Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The company previously gave retirees credit toward their share of health care costs, based on unused sick-leave. Union workers could take that sum in cash or put it toward the premium. Executives who quit before retirement, or decided not to participate in the plan, did not receive any other form of compensation for unused leave. It had value only as a credit toward retirement health-care costs. In 2008 the company amended the plan and stopped paying any part of retirees' health-care costs. Money for employees who could have taken their balances in cash is put in an account administered by the health-care plan. Retirees, including executives who never had an option to take balances in cash, plus one who had that option but elected to leave the money on deposit, filed suit under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1081. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings to the company. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The company, which did not take anything out of the plan, but simply reduced the amount it would pay in, reserved the right to amend its health-care plan. It is a business decision, not a legal question, whether to use that authority to retireesâ detriment.

Responding to complaints about a party, officers arrived and attempted to quiet and disperse the crowd of nearly 100 attendees, mostly of Mexican descent. Tension escalated. A full-blown melee ensued. Officers and civilian were injured and seven people were arrested. Party-goers filed suit against 17 officers and the town under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for use of excessive force, false arrest, and deprivation of equal protection, and under state law for battery, malicious prosecution, hate crimes, and evidence spoliation. The 78 plaintiffs pursued different claims against various combinations of individual named officers, unidentified officers, and the town. After a six-week trial, the jury returned sizable verdicts in favor of 23 plaintiffs against six individual officers and the town. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, noting that the judgment appeared to permit 13 plaintiffs to recover twice for the same injury on state-law claims, once from the individual officer and again from the town. As a result of confusing jury instructions and an improper special verdict form, the judgment did not reflect that the town's liability for the state-law claims against its officers was based on respondeat superior and was joint and several. The court rejected plaintiffs' challenges to evidentiary rulings.

After two years of contributing to a multiemployer pension plan established under a collective bargaining agreement, the company closed the covered facility, triggering withdrawal liability. The union notified the company of its liability under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1001, as amended by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 29 U.S.C. 1301-1461, and set a 20-year schedule requiring payment of $652 per month. The union sent another letter, months later, saying that it had miscalculated monthly payments, but not the underlying withdrawal liability, and advised the company to increase monthly payments to $978. The company timely paid the original amount, but refused to pay the revised sum. The company requested arbitration, but after a finding that it was not required to pay the higher amount in the interim, withdrew. The district court dismissed the union's suit based on the calculation. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded without reaching the statutory interpretation issue, based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. A plan may correct perceived errors in calculation and revise an assessment as long as the employer is not prejudiced. At that point the exhaustion provisions of the MPPAA apply to the revised assessment as they would to the original.

After the company announced a plan to outsource positions, it arranged for the new vendor to accept applications from its employees. Two targeted employees applied for positions within the company, rather than pursuing employment with the new vendor, but were not hired. A third employee stayed with company, but claimed that the company has paid him less than he deserves because it has never promoted him. Plaintiffs attribute these adverse employment actions to their supervisor's bias against Hispanics. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant company on claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, but affirmed on the pay discrimination claim. The district court improperly discounted the plaintiffsâ strongest evidence and erred in its analysis of the failure-to-hire claims under Title VII, by basing its decision on the lawful treatment of at least one Hispanic employee.

Drivers, employed by the concrete company, were represented by the union and went on strike after their collective bargaining agreement expired. The company announced that it no longer recognized the union as the drivers' representative and contacted the drivers directly to employ them individually on new terms. A few resigned from the union and returned to work. The strike settled and more returned, on terms less favorable than the previous agreement. The union filed charges with the NLRB. The district court issued an injunction under section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 160(j), ordering the company to stop certain unfair labor practices pending a final decision by the NLRB. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The concrete company does not qualify under section 8(f) as an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry, that would not be subject to some unfair labor practice restrictions in section 8(a) and would be entitled to withdraw recognition from the union. The court properly found the company's practices to be destructive to the unionâs organizational efforts and that the union had established irreparable harm.

Plaintiff, who is white, worked with an African-American who was confrontational, rude, and disruptive in the workplace. Plaintiff claims that a 940-pound steel coil that fell on him, from a machine operated by the "workplace bully," was dropped purposefully because of his race. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer on a racially hostile work environment claim under 42 U.S.C. 1981, without considering plaintiff's response brief or exhibits, which were non-compliant with local rules. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in enforcing its rules and deadlines. The record contained insufficient evidence for a jury to find that the co-worker's offensive conduct before the accident was severe or pervasive. While the injury was severe, no reasonable inference could be drawn that the coil was purposefully dropped because of race or that the employer was negligent in discovering the alleged racial harassment. The company had a reasonable procedure in place for detecting and correcting harassment, but plaintiff did not avail himself of that procedure.

Plaintiff received a written warning from his supervisor for failing to complete a task and went to management to complain. The complaint triggered a series of events that led to his discharge. He sued his former employer, complaining of racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, as well as discriminatory discharge, discriminatory employment actions, and retaliatory discharge, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but reversed as to the retaliatory discharge claim. The sum of the circumstantial evidence, including past discrimination, the investigation, and a "race card" statement, would not allow a rational jury to conclude that racial discrimination caused the firing. The evidence did not show that any similarly situated person actually received better treatment than plaintiff. Plaintiff did not prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence, but his history of complaints and the "race card" statement were enough to allow the retaliation claim to survive summary judgment.

Plaintiff, Green County's chief juvenile-intake worker from 1997-2008, alleged that Green County (county) deprived her of a property interest in her job without due process, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, where the county Board of Supervisors removed the juvenile-intake position from the auspices of the circuit court and created a new juvenile-intake position within the Human Services Department. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the county. The court concluded that the evidence indicated that the county reorganized to save costs and, had the county reorganized merely to terminate plaintiff's employment, its decision to rehire her for the new position would be inexplicable. The court also concluded that because nothing in the record suggested that saving money was a pretext for something else, the court affirmed the district court's holding that the county eliminated plaintiff's court-attached juvenile-intake position in conjunction with a legitimate governmental reorganization. Therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to due process and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The warden at the prison where plaintiff worked suspended him pending discharge and recommended termination after concluding that plaintiff had sexually harassed a female subordinate and had lied about the matter. An independent state agency responsible for hiring and firing unionized employees then had 30 days to act on the recommendation. Instead of objecting, plaintiff resigned and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 2000e, claiming that the firing was because he is black. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff had no direct evidence of race discrimination and did not show that the stated reasons for termination were pretextual.

Plaintiff began working at an auto dealership finance department in 2006. Her son began working in the department days later, but both were terminated about three months later. They filed a complaint in federal court alleging a variety of federal and state claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the dealership. The employees appeal only their claim for unpaid wages under the Indiana Wage Payment Statute, Ind. Code 22-2-5-1, dealing with frequency of payment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs should have proceeded under the Wage Claims Statute, Ind. Code 22-2-9-1, which deals with claims by discharged employees.