Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff claimed that she regularly arrived at her employer's factory 15 to 45 minutes before the start of her 5:00 a.m. shift and spent about 5 minutes unlocking doors, turning on lights, turning on the compressor, punching in on the time clock, and preparing coffee. She spent 5 to 10 minutes reviewing schedules and gathering and distributing materials to subordinates' workstations, so that they could immediately start work. Any remaining time was spent preparing models for production, cleaning the work area, or checking patterns. She was not told to come in before her shift, nor did she request an early start time or report errors in her pay based on pre-shift work. There was some evidence that early arrivals at the factory were used for socializing. The district court held that she was not entitled to overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207(a). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The employer had no reason to know, or even suspect, plaintiff was acting in direct contradiction of a company policy that she herself was partially responsible for enforcing.

The McCaskill–Bond Amendment to the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. 42112, provides that "combination of multiple air carriers into a single air carrier" requires the combined business to merge seniority lists of employees. Republic acquired Midwest. Seniority lists for mechanics, baggage handlers, and administrative personnel have been integrated, but Republic furloughed flight attendants, requiring them to apply for "new" jobs; if they are rehired, the Teamsters Union, which represents flight attendants at Republic's older carriers, places them at the bottom of its seniority roster. The Union maintained its position, even after the National Mediation Board concluded that the flight attendants who worked for Midwest became part of a single bargaining unit at an integrated air transportation business. The district court held that Republic's abandonment of Midwest's federal air transportation certificate, and the return of its planes, meant that Republic had acquired some assets but not an "air carrier" and entered judgment in favor of the Teamsters. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, reasoning that Midwest was completely integrated into Republic.

Seven months after the bank recruited plaintiff to serve as a vice presidents, it fired her. She had no performance issues, no attendance problems, and no complaints against her. She had dinner with a member of the board of directors, who told her the fantasies he had about her. She declined his advances and complained to human resources. The board member resigned. Shortly after that, the bank's new president told its then-president that he heard plaintiff had done something that she should have been fired for. About two months after the new president assumed office, plaintiff was fired. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants on her retaliation claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A retaliatory discharge case must be tried unless defendant presents unrebutted evidence that it would have taken the adverse employment action against the plaintiff in any case.

Plaintiff was fired from his position as senior vice president and claimed that it was based on his actions in opposing actions by a mid-level supervisor that he claimed amounted to sexual and racial discrimination. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer on claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), and section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not present evidence challenging the veracity of the company's legitimate, performance-based concerns or evidence that those concerns were pretextual.

Plaintiff, an attorney, was fired from his job as an associate and filed suit, asserting defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. After the suit was dismissed and while a state appeal was pending, he brought claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1981 for discrimination on the basis of race and national origin, with a supplemental claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. The district court issued a stay based on the abstention doctrine, reasoning that the claims would be barred by res judicata once the state judgment became final. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. Abstention requires more than pendency of another lawsuit. Although claims for defamation and emotional distress center on negative performance evaluation, plaintiff's federal discrimination claims (he says) encompass a broader scope of alleged misconduct over a longer period of time, including unfavorable treatment regarding assignments, promotions, disciplinary measures, salary, and work conditions.

A part-time school custodian, suffering mental disability, applied for full-time positions and was rejected. His performance had been evaluated as unsatisfactory. He filed a charge with the EEOC. A few months later the employer again evaluated his performance and fired him. In a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The employee did not establish the elements of a valid discrimination and retaliation claim under the ADA: that he was meeting his employer' legitimate employment expectations, and was performing his job satisfactorily.

Plaintiffs, employed by the Department of Homeland Security, filed a six-count employment discrimination suit in 2007. After the district court granted a motion to dismiss two counts, DHS failed to answer the complaint, apparently due to an oversight. In 2009, court granted plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, (FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)). One of the plaintiffs was facing criminal charges and they wanted to wait for the resolution of that case. Nine months later, after expiration of the limitations period, plaintiffs moved to reinstate the case under FRCP 60(b). The court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A case dismissed under Rule 41(a) is generally treated as if it had never been filed. The district court retained jurisdiction, but did not abuse its discretion in denying the extraordinary relief of reinstatement simply because plaintiffs made a mistake.

Plaintiff began working as a correctional officer for DOC in 2006, assigned to duty that required walking. In 2007, she was reassigned to a control room and no longer required to walk. In 2007, plaintiff received a warning for excessive absenteeism and was switched to a different schedule. She never worked under the new schedule. She took leave under the Family Medical Leave Act and returned to the bettr schedule. After her return, she was in an automobile accident, but did not disclose physician's restrictions on activity until a 2008 hearing on her refusal of overtime. In early 2008, plaintiff used vacation time to visit her brother, who had been injured. When she returned, she had been reassigned to watch tour duty. She refused some duties, stating that she physically could not do the job and that it violated her medical restrictions. Her supervisor asked for her resignation. She was barred from entering and never returned to work. The district court entered summary judgment for the DOC on claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. 2601, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create a material issue of disputed fact under the indirect method of proof analysis.

The company terminated plaintiff's employment in 2008 because he failed to meet his sales quota. A suit for unpaid wages under Wisconsin's wage-claim statute, alternatively seeking recovery under equitable contract doctrines, was rejected and the district court denied leave to amend. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although plaintiff was an at-will employee, his commission-based compensation was the subject of an express contract, which, under Wisconsin law, precludes quasi-contractual relief. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend because the motion came unjustifiably late.

Returning to work after 12 weeks of FMLA leave (29 U.S.C. 2615) to receive treatment for gastroesophageal reflux, employee was assigned to a different position. He received the same pay and benefits, but considered the change a demotion. Weeks later, he took additional leave for esophageal surgery. A few months later, he took leave to undergo total esophagectomy. He never returned and was terminated. He alleged that the esophagectomy was necessary because a supervisor caused him to suffer stress, high blood pressure, and reflux, which exacerbated his pre-existing medical condition. Following a 2008 Seventh Circuit decision, employee waived all claims except for retaliation by way of harassment between his second and third leaves. The judge barred evidence of a causal connection between the medical conditions and employer's alleged misconduct and held that employee exhausted his FLMA leave during his first leave. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The cause of an injury is irrelevant under the FMLA, and, in any case, the employee exhausted his FMLA rights before the alleged misconduct. Another employee, who accepted a settlement on an FMLA retaliation claim, was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees that would be triggered by a judgment.