualified and not qualified, based on scores. "Qualified" applicants were told that they were unlikely to be hired. From 1996 through 2001, the city hired random batches from the well-qualified pool. In 1997 a person in the qualified pool filed a charge of discrimination, claiming disparate impact on African-American applicants (42 U.S.C. 2000(e)). After receiving right-to-sue letters from the EEOC, applicants filed a class action in 1998. After a trial, the court rejected a business necessity defense and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. On remand, after the Supreme Court held that most of the claims were timely, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The city conceded that the cut-off score in the ranking system had a disparate impact, so each "batch" hiring had a similar impact. While hiring according to a list, perhaps hiring highest scorers first, might have served a business necessity, the random selection of batches amounted to repeated "use" of a tool that created disparate impact.

Plaintiff, assigned to a bridge crew in 2002, informed his supervisor of his fear of heights. He performed most job functions and the crew accommodated him by swapping assignments. In 2006 he was required to work in a lift bucket, unsecured by a safety line. Days later, required to lean over a bridge beam, he suffered a panic attack and was transported by ambulance; it was the only time the plaintiff was unable to complete an assignment. He was placed on non-occupational disability leave. A doctor described him as unable to work in an exposed, extreme position above 20-25 feet. The department denied an accommodation that was supported by psychiatric reports. The plaintiff stated that he would like to knock his supervisor's teeth out; the department discharged him, but, after arbitration, returned him to work. The district court dismissed claims under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The plaintiff offered sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the department regarded him as precluded from a substantial class of jobs; that the tasks he was unable to perform were not essential to the job and that the requested accommodation was reasonable in light of the crew history of job swapping; and that the reason for discharge was pretextual.