Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The National Labor Relations Board found that HH3 Trucking had committed unfair labor practices and ordered back pay for its workers. HH3 failed to comply. The NLRB petitioned for judicial enforcement. HH3 did not reply to the petitions. The Seventh Circuit we enforced the orders summarily. HH3’s liability is $190,000 plus interest. After finding that HH3’s owners, the Hudsons, could comply but had chosen not to do so, the court held the Hudsons in civil contempt, and ordered them to pay at least $600 a month until the full judgment had been satisfied. Nothing happened. The court directed the Marshals Service to place the Hudsons in custody until they paid. They promised compliance and were released. They paid $600, then stopped. They went back to jail. After they asserted that they are no longer able to comply, the court allowed them to be transferred to home confinement and investigated. Finding that, although Gretchen Hudson considers herself retired and William Hudson had (recently) become medically unable to work, they remain able to pay something by drawing on savings and sources of current income that include benefits from a retirement plan. They argued that money received from a pension plan covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), as their plan is, is free of all legal claims by third parties, 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(1). The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument and, noting that the “scofflaws” have begun to receive Social Security benefits, which themselves exceed $600 monthly, ordered them to pay at least that amount. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. HH3 Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

According to the 2010 Census, Hazel Crest was 85.2% black and 10.2% white, but had no black supervisory police officers until 2005. Garofalo and Peers, both white, were sergeants on the police force and were among four front-runners considered for a deputy police chief position, which ultimately went to a black officer who was not one of those four candidates. They claimed that the village discriminated against them by promoting a black officer they contend is unqualified and sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, and under Illinois state law. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Garofalo and Peers failed to present sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that they were the object of unlawful discrimination. Defendants offered evidence that Garofalo suffered from a lack of leadership and deficiencies in decision-making abilities. Peers had a reputation for a “volatile and unstable personality,” and did not have the respect of the men he supervised. Garofalo and Peers did not present evidence to counter that explanation and permit a finding of pretext. View "Garofalo v. Vill. of Hazel Crest" on Justia Law

The Chippewa County Highway Department employed Kvapil as a seasonal employee, 2006-2008. When he was hired, Kvapil completed a New Employee Orientation for Limited Term Employees Form that advised him of work rules. Kvapil acknowledged receiving the Employment Handbook by signing a receipt that stated that all county employees are employees at will; the Handbook also contained a provision entitled “At Will Employment.” Kvapil owns property in the Town of Wheaton, Chippewa County. From 2000 until 2008, Clary, the County Planning and Zoning Administrator, contacted Kvapil about Kvapil storing unlicensed and inoperable vehicles on that property. During the zoning dispute, Kvapil made threats of violence to Clary. After Kvapil failed to comply, a warrant issued and officers searched the Wheaton property. The county issued a citation. Kvapil visited the Planning and Zoning Department’s Office demanding documents and became hostile, tore up the warrant, threw it at Clary, and said “you’re going down.” After a series of emails discussing the county’s “zero tolerance policy towards any violence or threat,” Kvapil was suspended for one day. A letter notified Kvapil that further infractions would subject him to more severe discipline, including discharge. Subsequently, there was a report that Kvapil had run a private citizen off the road. After his termination, Kvapil filed suit, alleging a property interest in his seasonal work, absent commission of an infraction specified in the handbook. The district court rejected the argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Kvapil v. Chippewa Cnty." on Justia Law

In 1996, Whitfield applied for an electrician position at Navistar’s plant. Navistar hired 16 electricians while Whitfield’s application was pending. The written job description required that an applicant have either eight years of experience or a journeyman card. Whitfield allegedly had nine years of experience, with four years in the U.S. Navy. A foreman interviewed Whitfield and stated he would hire him if the Union verified the required experience. The Union was allegedly unable to verify his experience through numerous employers, but did not consider Whitfield’s experience in the Navy. Whitfield continued to work elsewhere as an electrician and to provide additional references. In 1998, Whitfield obtained an IBEW card, so there was no doubt that he met the requirements. The Union cleared him for hire, and returned Whitfield’s file to the foreman, who opened his folder and saw that the word “black” written on the cover sheet. While the resubmitted application was pending, Navistar hired five white electricians. Whitfield was never formally rejected but in 1999 the foreman told him that Navistar would not allow him to hire Whitfield. At trial Navistar asserted errors in his resume and lack of PLC experience, an allegedly unstated qualification. In 2001 Whitfield and 26 others sued Navistar under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). The district court certified the other plaintiffs’ hostile work environment class and ordered that Whitfield’s hiring discrimination claim remain part of the case for discovery, but separated his claim for trial. The hostile work environment action settled during trial. During joint discovery there was extensive evidence showing extreme racial hostility at the plant. At Whitfield’s 2012 trial, the court rejected his submission regarding evidence from the class trial and concluded that his evidence was insufficient to prove discrimination. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting an updated EEOC chart as clear and persuasive evidence that Whitfield was more qualified than many of the white electricians Navistar hired. View "Whitfield v. Int'l Truck & Engine Corp." on Justia Law

Averhart, formerly a guard at the Cook County Jail, was suspended without pay in 2001 and fired in 2003. She had filed an EEOC charge of discrimination in 2000 and was investigated for smuggling drugs and contraband to prisoners. She had been arrested for shoplifting. She claimed retaliation for her corroboration of a coworker’s claims of sexual harassment and filed her first of four federal lawsuits in 2001. She has lost them all, along with two state suits. The district court dismissed the fourth suit as barred by the earlier decisions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the suit frivolous. The court noted that she was never an employee of the Merit Board, which approved her firing; that a claim against the Sheriff’s Department was filed almost a decade beyond the statute of limitations; and that new theories of race and sex discrimination do not avoid preclusion, which requires all legal theories that concern the same events to be brought in a single suit. The court gave Averhart 14 days to show cause why it should not impose sanctions under Fed. R. App. P. 38, possibly including a financial penalty and an order revoking her privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis. View "Averhart v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff" on Justia Law

Fuqua, a computational linguist, was hired by SVOX in 2009 to help market linguistic products. A few months later, SVOX approached Fuqua with a new employment contract that contained an inventions assignment clause that required Fuqua to disclose and assign to SVOX intellectual property that he made, conceived, or developed in the past and required assignment of his rights to patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, and royalties to SVOX. Fuqua believed that the disclosure required by the new agreement would violate state and federal laws and refused to sign the contract. SVOX terminated Fuqua’s employment. Fuqua filed a complaint with the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Defense (OIG), alleging violation of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which prohibits reprisals for disclosures of wrongdoing relating to covered funds under the act. The OIG found that SVOX did not receive Recovery Act funds and declined to investigate further. The district court dismissed, finding that SVOX did not receive covered funds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Fuqua v. SVOX USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Huon, a lawyer representing himself, sued his former employer Johnson & Bell, and its attorneys, for intentional discrimination based on race (Asian) and national origin (Cambodian) in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981. After remand, the district court granted the defendants judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Huon’s suit was barred by claim preclusion because it arose out of the same “series of connected transactions” as claims that he previously litigated in state court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims mirrored those raised in state court.View "Huon v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd." on Justia Law

Campbell worked at the Forest Preserve District’s Cermak Family Aquatic Center. In 2010, a security camera recorded him having sex with a coworker in the center’s office. Weeks later, the FPD fired him. Nearly two and a half years later, Campbell sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1981, alleging that he was denied progressive discipline in violation of his right to due process; that he was fired because of his race in violation of his right to equal protection of the law; and that his termination violated that statute’s prohibition on racial discrimination in making and enforcing contracts. Campbell later conceded that his section 1983 claims were time‐barred. The district court dismissed, finding that section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for violations of section 1981 committed by state actors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 section 1981 provides a remedy against state actors independent of section 1983 and that if we were to allow his claim to proceed directly under section 1981, it would be timely because it would be governed by 28 U.S.C. 1658’s four‐year statute of limitations, rather than the two‐year statute of limitations governing section 1983 claims in Illinois. View "Campbell v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty." on Justia Law

The Union represents a bargaining unit at PPG’s plant. PPG informed the Union in April 2009 that it wanted to modify the collective bargaining agreement to reduce labor costs. That CBA states that a party seeking to alter the agreement must provide 30 days’ notice. The parties are required to meet in conference at least 10 days before the agreement expires. Proposed changes must be presented not later than the first day of the conference, by the party seeking modification. The parties attended an informal meeting on May 14. PPG explained that its labor costs exceeded competitors’ by $10 an hour; the parties discussed possibilities for reducing those costs. The Union requested that PPG provide details of one proposal and calculate labor-cost reductions that could be achieved without concessions from current employees. On May 28, PPG sent an e-mail with those details. The official negotiating conference began on June 1. PPG reiterated its proposal. During the next two days PPG put forward other proposals. The Union responded that it was not required to bargain about those proposals and filed a grievance. An arbitrator found some proposals timely and others untimely. PPG put forward its final offer, removing several items that had been proposed after June 1. PPG determined that the parties were at an impasse and unilaterally implemented the final offer. The Union filed suit under 29 U.S.C. 185(a). The district court granted PPG summary judgment, concluding that the arbitrator’s award did not preclude PPG from implementing the proposals. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Neither the text of the decision nor the arbitration record supported the Union’s desired interpretation of the award. View "United Steel, Paper & Forest, Rubber, Mfg, Energy Int'l Union v. PPG Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007 Hnin, from the country of Myanmar, began working at TOA’s metal stamping plant. All TOA associates, including Hnin, receive a handbook with a statement that TOA normally employs progressive discipline and attempts to provide notice of deficiencies and an opportunity to improve, but that some infractions warrant probation or dismissal without prior warning, including violations of TOA’s sexual harassment policy. In 2010, Brock began working at TOA, about 22 feet from Hnin’s work station. A month later Brock reported that Hnin had been harassing her for some time, that she had asked Hnin to stop several times, and that the harassment involved a co-worker, Miller. Hnin made body gestures and kissing noises, suggesting that Miller and Brock were together. Brock also stated that Hnin instructed co-workers to slow down so they could work more overtime and acted in an intimidating manner. She identified several witnesses. During an explanation of the investigation, Hnin became aggravated and spoke in an elevated tone. He denied any wrongdoing and asked that the witnesses be brought in so he could confront them. He was told that this request was not in line with TOA’s procedures. TOA terminated his employment. Hnin filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000, and state law. The district court granted TOA summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting national origin discrimination and Title VII retaliation claims. View "Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC" on Justia Law